Problems of Communism

SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 1987

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Cover: Soviet First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev and his wife hosted by Egypt's Gamal Abdul-Nasser at a Cairo sports exhibition in May 1964. Photo by TASS from Sovfoto.

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IN THIS ISSUE OF

Problems of Communism

Articles

Patterns of Soviet Third World Policy

Francis Fukuyama

Mikhail Gorbachev's "new political thinking" is already being reflected in Soviet policy toward the Third World. In essence, this policy is merely the latest shift to the right in a pattern of alternating left/right swings in policy going back practically to the establishment of Soviet power. The right-wing emphasis consists of cultivating ties with geopolitically important states irrespective of their ideological coloration. Whether the Soviet Union will stay on this course depends largely on whether its economic restructuring will allow it to compete effectively with the West for economic and political influence in the newly industrializing countries.

Philippine Communism After Marcos

Gareth Porter

The precipitous fall of President Ferdinand Marcos and the emergence of the popular Corazon Aquino as leader of the Philippines has presented a serious dilemma for the insurgency of the Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army. Although the widespread network of guerrilla units and a broad range of mass organizations sympathetic to or run by the CPP/NPA still remain a formidable force, the party must fight the instincts of many of its followers who would prefer electoral competition to armed struggle.

China's *Nomenklatura* System

John P. Burns

The Chinese Communist Party is in the process of streamlining its *nomenklatura* system, arguably the major instrument for exercising party control over the personnel running contemporary China's political, economic, social, and cultural institutions. The 13th Party Congress in autumn 1987 endorsed plans to further reduce the number of jobs whose filling is directly supervised by party committees, but the proposed changes still leave the party in a dominant position. The article includes a translation of the "Job Title List of Cadres Managed by the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, 1984."

(Abstracts continued on reverse side)

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Notes

Soviet Arms Transfers to the Third World

Mark N. Kramer

Arms transfers have become the most salient Soviet means of currying favor with Third World governments, and in the last decade they have also served as an important source of hard-currency revenues for the USSR. The growing competitiveness of the world arms market and the resultant pressure to grant more concessionary sales terms or co-production arrangements means that the Soviet Union will face a growing dilemma between the pursuit of politico-military goals and of economic self-interest.

Books

Perspectives on Afghanistan

Anthony Arnold

Recent statements by high Soviet officials make it possible to expect a withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan—even though the Soviet-imposed regime in Kabul might topple. This raises the question of what postwar Afghanistan might be like. While one cannot minimize the problems of political bickering, reconstruction, and resettlement, recent detailed studies suggest that the fabric of Afghan society is durable, and its institutions viable. It is therefore by no means wishful thinking to expect that the various Afghan groupings will find the discipline to keep their country together and to make it governable, albeit not by communists.

Superpowers in the Middle East

Carol R. Saivetz

The extension of the Iran-Iraq war into the Persian Gulf through attacks on neutral oil shipping has seriously complicated the situation for the other Gulf States and created new dilemmas for both superpowers. Kuwait's requests for protection have made it very difficult for both superpowers to maintain balanced policies toward the two combatants. For the regional states, the prolongation of the war raises the specter of domestic instability.

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Patterns of Soviet Third World Policy

Francis Fukuyama

Now that Mikhail Gorbachev has been General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) for nearly three years, it is possible to make some judgments about the degree to which his policy toward the Third World differs from that of his predecessors, particularly Leonid Brezhnev. Gorbachev has frequently surprised Western observers by speaking in a very different way about the entire Soviet policy agenda. He has stated on numerous occasions that for him domestic policy has priority over foreign policy, and that to carry out his ambitious domestic reform program, he needs peace and the lowering of international tensions.[1] In the realm of foreign policy, he and his lieutenants have been proclaiming the need for "new political thinking" about problems of international security and global order. The "new political thinking" at this point consists of some concrete changes, notably in Soviet approaches to arms control, and a great deal of rhetoric about the mutuality of security, economic and environmental interdependence, the impermissibility of war in the nuclear era, and the like.[2] In a recent article that was presented as a letter to the Secretary General of the United Nations, Gorbachev touched upon all these themes:

Objective processes are leading to a situation in which our complex and diverse world is becoming increasingly interrelated and interdependent. It increasingly needs a mechanism that is able to responsibly discuss the world's common problems at a representative level and to be a place of joint search for a balance of the various and contradictory but real interests of today's community of states and nations.[3]

In view of this new rhetoric, has Soviet policy in the Third World changed? I would argue that Gorbachev does have a fairly well-defined Third World policy already in place, a policy whose theoretical justification has been developed systematically in the 1980's, and whose implementation is by now evident. The core of this policy is a shift to the "right" in the traditional language of communism: future initiatives are likely to be directed toward strengthening ties with geopolitically important Third World states, even if they are capitalist-oriented, rather than helping to power self-proclaimed Marxist-Leninist regimes, the "left" policy pursued in the 1970's under Leonid Brezhnev.

Yet, the Soviets will have to deal at the same time with the legacy of the late Brezhnev years, when Moscow made commitments to weak, troubled Marxist-Leninist states like Angola, Afghanistan, and Ethiopia. The shift in Soviet preferences with regard to clients has not thus far meant, and is not likely to mean, the abandonment of allies from the earlier generation; rather, the old list of friends will be overlaid with a new one. Overall Soviet policy in the Third World will therefore seem quite eclectic, with a broadening of Soviet ties to a heterogeneous collection of states around the globe. This type of shift or

[1]See, for example, his address to the International Peace Forum, February 16, 1987, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC—hereafter, *FBIS-SOV*), Feb. 17, 1987, pp. AA/15–26.

[2]For a characterization of the "new political thinking," see Charles Glickham, "New Directions for Soviet Foreign Policy," Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty (hereafter RFE-RL), *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin* (Munich), Supplement RL 2/86, Sept. 6, 1986.

[3]*Pravda* (Moscow), Sept. 17, 1987, excerpts trans. in *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (Columbus, OH), Oct. 21, 1987, pp. 16–18.

Francis Fukuyama is a Senior Staff member of the Rand Corporation. He has written extensively on USSR-Third World relations, focusing on the Middle East. His most recent study is Soviet Civil-Military Relations and the Power Projection Mission *(1987).* *This article is based on a presentation to a conference on national security organized in June 1987 by Harvard University's Center for International Affairs.*

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

Soviet and Afghan government forces on display during a military parade in Kabul.

—Abbas/Magnum.

tactical adjustment is nothing new in Soviet foreign policy, and in fact represents only the tenth and most recent period in an alternating cycle of left- and right-wing strategies pursued since 1917.

Periods of Soviet Foreign Policy

Samuel Huntington has recently written that Soviet policy in the Third World has gone through two phases or waves in the postwar period (corresponding to the tenures of Nikita Khrushchev and Brezhnev), interspersed with three periods of American assertiveness.[4] This periodization is correct as far as it goes, but in looking at the entire course of Soviet history, one finds that policy toward the colonial regions and later the Third World has in fact gone through ten shifts, of which Gorbachev's turn to the right is only the most recent.

The defining feature of Soviet policy has been an alternation between what have come to be known as "left-wing" and "right-wing" strategies.[5] The distinction between left and right revolves around the issue of the appropriate choice of allies in the quest for communist power or Soviet influence. In left-wing periods, communist parties have tended to eschew alliances of any sort, concentrating instead on maintaining their internal orthodoxy and discipline. Right-wing periods, by contrast, have been ones of broad alliance between communist parties and other sympathetic noncommunist groups. In the case of the colonial/Third World, these have been local "bourgeois" nationalists, national liberation movements, and other "anti-imperialist" groups.

The issue of allying with local nationalist elites has been a subject of contention in Soviet and world communist circles practically since the Bolsheviks came to power in 1917. It was raised explicitly at the Second Comintern Congress in 1920 when a young Indian Marxist, Manabendra Nath Roy, criticized Lenin's draft

[4]Samuel Huntington, "Patterns of Intervention," *The National Interest* (Washington, DC), No. 7, Spring 1987.

[5]For a description of the left-right dichotomy, see Marshal D. Shulman, *Stalin's Foreign Policy Reappraised*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1963, pp. 4–7.

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Table 1: Ten Periods of Soviet Third World Policy

	Dates	Orientation	Characterization
1.	1917–1921	left	War Communism
2.	1921–1928	right	New Economic Policy (NEP)
3.	1928–1935	left	"Third Period"
4.	1935–1939	right	Popular Front
5.	1939–1941	left	Nazi-Soviet Pact
6.	1941–1947	right	Wartime alliance
7.	1947–1952	left	Zhdanovshchina
8.	1954–1964	right	Khrushchev's opening to "bourgeois nationalists"
8a.	1964–1972	right	Moribund Khrushchevism
9.	1973–1982	left	Support for Marxist-Leninist vanguard parties
10.	1982–	right	Andropov-Gorbachev policy

theses on the national and colonial question.[6] Roy argued that Lenin's general endorsement of national liberation movements led by the middle class in the colonial world would serve only to establish capitalism in these areas and would ultimately lead to a betrayal of communists and the revolution. Roy stated that such groups as the Chinese Kuomintang and the Indian National Congress were inherently untrustworthy and should not be seen as vehicles to advance the interests of world communism.

This tactical debate has never been fully resolved. Indeed, the whole of Soviet foreign policy from 1917 to the present can be seen as an alternation between left- and right-wing policies (see Table 1). Although the labels for many of these periods are drawn from Soviet domestic politics, they correspond to distinctive phases of policy toward the developing world as well. The years immediately following the October Revolution were ones of revolutionary enthusiasm, when Bolshevik leaders hoped for the immediate establishment of communism in Europe, and particularly in defeated Germany. The Bolsheviks sought to undermine the almost universally hostile capitalist states of the West (particularly Great Britain) by promoting colonial revolutions. They staged a Congress of the Peoples of the East in Baku in 1920,[7] creating an infrastructure within the Comintern to control the newly-established communist parties in countries like China and Indonesia, and even organizing an army in Tashkent to invade northern India.[8]

This initial left-wing period, when hopes for instability in the capitalist world and imminent communist revolutions were high, was followed by three more left phases prior to Stalin's death in 1953. During the so-called Third Period from the Sixth Comintern Congress in mid-1928 through the beginning of the Popular Front period in 1935, the Comintern advised local parties to jettison bourgeois nationalist allies in favor of a go-it-alone insurrectionary policy that led to abortive uprisings in China, Indochina, and Brazil. In the brief interlude when the Nazi-Soviet Pact was in effect, from 1939 to 1941, communists in the developing world adopted obstructionist tactics to impede the war efforts of their West European colonial masters.[9] Finally, there was the left period associated with the name of Andrey Zhdanov, dating from the founding of the Cominform in September 1947 and lasting approximately to the 19th CPSU Congress in November 1952.[10] With the onset of the cold war, Third World communist parties once again broke with their bourgeois nationalist allies. Acting without broad support, the parties in Indonesia, Malaya, the Philippines, Burma, and India launched bids for power and failed, while the Chinese communists came to power, and the North Koreans invaded the South.

These left-wing periods were interspersed with three right-wing ones in which the Soviets put off hopes for the immediate revolutionary seizure of power by local communist parties and adopted a longer-term strategy of building influence through the cultivation of alliances with noncommunists. The first of these periods of retrenchment is dated in conventional histories on the Comintern from 1924 (after the failure of the uprisings in Germany during the Ruhr crisis), although it actually began in 1921 with the signing of the Anglo-Soviet trade agreement—Moscow's first effort at détente with the West.[11] The Comintern ordered its affiliated parties to

[6]A complete transcript of this debate is contained in *2-oy kongress Kommunisticheskogo Internatsionala. Iyul'-Avgust 1921g. Stenograficheskiy otchët* (The Second Congress of the Communist International, July-August 1921), Petrograd, Izdatel'stvo Kommunisticheskogo Internatsionala, 1921, fourth session.

[7]A transcript of the proceedings of the Baku Congress is given in *Pervyy S"yezd Narodov Vostoka. Baku, 1–8 Sentyabr 1920 g.* (First Congress of the Peoples of the East, Baku, September 1–8, 1920), Petrograd, Izdatel'stvo Kommunisticheskogo Internatsionala, 1920. See also Xenia Eudin and Robert North, Eds., *Soviet Russia and the East, 1920–27*, Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1957.

[8]This is described in M. N. Roy's *Memoirs*, Bombay, Allied Publishers, 1964, pp. 470–74.

[9]Given Moscow's alliance with Nazi Germany at the time, it may seem odd to characterize this period as a left-wing one. Nonetheless, apart from China, the Comintern ordered local communist parties in the colonies of the European powers to follow an insurrectionary left-wing strategy of hostility both to the colonial powers and to potential local social democratic or nationalist partners.

[10]Strictly speaking, the end of the so-called Zhdanovshchina came much earlier, shortly after Zhdanov's death in August 1948. I date the end of the left-wing period traditionally associated with it not to Stalin's death, but to the 19th CPSU congress, when a new policy was formally announced.

[11]On the first period of détente, see Richard Ullman, *The Anglo-Soviet Accord*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1972; and W. P. and Z. K. Coates, *A History of Anglo-Soviet Relations*, London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1944.

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form united fronts with the major bourgeois nationalist groups of the day—such as the Chinese Kuomintang, the Indian National Congress, the Sarekat Islam in Indonesia, and the Wafd in Egypt. Later right-wing shifts tended to occur at times when Moscow wanted good relations with the West, and involved the formation of broad alliances with noncommunist groups, as in the Popular Front period in the mid-1930's or when the wartime alliance with the United States and Britain was in effect, 1941–45.[12]

Though this periodization of Soviet foreign policy through 1953 is relatively conventional, fitting the post-Stalin years into the traditional left-right framework may seem strange to many. Nonetheless, these categories are still useful for understanding Soviet foreign policy, at least its policy toward the Third World. Khrushchev and Brezhnev did not use Stalinist terms like "right-wing opportunist," "united front from below," or "class against class," but the issue of whether and how closely to ally with bourgeois nationalists, socialists, and other sympathetic anti-imperialist groups has been and remains to this day a very live and open question. The old Lenin-Roy debate is still being carried on today in a somewhat, but not totally, different vocabulary.

Khrushchev, for example, dramatically expanded Soviet influence in the Third World by adopting what was essentially a right-wing policy of support for "bourgeois nationalist" regimes. Nasser's Egypt, Nehru's India, and Sukarno's Indonesia, the very states that Moscow had spurned as "imperialist lackeys" in the left-wing period after September 1947,[13] figured prominently in his foreign policy initiatives. Like Lenin, who was willing to write off the fledgling Turkish Communist Party in the early 1920's for the sake of smooth relations with Kemal's Turkey, Khrushchev maintained alliances with Nasser of Egypt and Qassem of Iraq even while these leaders were persecuting local communists.[14] The choice for the Soviets was a familiar one: the right-wing policy brought broadly-based Soviet political influence, but at the cost of a significant dilution of local communist strength. Moscow's influence in the Third World grew impressively during this period, but Khrushchev's policies also led to the undertaking of large and poorly thought-out commitments to such countries as Cuba and Egypt.

The period between Khrushchev's ouster in 1964 and the late Brezhnev years—labeled 8a in the table—is difficult to define in left/right categories. Soviet policy was a mixture of caution with regard to revolutionary expectations, and hard-nosed assertion of military power as seen in the Soviet navy's ever broadening deployments and the dispatch of 20,000 air defense troops to Egypt in 1970. This period might be considered one of "moribund Khrushchevism," that is, one of continuing support for bourgeois nationalists but without Khrushchev's enthusiasm for the project.

In one sense, all Soviet policy since Stalin has been "right-wing," because it has all but abandoned the orthodox but generally weak communist parties, and worked instead almost entirely with "revolutionary democrats." Nevertheless, it can be argued that by the mid-1970's, Soviet policy had moved leftward relative to the Khrushchev era. The exact dating of this turn is more difficult to specify since the break with past policy was not nearly as trenchant as under Stalin: even in his "left-wing" period, Brezhnev continued to support traditional nationalist clients like India, Syria, and Algeria. However, Brezhnev's policy distinctly emphasized support for self-proclaimed Marxist-Leninist national liberation movements or regimes, and made efforts to help them evolve into formal Marxist-Leninist vanguard parties. This shifted the center of gravity of support away from the nationalist governments to the Marxist-Leninist regimes. The same rationale that had motivated earlier Soviet shifts from right to left also motivated Brezhnev. Alliances with the bourgeois nationalists in the 1960's and early 1970's had been disappointing because, from the Soviet perspective, they proved unreliable and insufficiently anti-imperialist. Moscow therefore turned to groups that were, if not necessarily orthodox communist, at least more ideologically sympathetic.

We are currently in a tenth period of Soviet policy, characterized by a classical shift to the right as seen in Moscow's cultivation of large, geopolitically important Third World countries. As did Lenin in the early 1920's, Stalin during the Popular Front period, and Khrushchev in the 1950's, the new Gorbachev leadership has come to recognize that political power lies not with narrowly based Marxist-Leninist groups in the Third World, but with powerful nationalist states such as Mexico, India, and Argentina. Thus, the best strategy for expanding Soviet influence in the world may be the "opportunist" one of allying with the existing national governments, irrespective of their ideological coloration.

[12]It should be noted, however, that right-wing periods are generally more propitious for promoting Soviet interests and influence, and hence no less threatening for Moscow's Western opponents.

[13]Actually, the shift to a right-wing strategy that is frequently associated with Khrushchev began before Stalin's death. With respect to the Third World, Stalin is frequently and inaccurately associated with the sectarian left-wing policy adopted between 1947 and 1952. As should be clear from Table I, his rule encompassed several shifts between left and right.

[14]On Khrushchev's tribulations with bourgeois nationalist clients in the Mideast, see Oles Smolansky, *The Soviet Union and the Arab East Under Khrushchev*, Lewisburg, PA, Bucknell University Press, 1974.

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Theoretical Background

The Gorbachev shift in policy must therefore be viewed against the background of the Brezhnev policies and the Soviet reassessment of them.[15] Soviet activism in the Third World in the mid-1970's rested on the belief that Moscow could secure and protect its influence in the Third World by espousing the cause of Marxist-Leninist regimes, helping them to form vanguard parties, and thereby institutionalizing, so to speak, those states' good relations with Moscow. This "second generation" of clients would, the Brezhnev leadership hoped, be less preoccupied with their own nationalist agendas and more willing to collaborate with Moscow than were the "first generation" of postcolonial leaders in the 1950's and 1960's. At the same time, it was hoped that the new clients would become less vulnerable to coups and other political setbacks. In contrast to the arms-length policies pursued in the 1950's and 1960's, the Soviets worked actively together with their Cuban and East German allies in the late Brezhnev years to restructure the internal political systems of countries like South Yemen, Afghanistan, and Ethiopia along orthodox communist lines.[16]

However, the project of exporting Soviet political and economic structures to the Third World did not work out well. By the early 1980's, there was a general recognition in the Soviet theoretical literature that earlier hopes for strong clients and lasting influence resulting from the promotion of Marxist-Leninist vanguard party-states were not being realized. Though the new generation of Marxist-Leninist allies willingly cooperated with Moscow both politically and militarily, they themselves were not doing well. They tended to be economically backward, even by Third World standards, and this condition was made worse by the "premature" introduction of such socialist "measures" as collectivization of agriculture and wholesale nationalization of foreign property. Due to their small domestic political base and ideological narrowness, many of these regimes were perceived as illegitimate by sizable segments of their own populations; several, including those in Angola, Mozambique, Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Nicaragua, faced internal guerrilla insurgencies. Rather than having the need for Soviet military and economic assistance taper off when the Marxist-Leninist regimes came to power, in many cases the need for assistance grew substantially over time, to the point of making the Soviet Third World "empire" a non-negligible drain on Soviet resources.

Even though disillusionment with the Marxist-Leninist vanguard party-state became more or less universal among Soviet specialists on the Third World by the mid-1980's, few suggested alternatives to this policy. An important exception was Karen Brutents, a deputy head of the CPSU Central Committee's International Department since the mid-1970's. Initially responsible for the Middle East and Latin America, Brutents has probably held the portfolio for the rest of the Third Word as well since the retirement of Rostislav Ul'yanovskiy. Brutents differed from many of his colleagues in never manifesting particular enthusiasm for Marxist-Leninist vanguard parties. Throughout his academic career, he was consistently skeptical about the possibility of building genuinely socialist institutions in backward countries.[17] In a series of articles written in the early 1980's, Brutents argued in favor of shifting Soviet emphasis away from countries that are ideologically correct but small and weak to geopolitically important Third World nations with "objective" anti-imperialist potential, including those that are capitalist-oriented. Even before Brezhnev's death, Brutents pointed out "the solid base for the Soviet Union's growing cooperation with those liberated countries where capitalist relations are developing but which pursue a policy of defending and strengthening national sovereignty in politics and economics."[18] He noted the Soviet Union's growing links with non-Marxist-Leninist countries like India, Brazil, and Mexico, and suggested that it was they and not the socialist oriented Ethiopias, Afghanistans, and Angolas which ought to be the focus of Soviet attention.[19] In 1984, he further amplified this thesis. Pointing to the existence of significant contradictions between many capitalist-oriented Third World states and the West, he observed: "As long as it does not reach the monopolistic stage, even the development of capitalist relations in the liberated countries does not nullify [these contradictions] and does not directly contribute to consolidating the positions of imperialism . . . ."[20]

[15] I have described both the policy of the late Brezhnev period and its subsequent reappraisal in *Moscow's Post-Brezhnev Reassessment of the Third World,* Santa Monica, CA, The Rand Corporation, R-3337-USDP, 1986, and in "The Rise and Fall of the Marxist-Leninist Vanguard Party," *Survey* (London), Summer 1985.

[16] F. Fukuyama, "The New Marxist-Leninist States and Internal Conflict in the Third World," in Uri Ra'anan et al., *Third World Marxist-Leninist Regimes: Strengths, Vulnerabilities and US Policy,* Washington, DC, Pergamon-Brassey's, 1985,, pp. 18–44.

[17] See, for example, "The Age of Socialism and the National Liberation of Peoples," *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 18, December 1967, p. 96, and "Ruling Revolutionary Democracy: Some Aspects of Practical Activity," *MEMO* (Moscow), Part 2, December 1972, p. 125. I am grateful to Scott Bruckner for many insights on Karen Brutents.

[18] "The Soviet Union and the Liberated Countries: Questions of Theory," *Pravda,* Feb. 2, 1982.

[19] Ibid.

[20] "The Liberated Countries at the Beginning of the 1980's," *Kommunist,* No. 3, February 1984.

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Although Brutents's views were not in vogue in the late Brezhnev years, his ideas have found a better reception under Gorbachev. The International Department, which succeeded the Comintern as the organization for promoting the world revolutionary process, has traditionally been a home for hard-liners. Such figures as Boris Ponomarev and Ul'yanovskiy were quite sympathetic in the 1970's to a policy of promoting Marxist-Leninist vanguard parties—and relatively insensitive to the effects of such a policy on US-Soviet relations.[21] But Ponomarev, who was an official of the Comintern until its dissolution in 1943 and became head of the International Department soon after its creation, finally retired in February 1986. Later that year, the other deputy responsible for Third World affairs, Ul'yanovskiy (whose career also started in the Comintern in the 1930's) retired. Ponomarev was replaced by Anatoliy Dobrynin, the former ambassador to the United States and a career foreign ministry official whose background and life experience have been very different from his predecessor's.

Another Soviet official who has written about the importance of the non–Marxist-Leninist Third World has been Aleksandr Yakovlev. Yakovlev, who was head of the Institute of the World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), was promoted by Gorbachev in 1985 to the Propaganda Department in the Secretariat of the CPSU Central Committee. He was made a candidate member of the Politburo at the January 1987 Central Committee plenum and a full member at the June 1987 plenum. He is reportedly one of Gorbachev's closest advisers and the party secretary with main responsibility for implementing the policy of *glasnost'*.[22]

Gorbachev's foreign policy initiatives reflect Yakovlev's thinking in many ways. The latter's interest in the major states of the Third World evolved while at IMEMO, which concerns itself with the overall strategy of Soviet foreign policy. IMEMO has argued that there are numerous intercapitalist contradictions of which the Soviet Union can take advantage. Rather than focusing narrowly on US-Soviet relations, as was often done while Andrey Gromyko was foreign minister, Yakovlev has suggested a multipolar strategy through which the Soviet Union could broaden its range of contacts and cultivate important capitalist allies of the United States in Western Europe and Asia. During Gorbachev's first two years as General Secretary, there has in fact been considerable diplomatic engagement with states like France and West Germany, and Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze has visited Tokyo, something not done by Gromyko since the mid-1970's. The Soviet Union has also launched several initiatives aimed at improving Sino-Soviet relations, among them Gorbachev's major address on Asian security delivered in Vladivostok in July 1986.[23]



Aleksandr Yakovlev, member of the Politburo and Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, a major advocate of a right-wing line in contemporary Soviet foreign policy.

—Peter Turnley/Black Star.

Yakovlev's general thinking led him to espouse the same policy toward the Third World as does Brutents. In a recent article, Yakovlev stated:

Among the consequences engendered by the operation of the law of unevenness in our age is the appearance of sufficiently strong young national capitalist states—the "newly industrializing countries"—which are at the same time both the object and agent of economic expansion. They—for instance, Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico—have their own monopolistic groups, in certain cases capable of entering the struggle

[21]This is well documented by Arkady Shevchenko in *Breaking with Moscow*, New York, Knopf, 1985.

[22]For more on Yakovlev's background, see Alexander Rahr, "Soviet Propaganda Chief's Unexplained Absence," RFE-RL, *Radio Liberty Research* (Munich), RL 447/86, Dec. 2, 1986; and Julia Wishnevsky, "Aleksandr Yakovlev and the Cultural Thaw," RFE-RL, *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 51/87, Feb. 5, 1987.

[23]See Hiroshi Kimura, "Soviet Focus on the Pacific," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), May-June 1987, p. 5.

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against the "old" industrial empires . . . . One must suppose that in the historically foreseeable future, the centrifugal trend—toward the growth of interimperialist contradictions and the further splintering of the centripetal capitalist world of the postwar decades—will actively resist the centripetal forces.[24]

Yakovlev and Brutents in effect favor a return to a Khrushchev-like policy of cultivating ties with important Third World states and de-emphasizing implicitly support for states ruled by Marxist-Leninist vanguard parties.

The approach received official sanction in the new party program adopted at the 27th CPSU Congress in February 1986. The program states:

The practice of the USSR's relations with the liberated countries has shown that there are also real grounds for cooperation with young states that are traveling the capitalist road. These grounds include a common interest in the preservation of peace, the strengthening of international security, and the termination of the arms race. They include the sharpening contradiction between the interests of the peoples and the imperialist policy of diktat *and expansion. They include the understanding by the young states of the fact that political and economic ties with the Soviet Union facilitate the strengthening of their independence.*[25]

Clearly, therefore, the Soviet Union ought to be neither inattentive to the Third World nor accommodating to American and Western interests; rather, it should anticipate and take advantage of the "contradictions" between the West and the newly industrializing countries. Interestingly, the party program devotes only one brief paragraph to the socialist-oriented countries[26]—the very same self-proclaimed Marxist-Leninist regimes that had been ritualistically celebrated in earlier pronouncements by Leonid Brezhnev.

Implementation of the New Line

Moscow's new emphasis on large, geopolitically important states appears therefore to be a carefully thought-out policy direction and certainly one of the most clearly heralded. By now, the practical implications of the policy are evident in a variety of regions around the world, nowhere more so than in India. India, of course, has been favored by the Soviets since the mid-1950's, but under Gorbachev, India has received by far the greatest amount of Soviet attention; it was the only country of the Third World, besides Afghanistan, to be specifically referred to in Gorbachev's address to the 27th party congress in 1986.[27] Rajiv Gandhi visited Moscow in May 1985 as one of Gorbachev's first foreign guests, and Gorbachev returned the visit in late November 1986; this visit was his first to a Third World or Asian country.[28] Gorbachev clearly views India as the centerpiece of his policy toward the developing world. In his address to the Indian parliament, he said:

To me personally, it is quite obvious that much of what we call new political thinking manifested itself internationally for the first time in relations between the Soviet Union and India. And the fact that differences of sociopolitical system and ideology and our national, cultural, and other distinctions have not hampered our dialogue is extremely important as a guiding example for others.[29]

Since the visit, Soviet leaders speaking in other Third World countries have repeatedly referred to Soviet-Indian relations as a kind of "model" for Moscow's ties with developing countries.

In the course of these meetings, the Soviet Union and India agreed to a series of wide-ranging economic and military interactions, including Soviet credits equivalent to US$1.4 billion in May 1985, a four-year trade agreement in November 1985 and another one in November 1986, and an agreement announced in July 1986 under which India would manufacture MiG–29 aircraft.[30] This is not to suggest that the Soviet-Indian alliance has been without problems. The Soviets have had a difficult time balancing their bilateral trade with India, in view of declining Indian demand for Soviet machinery and the drop in world oil prices that began in the mid-1980's.[31]

[24]Aleksandr Yakovlev, "Interimperialist Contradictions—The Contemporary Context," *Kommunist*, No. 16, November 1986, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Dec. 12, 1986, Annex, p. 7.

[25]"The Communist Party Program and Party Statutes, Final Versions," *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Special Supplement, December 1986.

[26]Gorbachev's address to the 27th party congress in February 1986 does not contain a separate section on the Third World and makes scarcely any mention of individual Third World countries, except for Afghanistan which is spoken of as a "running sore." *FBIS-SOV*, Feb. 26, 1986, p. 31

[27]This was a reference to the Indo-Soviet summit meeting. See *FBIS-SOV*, Feb. 26, 1986, p. O/30, and Alvin Z. Rubinstein, "A Third World Policy Waits for Gorbachev," *Orbis* (Philadelphia), Summer 1986, p. 357.

[28]This was actually the fourth meeting between Gandhi and Gorbachev. See Jyotirmoy Banerjee, "Moscow's Indian Alliance," *Problems of Communism*, January-February 1987, p. 1.

[29]*FBIS-SOV*, Nov. 28, 1986, p. D/6.

[30]The 1985 agreement was to have doubled Soviet-Indian trade in 1986, but these expectations were not realized, due to drops in the prices of oil and tea. See Bohdan Nahaylo, "Gorbachev's Asian Debut: The Visit to India," RFE-RL, *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 440/86, Nov. 21, 1986, p.4.

[31]Dilip Mukerjee, "Indo-Soviet Economic Ties," *Problems of Communism*, January-February 1987, p. 21.

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Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev greets Mexican Foreign Minister Bernardo Sepulveda Amor in the Kremlin on May 6, 1987.

—Sovfoto.

But the Soviet Union has remained the largest customer for Indian exports while India is one of the biggest buyers of Soviet arms.[32]

India is not the only Third World country on Gorbachev's agenda. In October 1986, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze visited Mexico City. Shortly thereafter, the Soviets announced plans for the General Secretary to visit Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay, the very countries cited by Brutents and Yakovlev as targets for Soviet diplomacy, sometime in 1987.[33] The Mexican Foreign Minister Bernado Sepulveda Amor was given a lavish reception in Moscow in early May 1987. He was received by Gorbachev personally, even as the Libyan foreign minister was allowed to pass through Moscow with relatively little fanfare.[34] The Mexicans have endorsed various Soviet international positions on Central America and on the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Although Gorbachev's visit to South America was delayed by other more pressing matters, Shevardnadze, in late September 1987 journeyed to Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay.[35]

Evidence abounds of heightened Soviet interest during the past three years in the capitalist-oriented parts of the Third World. The area in which the Soviet Union has undertaken the most visible initiatives is the Middle East. Moscow established diplomatic relations with Oman and the United Arab Emirates in September and November 1985 respectively. Although the process of normalizing ties with the conservative states of the Persian Gulf was set back temporarily by the January 1986 civil war in South Yemen, the Saudi oil minister visited Moscow in early 1987, and rumors persist that the establishment of Soviet-Saudi diplomatic relations is imminent.[36] In March, Moscow promptly rescheduled a large tranche of debt to Egypt which was to come due later in the year, inviting comparisons between Soviet generosity and the behavior of Egypt's Western creditors like the United States and the International Monetary Fund, which have pressed Egypt for various internal reforms. The Soviet Union has been edging closer to reopening ties with the predominant military power in the Middle East, Israel, as well. The first official contact was made in Helsinki in August 1986. In April 1987, Gorbachev made the pointed assertion in a dinner for Syrian President Hafez al-Assad that the absence of diplomatic relations between Israel and the USSR "cannot be considered normal," and a Soviet consular delegation arrived in Jerusalem in July.[37]

Moscow's most remarkable initiative, however, came in the Persian Gulf in the summer of 1987. The Soviets promptly responded to Kuwait's request to protect its tankers threatened by Iran in May 1987 by agreeing to permit Kuwait to charter three Soviet-flagged tankers to transport its oil. But Soviet diplomacy was low-key and nonconfrontational, and sought to maintain its balance between Iran and Iraq.[38] Moscow was also able to capitalize on the American heavy-handed response to the Gulf situation which included tilting fairly openly toward Iraq and sending a large naval task force into the Gulf in answer to a parallel request from Kuwait for protection of its tankers. While continuing to support Iraq with weapons and voting in favor of UN Security Council Resolution 598 urging a ceasefire in the tanker war, the Soviets

[32]Ibid., p. 20.

[33]Robert S. Greenberger, "Reagan Administration Gets Nervous as Soviet Union Woos Latin America," *The Wall Street Journal* (New York), Nov. 17, 1986.

[34]See Bill Keller, "Soviet, In a Shift, Expands Contact with Third World," *The New York Times*, May 25, 1987. See also interview with Sepulveda in *Izvestiya* (Moscow), May 22, 1987.

[35]William R. Long, "Shevardnadze to Begin Trip to South America," *Los Angeles Times*, Sept. 26, 1987, p. 4.

[36]Stephen Page, "Patterns of Soviet Activity in Southwest Asia," *International Journal* (Toronto) Spring 1986, p. 321.

[37]See Galia Golan, "Gorbachev's Middle East Strategy," *Foreign Affairs* (New York), Fall 1987, p. 41.

[38]When one of the chartered Soviet ships, the *Ivan Koroteyev*, was attacked by Iranian forces, the Soviets were extremely mild in their response. The Soviets increased the size of their naval task force in the Gulf over the summer to one destroyer, three minesweepers, and a supply ship, still a much smaller and less threatening force than the 40-plus ships sent by the United States.

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kept their bridges open to Tehran by not supporting a second resolution, mandating sanctions against Iran. The Iranians, not wanting to be isolated from both superpowers simultaneously, invited Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Yuliy Vorontsov to Tehran in June, August, and October. In the course of these visits, the two sides discussed a number of economic projects including a new oil pipeline and a railroad link with the USSR.[39] Moscow was thus not only able to meet the Kuwaiti request for reflagging, but to use the opening as leverage to actually *improve* relations with Tehran at the same time. Should Iran and Iraq for their own reasons decide to settle the conflict, Moscow will be in a very good position to play the role of mediator.[40]

The USSR has also been very active in building bridges to members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), despite Soviet commitments to Vietnam. There has been an upsurge in bilateral visits between Soviet officials and their counterparts in Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand. Indonesia's economics minister Ali Wardhana visited Moscow in October 1984; in July 1985, Anatoliy Zaytsev, in charge of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Southeast Asia bureau, headed the first of several Soviet delegations that have visited Bangkok; and Yakov Ryabov, a deputy prime minister, visited Kuala Lumpur in November 1985. The Soviets have been expanding economic ties and have tried to capitalize on the ASEAN trade disputes with the United States and on fears of the People's Republic of China.[41] In early March 1987, Shevardnadze made a visit to Australia and Indonesia, and the foreign ministers of Thailand and Malaysia were hosted at the Kremlin later in the year.

In contrast, Moscow's treatment of some of the Third World communist states has been less diplomatic. For example, the speech given by Yegor Ligachev at the 6th Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam in Hanoi can only be described as brutally frank. This party congress, held in December 1986, was marked by a remarkable degree of self-criticism on the part of the Vietnamese themselves; nonetheless, Ligachev said that the Vietnamese party:

. . . is concentrating the attention of communists on existing problems, boldly revealing the miscalculations that have been committed, and restructuring its organizational and cadre work in accordance with the requirements of transformations in the socioeconomic sphere. All its activity is taking place in an atmosphere of responsible criticism and self-criticism and of observance of the principle of looking the truth in the face. This is characteristic of a truly Marxist-Leninist party. V. I. Lenin used to say that "the party of the revolutionary proletariat which is strong enough to criticize itself openly can call error and weakness by their names without beating around the bush."[42]



A Soviet minesweeper and surveillance ship (No. 502) *photographed in the Gulf of Oman on August 3, 1987.*

—Derek Hudson/Sygma.

There have been considerable recriminations between Moscow and Hanoi in recent years over the latter's mismanagement of the Vietnamese economy and the squandering of the annual Soviet subsidy valued at US$1–2 billion. However, the Soviets have not cut their subsidy but have raised it by approximately 50 percent over the next five years.[43] Nonetheless, the Soviets are

[39]See, e.g., Daniel Abele, "Recent Soviet Moves in the Persian Gulf," RFE-RL, *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 307/87, Aug. 10, 1987.

[40]Whether the Soviets can continue to balance between the two belligerents is much more problematic. Earlier attempts to straddle bilateral conflicts, e.g., during the Nasser-Qassem rivalry in the late 1950's, or during the Ogaden war between Ethiopia and Somalia in the late 1970's, ended in failure.

[41]See Donald Zagoria, "Soviet-American Rivalry in Asia," in Andrzej Korbonski and Francis Fukuyama, Eds., *The Soviet Union and the Third World: The Last Three Decades*, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1987, pp. 261–62.

[42]*FBIS-SOV*, Dec. 17, 1986, p. E/5. A *Pravda* editorial following Ligachev's return stated that "the Sixth VCP Congress concentrated mainly on the tasks it still has to resolve. The Political Report . . . devoted the most serious attention to disclosing and rectifying errors permitted in the past and to eliminating the phenomena of stagnation that have prevented the party and the country from making more rapid progress and that have particularly serious consequences in the socioeconomic sphere." *FBIS-SOV*, Dec. 30, 1986, p. E/1.

[43]Kimura, loc. cit., p. 5.

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clearly unhappy with the performance of the Vietnamese economy and the costs of aiding it.

A comparison of India and Vietnam is instructive when trying to understand the motives for Moscow's right-wing shift, because the two are in many ways respectively prototypes of the "bourgeois nationalist" and the Marxist-Leninist state. Moscow's interest in Vietnam is obvious: the latter has provided concrete payoffs in the form of basing rights at Danang and Cam Ranh Bay, and serves as an ally and counterweight to the People's Republic of China. Vietnam is, moreover, officially classified as a "socialist" country by the Soviets, and therefore of special ideological significance; it and Cuba are the only two Third World countries that are full members of the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance.

The benefits offered by India are much less tangible. India has consistently refused basing rights to Moscow and is almost certain to do so for the foreseeable future. Although non-aligned and reasonably anti-Chinese, India has proven over the years to be fully independent of Moscow in its political and economic dealings with the outside world. Nonetheless, for the Soviet Union, India has advantages over Vietnam in several respects. First, bilateral Soviet-Indian trade is quite considerable and does not represent a disguised Soviet subsidy like Moscow's trade with many Marxist-Leninist countries, including Vietnam. In return for military technology and industrial machinery the USSR imports substantial quantities of Indian textiles and consumer goods.[44]

Second, India is highly influential in the Non-Aligned Movement. While Vietnam has totally isolated itself from ASEAN and the rest of Asia by its militaristic policies in Cambodia and elsewhere, India remains in very good standing with most of the Third World.

Third, there is tremendous stability to the Soviet-Indian relationship. Moscow's ties with New Delhi have lasted now for well over 30 years. Moscow can be confident that the Indian government is unlikely to be overthrown by a coup or displaced by a guerrilla movement.

Fourth, India can be relied upon to take the Soviet side on numerous East-West issues, including the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and arms control, and to exercise a certain moral suasion supportive of Soviet positions in such forums as the United Nations. Vietnam, of course, takes pro-Soviet positions as well, but carries very little weight in the international community. India, moreover, can be anti-American and anti-Chinese without embroiling Moscow in dangerous conflicts with either of those powers.

Rajiv Gandhi and Mikhail Gorbachev at a November 28, 1986 press conference in New Delhi.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

Finally, there are specific political issues on which Moscow hopes to gain Indian good will, particularly Afghanistan and Cambodia. It is important to bear in mind that India is in a position to help the Soviets solve problems; it is not a source of problems as the Marxist-Leninist regimes of Vietnam or Afghanistan are.

Although Soviet-Indian relations are by far the best-developed, Moscow can hope to achieve similar relationships by cultivating better ties with Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina. Bilateral trade with Argentina is already substantial (though largely one-way).[45] Moreover, Moscow can hope to develop its influential friends among these large Latin American countries without having to subsidize yet another faltering economy or risk a confrontation with the United States.

It should be noted that the Soviet emphasis on big Third World states should not be regarded as evidence of a passive Soviet policy. The policy envisioned by Brutents and Yakovlev is in fact a very active one that seeks to build new and, in some instances, stronger ties with states that have grievances against the United States and the West—indeed, to play upon those grievances and to exacerbate them where possible. At the same time, the nature of Moscow's relationships with these countries will tend to be political and economic rather

[44]It is true that India receives below-market interest rate credits to finance its purchases of Soviet military equipment. But Indian imports of Soviet weaponry (which do not show up in published trade statistics) are offset by the persistent Indian current account surplus, leading to an overall equilibrium in the balance of payments. See Murkerjee, loc. cit., p. 24.

[45]For a fuller account of Soviet-Argentine trade, see Aldo Cesar Vacs, "Soviet Policy Toward Argentina and the Southern Cone," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political Science* (Berkeley, CA), September 1985, pp. 159–71.

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than military. The Soviets will make greater efforts to line up these influential developing states behind Soviet positions, and expand bilateral economic links, particularly in raw materials and intermediate technologies.

The new Soviet policy at this point consists largely of statements of purpose and of a series of accomplished or planned visits by Soviet officials. Nonetheless, the level of Soviet diplomatic activity during the thirty-plus months of the Gorbachev administration is impressive and suggests that further, more dramatic initiatives can be expected.

The Old Agenda

Moscow's new initiatives have not canceled its commitments to the clients acquired in the Brezhnev years, including the self-proclaimed Marxist-Leninist states. Although these commitments may seem onerous as Soviet economic managers start casting about for investment funds, they are hardly heavy enough to justify taking the political risk of outright retreat in countries where Moscow has become significantly involved. Thus, the old agenda is still very much a part of Soviet Third World policy, and Moscow dedicates ever-increasing sums of money to established clients. As noted above, despite Ligachev's criticism of Vietnamese management, the Soviet Union increased its subsidy to Hanoi. Syria reportedly had its approximately $15 billion debt rescheduled during a visit by Hafez al-Assad to Moscow in April 1987, in addition to receiving commitments for supply of more advanced weapons.[46] Nicaragua and Libya have both received new commitments for arms supplies during Gorbachev's tenure as General Secretary, the latter getting SA–5 long-range missiles in December 1985. These missiles were fired at US aircraft in the Gulf of Sidra in March 1986, thereby touching off the sequence of events leading to the US retaliatory raid on Tripoli the following month. The Soviets and Cubans helped to organize the third major yearly offensive in Angola against Jonas Savimbi's UNITA in the spring of 1987, based on substantial promises of military aid made in 1983–84. There are also reports that the USSR is again providing Mozambique with counterinsurgency aid.

Soviet behavior in Afghanistan should provide a good test of how far-reaching the changes in Soviet Third World policy are. There is accumulating evidence of growing disenchantment with the occupation of Afghanistan on the part of both the public at large and Soviet elites.[47] Certainly there have been various kinds of negative social consequences. On the military front, the provision of qualitatively better US military assistance to the Afghan mujahedin, including portable Stinger antiaircraft missiles, has caused the rate of Soviet equipment losses to go up considerably over the past year and one-half.[48] The Soviets have repeatedly stated their intention to withdraw and have dropped many hints privately that they are prepared to do so imminently, provided they can find an appropriate face-saving formula to mask their abandonment of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). Notwithstanding these hints, the much-touted withdrawal of six regiments announced in Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech in July 1986, and the unilateral ceasefire undertaken by the PDPA regime in December of that year, there is as yet no real indication that the Soviets are prepared to withdraw. Indeed, Soviet military operations have increased substantially in scope and effectiveness with each summer offensive. The frequency and violence of Afghan Air Force cross-border attacks into Pakistan also increased early in 1987.[49]

Finally, the Soviet collective security system has continued to grow. The most recent self-proclaimed Marxist-Leninist state to sign a Declaration of Friendship and Cooperation with Moscow was Benin. Mathieu Kerekou, the chairman of Benin's People's Revolutionary Party, journeyed to Moscow for the signing in November 1986.[50] It seems that the traditional agenda is not being jettisoned, especially when it can be executed with low visibility and few costs. There have been persistent reports of Soviet deliveries of money and weapons to the

[46]Ihsan A. Hijazi, "New Soviet Aid to Syria Reported," *The New York Times*, Apr. 30, 1987. On the other hand, there were reports of differences between Assad and Gorbachev on a number of points, including the Iran-Iraq war, Palestinian reunification, and an international Middle East conference; diplomatic sources said that "Syria did not fit well into Gorbachev's new policy of seeking to defuse regional conflicts in order to build a more stable strategic relationship with the United States." Quote from "The USSR This Week," RFE-RL, *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 168/87, May 1, 1987, p. 2.

[47]Not only are there increasingly frank admissions of casualties and other costs from the war in Afghanistan, but even some airing of criticism of the Soviet presence there. See for example the radio commentary of March 27, 1987, which admitted that the resistance comprises "vast numbers of the Afghan population," quoted in "More Selective *Glasnost'* About Afghanistan," RFE-RL, *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 167/87, Apr. 28, 1987, p. 5; and Bohdan Nahaylo, "Ukrainian Mother Protests Soviet Media Coverage of the War in Afghanistan," RFE-RL, *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 34/87, Jan. 22, 1987.

[48]Though the losses are probably not even close to the rate of one plane per day that had been reported in the Western press. See David Ottoway, "Big Losses of Soviet Planes Cited," *The Washington Post*, Dec. 17, 1986.

[49]"Afghan Planes Said to Kill 35 in Attacks on Pakistan," *The New York Times*, Feb. 27, 1987; and Barbara Crossette, "Pakistan Downs an Afghan Intruder," ibid, Mar. 31, 1987.

[50]Benin's Declaration (as opposed to a treaty) does not mention consultations in the events of threats to Benin's security, as do many other similar documents. See *FBIS-SOV*, Dec. 5, 1986, pp. J/1–4.

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Mathieu Kerekou, Chairman of the Central Committee of the People's Revolutionary Party of Benin and President of the People's Republic of Benin, with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev during a November 21, 1986 visit in which the two countries signed a Declaration of Peace and Friendship.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

communists in both the Philippines and Chile. Soviet support for the New People's Army in the Philippines, which evidently began in 1984–85, has been disguised by using middlemen such as the Vietnamese.[51]

Conclusion and Projections

The manner in which Moscow is implementing its policy toward the Third World under Gorbachev points to several characteristics of Soviet foreign policy in general. The first is the striking continuity of tactical issues facing Kremlin leaders. In this, the tenth phase of Soviet foreign policy, the Brutentses and Yakovlevs echo their counterparts in the Stalins and Bukharins of the 1920's. Similarly, those in the International Department who advocated support of Marxist-Leninist vanguard parties in the 1970's repeated many of the arguments of such early leftists as M. N. Roy, Georgiy Dimitrov, or even Lev Trotskiy. Soviet policy toward the developing world has thus had a cyclical character, with the shortcomings of one line inclining Soviet leaders to try the opposite. Just as Soviet experiences with Chiang Kai-shek and Kemal Atatürk in the 1920's led them to espouse the likes of Li Li-san or Qu Qiu-bai during the "Third Period," so the Brezhnev leadership sought to replace the Sadats and Siad Barres of the 1970's with such leaders as Abd al-Fattah Ismail and Mengistu Haile Mariam. Both left- and right-wing policies have advantages and defects, and neither can totally satisfy Soviet policy requirements for both influence and reliability. Hence the constant reappearance of the same tactical issue.

The second characteristic is that the role of ideology in defining Soviet foreign policy objectives and in providing political instruments for expansion has been steadily declining in the postwar period. The changes already brought about by Gorbachev have further accelerated that decline. Whatever the real-world implications of the "new political thinking," the old ideological language of Marxism-Leninism and vanguard parties is now seldom heard, and those who use that idiom seem strangely out of place in the current milieu.

The third characteristic of Soviet foreign policy that has special bearing for the Third World is that Moscow no longer has at its disposal a world communist movement through which it can work and to which it can give orders with a reasonable expectation of compliance. The Soviet leadership cannot announce a single "line" applicable to all parts of the world as it did earlier through the Comintern and the Cominform. The Third World Marxist-Leninists are dealt with almost entirely separately from the European communists. Simply stated, the Soviet Union does not have the option of issuing and enforcing a single line because international communism has not recovered and is unlikely to recover from the splits with Yugoslavia in the 1940's and with China in the 1950's and 1960's. Furthermore, the loyalty of some recently acquired allies is rather suspect; even such seemingly close allies as Vietnam cooperate with Moscow on the basis of political calculation rather than fealty to the socialist "homeland." Third World Marxist-Leninists are also a rather weak group. Only Cuba and Vietnam are ruled by "orthodox" communist parties and hence qualify as genuine socialist countries in Soviet eyes. The groups governing such countries as Angola, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan are but pale imitations of the Chinese or Indonesian communist parties of the 1920's and 1930's, being at a much more primitive level in terms of both party organization and ideological self-understanding.

In addition to these external constraints on Moscow's implementation of Third World policy, there are domestic limitations to a full-scale commitment to and implementation of the principles of the tenth period. Primary among these are the ingrained attitudes found in the military and such party bodies as the International Department, which militate against accepting a new agenda.

[51]Leif Rosenberger, "Soviet Support for the New People's Army in the Philippines," unpublished article, June 1987.

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A Soviet Aeroflot helicopter helps evacuate famine victims from the Welo Province of Ethiopia in February 1985.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

While the departure of Ponomarev and Ul'yanovskiy from the International Department and the events surrounding the firing of Defense Minister Sergey Sokolov and Air Defense Minister Aleksandr Koldunov suggest some diminution of these forces, there are still powerful groups devoted to the old agenda.[52] The internal institutional drama is far from being played out.

Finally, the continued tenure of Gorbachev and the vitality of his economic reform program are necessary for the effectiveness of the right-wing shift.[53] Without an economic revitalization of the Soviet Union, it is difficult to see how its relations with such countries as Mexico and Brazil or the ASEAN states could develop very far. Military goods and services remain the Soviet Union's area of comparative advantage in competing with the West for the favor of Third World countries. But the large and relatively stable newly industrializing countries do not need the package of internal and external security assistance offered by the Soviet Union and its bloc allies. Indeed, Brazil competes with Moscow in selling arms to Third World countries. In the absence of a much more thoroughgoing internal economic reform, the Soviets will remain relatively poor at offering technology, markets, and other economic benefits. Furthermore, the Soviet leadership seems to have decided against offering substantial quantities of economic assistance. Moscow's relations with New Delhi or Buenos Aires will therefore never become as close as its ties with Vietnam or Angola.

All of this indicates that disappointment with the new policy must inevitably set in. The question remains, then, whether there will be calls for a return to greater ideological orthodoxy and support for self-proclaimed Marxist-Leninists. Will there be a return to Soviet interventionism in the Third World in the manner of the late Brezhnev period? In sum, will there be a swing back to the left in the next, the eleventh, phase of Soviet policy toward the Third World? Of one thing we can be relatively sure: the Soviet Union is likely to remain an expansionist power with far-flung military and political interests all over the Third World. Indeed, the Brutents-Yakovlev strategy of Soviet policy is also expansionist and hostile to American interests. But the rationale for this expansionism is likely to become less ideological. The Soviet Union will still seek influence and will still worry about its prestige and commitments, but more in the name of protecting its interests as a great power than as the carrier of a messianic, universal ideology.

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[52]I believe, without being able to fully document, that the death of Mikhail Suslov in 1981 was very important in paving the way for these personnel changes, and that, consistent with his reputation, Suslov played an extremely important role in keeping alive the ideological issue in Soviet foreign policy. There are still a few hardliners from his generation left in the International Department—in particular, Ivan Kovalenko who has borne some responsibility for keeping Soviet-Japanese relations frosty. For a good account of recent Soviet civil-military relations, see Jeremy Azrael, *Soviet Civilian Leadership and the Military High Command: 1976–1986*, Santa Monica, CA, The Rand Corporation, R-3521-AF, 1987.

[53]Since early 1987, Gorbachev and his lieutenants have spoken frequently of resistance to *perestroyka*. See particularly Gorbachev's speech to the Komsomol, *FBIS-SOV*, Apr. 17, 1987, pp. R/1–17.

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Philippine Communism After Marcos

Gareth Porter

The sudden collapse of the regime of Ferdinand Marcos and the nonviolent transfer of power to President Corazon Aquino in February 1986 has at least temporarily halted the spectacular growth of the armed insurgency launched by the new Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) in the early 1970's. Conducted by the CPP's military arm, the New People's Army (NPA), the insurgency had capitalized on a setting of crumbling precapitalist socio-economic institutions, uncontrolled expansion by agribusinesses, and political repression, to rapidly develop from a small group of former Huk rebels and university students into a well-coordinated guerrilla army that aspired to achieve military parity with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). As the Marcos regime began to stumble and a legal urban opposition took shape, the illegal CPP also devised ways to be a major player in legal politics.

The emergence of the popular President Aquino, with her policy of conducting peace negotiations with the insurgents and restoring electoral and parliamentary institutions, has put the CPP on the defensive with regard to its strategy of "protracted people's war," has reduced its ability to mobilize popular sentiment against the government, and has even provoked an unprecedented internal debate within the CPP. The CPP has experienced a series of political setbacks at the national level, beginning with its disastrous miscalculation in deciding to boycott the 1986 Presidential election.

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Do these difficulties indicate more fundamental weaknesses and vulnerabilities, which could presage a waning of the overall strength of the CPP/NPA? What course is the party likely to follow in the years ahead? In an attempt to provide some answers, this article assesses the political-military capabilities and limitations of the Philippine communist movement and analyzes the debate within the CPP over its ideological outlook and strategic line since the end of the Marcos era.

Origins

The CPP was founded in 1968 by a group of young Maoist dissidents who left the orthodox Moscow-oriented Communist Party of the Philippines (*Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas,* or PKP), charging its leaders with fundamental ideological deviations and strategic errors.[1] Although the new party took the same name as the existing party, it differentiated itself from the PKP by adding the phrase "Marxist-Leninist" or "Mao Tse-tung Thought" in parentheses.[2] Founding chairman Jose Maria Sison set out a strategic line of waging people's war in the countryside, aimed at implementing Mao's principle of "encircling the cities from the countryside."[3] In March 1969, the New People's Army was born when Commander Dante, a former Huk guerrilla leader, seceded with a few dozen troops from a faction of the old

[1] For analysis of the struggle between the PKP leadership and its Maoist critics that led to the founding of the CPP, see Francisco Nemenzo, "Rectification Process in the Philippine Communist Movement," in Lim Joo Jock and S. Vani, Eds., *Armed Communist Movements in Southeast Asia,* Hampshire, England, Gower, 1984; and David Rosenberg, "Communism in the Philippines," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), September-October 1984, pp. 29–34.

[2] "Constitution of the Communist Party of the Philippines," in *Guide for Cadres and Members of the Communist Party of the Philippines,* 3rd ed., Central Luzon, The Revolutionary School of Mao Tse-tung Thought, 1977.

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Jose Maria Sison, founder of the Communist Party of the Philippines, upon his release from prison in March 1986.

—Susan Meiselas/Magnum.

Huk army that had degenerated into a criminal syndicate, and affiliated himself with the CPP.[4]

From 1970 to 1974, the NPA tried to follow the Maoist pattern of establishing "stable base areas" in the Cagayan Valley of Northern Luzon and in the Bicol peninsula. That course was abandoned after heavy concentrations of AFP troops nearly wiped out NPA units and uprooted the organized peasants.[5] From then on, the CPP avoided becoming concentrated in an identifiable area, and once a barrio was organized, moved on to a new "white area" to open up a new guerrilla front.[6] During the mid- and late 1970's, the CPP/NPA avoided military operations altogether, giving the impression to the Marcos regime that the revolutionary organization was dormant.[7]

However, while the AFP was busy fighting the Moro National Liberation Front in Mindanao, CPP/NPA cadres were quietly establishing political bases in the more remote non-Muslim barrios of Mindanao and on the islands of Panay, Samar, and Negros in the Visayas. There they found fertile ground for an armed dissident movement in peasant socioeconomic and political grievances.[8] Despite the Marcos land reform, most tenant farmers on rice and coconut land were still paying from 33 percent to 50 percent of their crops to the landlord and had to bear half of the costs of production as well. At the same time, urban-based elites—using their personal contacts with the government bureaucracy and their knowledge of the law—were grabbing the land of peasants who had been cultivating it for years. Wages for sugar workers were not only far below the legal minimum but well below the subsistence level. Exhaustion of the land frontier and the high rate of population growth had created a new class of underemployed and insecure landless workers. Social justice programs organized by the church were being treated by local political and economic elites as subversive, and their organizers were being repressed with the help of the AFP. And the AFP's counterinsurgency campaign, which relied heavily on coercing barrio residents into identifying local NPA cadres and brutalizing NPA suspects, generated military abuses that became a major reason for NPA success in recruiting and organizing. These issues, along with a decline in services and a rise in lawlessness, were turned to advantage by CPP/NPA organizers.

By 1980, the "people's war" was considered by party leaders to have entered the "advanced substage of the strategic defensive," in which it would be capable of carrying out limited coordinated tactical offensives.[9] CPP leaders in 1981 began a three-year program to transform the NPA from a network of small, armed propaganda units into regular guerrilla units whose primary tasks were military rather than political. Most of the political organizing work was turned over to mass organizations, while the NPA turned its attention to planning and executing military operations.[10]

During 1984, CPP leaders began to look beyond the initial "defensive" stage of the struggle and lay plans to achieve by 1987 what they call the "strategic stalemate" stage of the conflict, defined as the realization of essen-

[3]See "Rectify Errors and Rebuild the Party," reprinted in Republic of the Philippines, Department of National Defense, *So the People May Know*, Manila, n.d., pp. 106, 124, 126; and Amado Guerrero (Jose Maria Sison), *Philippine Society and Revolution*, Manila, Pulang Tala Publications, 1971, pp. 281–82.

[4]Nemenzo, loc. cit., p. 80. The Huk (short for *Hukbo ng Bayan laban sa Hapan*—People's Anti-Japanese Army) guerrillas emerged from the pre–World War II peasant movement in Central Luzon to resist the Japanese occupation and then fought the Philippine government from 1946 to the mid-1950's, led loosely by the PKP. For the most authoritative study of the Huk movement, see Benedict J. Kerkvliet, *The Huk Rebellion*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1977.

[5]Ibid., p. 90; and Denis Freney, "The Long Haul for the New People's Army," *Tribune* (Sydney), Dec. 3, 1986, pp. 8–9.

[6]Freney, loc. cit.

[7]Nemenzo, loc. cit., p. 92.

[8]The following summary of conditions that gave impetus to the insurgency is drawn from Gareth Porter, *The Politics of Counterinsurgency in the Philippines: Military and Political Options*, Philippine Studies Occasional Paper No. 9, Honolulu, Center for Philippine Studies, University of Hawaii, 1987, pp. 15–23.

[9]*Ang Bayan* (underground publication of the CPP Central Committee), Dec. 31, 1981.

[10]"Armed Struggle Scales Up," *Liberation* (underground publication of the National Democratic Front), March 1984, pp. 5,8.

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At left, an NPA guerrilla with a picture of Mao Zedong on his back prepares for an attack on a military communications camp in Ginyangan, Quezon Province; at right, the guerrillas with the body of a government soldier killed in the May 1985 operation.

—A. Hernandez/Sygma.

tial military parity with the AFP.[11] Between 1982 and 1984, NPA armed strength increased from only 2,391 to 8,383 guerrillas, according to the intelligence branch of the AFP. The NPA concentrated on creating company-sized units, usually with 60 to 100 fighters—enough troops to attack some fixed targets.[12] By the end of 1986, the number of guerrillas with modern arms was estimated at 12,000.[13]

During the 1984–86 period, the NPA carried out ambushes of small military or paramilitary units, assassinations of individual officials, and raids on town halls or military detachments to seize arms. Only one-fifth of NPA "tactical offensives" were targeted against regular AFP units. The rest were aimed at the paramilitary Philippine Constabulary (PC), the Integrated National Police (INP), and local militia or Civilian Home Defense Forces (CHDF).[14] The first major departure from this pattern of limited engagement came in September 1987, when the NPA destroyed four bridges to the Bicol region, cut off rail traffic, and blew up five power-transmission towers—its boldest challenge to the government yet.[15]

Limits of NPA Military Power

Despite its increased manpower and military capabilities, the NPA remains far from achieving military parity with the AFP. It cannot hold a town or any other military objective for more than a few hours and must immediately break up into small units after completing an operation.[16] The military growth of the NPA is constrained, moreover, by the difficulty of obtaining arms. A CPP publication suggested in 1984 that 25,000 automatic rifles would be sufficient to move the NPA into the "early substage" of the "strategic stalemate stage." But the same publication admitted that the 20,000 NPA guerrillas shared only 10,000 rifles—a figure that was not far from the 8,300 estimated by AFP intelligence.[17] Since then, the gap between manpower and arms in the NPA appears to have widened: by late 1987, the NPA was estimated to have upwards of 24,000 guerrillas but only a little more than 12,000 weapons.[18]

Moreover, it is now clear that the pace of NPA weapons acquisition has slowed dramatically since the ouster of Marcos. The AFP estimates that from late 1985 to

[11]Statement by an NPA commander in western Samar, quoted in *The Christian Science Monitor* (Boston), Jan. 2, 1985. This timetable was recognized as overoptimistic when the CPP Central Committee, meeting in September 1985, created a new intervening stage, the "strategic counter-offensive" sub-stage between the "advanced" sub-stage of the defensive stage and the stalemate stage. See National Youth and Student Department, "Against the Snap Election Boycott," *Praktika* (underground publication of the CPP's National Urban Commission), Vol. 1, No. 1, May 14, 1986, p. 35; and interview with a CPP cadre in Metro Manila, August 24, 1986.

[12]"Armed Struggle Scales Up," p. 8.

[13]Statement by Secretary of Defense Rafael Ileto, *Manila Times*, June 20, 1987.

[14]Based on the NPA's own list of individual tactical operations during three quarters of 1985, the CHDF was targeted 26 times, the PC and INP, 56 times, and the AFP, 21 times. *Pulang Bandila* (Red Flag—underground publication of the New People's Army), June-July 1985, August-September 1985, and February-March 1986.

[15]Rodney Tasker, "Left Quick March," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong), Oct. 8, 1987, p. 14; and *Manila Chronicle*, Oct. 14, 1987.

[16]Larry Niksch, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the Philippines*, Washington, DC, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, July 1, 1985, p. 38.

[17]*Liberation*, February 1984, p. 19. The AFP's estimate for 1984 was given in "The National Security Situation," AFP briefing paper for Philippine government officials, July 2, 1986.

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late 1986, the number of firearms in NPA hands increased from 11,000 to 12,288—an addition of only 1,200 weapons, compared with increases of 3,800 and 2,600 in 1983 and 1984.[19] By late 1987, the AFP had actually *reduced* its estimates of the number of firearms possessed by the NPA.[20]

Up to now, the NPA has not been able to obtain any large number of arms from abroad, and what few shipments it has received are believed to have been purchased on the international arms market or from criminal syndicates.[21] The Soviet Union has not been willing thus far to provide arms to the insurgents. This is not that surprising, because the CPP was identified as anti-Soviet and pro-Chinese throughout the 1970's and early 1980's, and the party condemned the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Although it has dropped its public condemnation of Soviet "social imperialism," the CPP was still debating the issue of whether the Soviets were in fact imperialist as late as 1985, and the party is far from following the Soviet international line.[22] The allegation by a former KGB agent that the Soviets provided financial assistance to the CPP in the late 1970's, when the party was still explicitly embracing Maoism, is very dubious.[23] In January 1986, AFP intelligence reported that the Soviets remained committed to the orthodox, pro-Soviet PKP, whose leadership has viewed the CPP as linked with the CIA and the Catholic Church.[24]

In early 1987, the CPP suddenly mentioned that the Soviets as well as the Vietnamese had offered the insurgents arms and money, but the party claimed to have rejected the offer because of unacceptable conditions. Former Central Committee chairman Rodolfo Salas, in detention in Manila, told a Japanese journalist that the CPP was negotiating with Moscow and Hanoi through mediators in the Philippines and abroad.[25] Whether this claim is accurate or represents an effort by the CPP to reassure its own members of the feasibility of achieving victory through armed struggle remains to be seen. In a more recent interview, a ranking CPP official claimed only that the CPP was in the process of establishing relations with ruling communist parties, and strongly hinted that the party leadership was frustrated with the Soviets. The official remarked that it would be "ironic" if the Philippine armed struggle did not get any support from ruling communist parties, in view of those parties' "ties with other national liberation movements."[26]

Despite a number of reports that arms and ammunition had been shipped to the CPP/NPA, Philippine Defense Secretary Rafael Ileto said in late August 1987 that no such landings had been confirmed.[27] For the time being, at least, the insurgents must, therefore, primarily rely on the capture of weapons and ammunition from the AFP or CHDF units or on purchase.[28] It is important to note that, as difficult as it is to obtain enough weapons to arm a 25,000-member guerrilla army, securing sufficient ammunition for these weapons is even more challenging. It is far easier to capture a rifle than to obtain enough ammunition to use it.[29]

[18]See statements by AFP Chief of Staff General Fidel Ramos, *Manila Bulletin*, Oct. 15, 1987, and by Defense Secretary Ileto, *Manila Times*, June 20, 1987. Estimates of total NPA manpower are highly uncertain. AFP intelligence officers believe they may be counting NPA commanders more than once, since some commanders could be operating in more than one province under different names. See "Direct Line," column in *New Day* (Manila), July 28, 1986, pp. 4–7. The NPA itself, on the other hand, claims 15,000 full-time and 20,000 part-time guerrillas in its ranks (see *Liberation*, April-May 1986).

[19]"The National Security Situation"; also data provided by Brig. Gen. Alexander Aguirre of the AFP, *Ang Pahayagang Malaya* (Quezon City), June 16, 1987.

[20]See Ramos statement in *Manila Bulletin*, Oct. 15, 1987.

[21]Republic of the Philippines, *The Communist Insurgency in the Philippines*, Manila, 1985, p. 11. As recently as December 1983, on the occasion of its 15th anniversary, the CPP reported receiving congratulatory messages from only four communist parties: the Chinese and three others openly oriented toward Beijing—the Burmese, Thai, and Malaysian. *Ang Bayan*, March 1984, pp. 13–14.

[22]See the interview with one of the members of the CPP Commission for Northern Luzon, by Phil Bronstein, "A Rebel Army Grows in the Forest," *San Francisco Examiner*, June 23, 1985.

[23]See Leif Rosenberger, "Philippine Communism and the Soviet Union," *Survey* (London), Spring 1985, pp. 136–37. Rosenberger cites testimony by Stanislav Levchenko (who was in the KGB mission in Tokyo from 1975 to 1979) that KGB officers passed money to CPP messengers regularly in Tokyo during that period. It is far more likely that money was being passed to the legal but still pro-Soviet PKP at a time when both Soviet and PKP policies had become supportive of the Marcos regime.

Another allegation by Rosenberger, that an East German played a key role in the CPP links with external funding sources in the early 1980's, is an inexplicably garbled story. The man identified as an East German, Carl Gaspar, is in fact a well-known Philippine radical who was arrested with a West German in March 1983 as a suspected subversive. See Helen Graham and Breda Noonan, Eds., *How Long: Prison Reflections of Karl Gaspar*, Quezon City, Claritian Publications, 1984, p. xiii. For the view of the US Embassy's specialist on the CPP in 1982, see Raymond Bonner, *Waltzing with a Dictator*, New York, New York Times Books, 1987, p. 358.

[24]Interview with ranking AFP intelligence officer, Camp Aguinaldo, Jan. 6, 1986.

[25]See *Yomiuri Shimbun* (Tokyo), Jan. 15, 1987. Top party leaders in Bataan province made a similar claim regarding Soviet offers (see *Manila Bulletin*, Jan. 8, 1987).

[26]Interview with "Armando Liwanag," identified as Central Committee Chairman, published in an unidentified party newspaper (presumably *Ang Bayan*), as reported in *South China Post* (Hong Kong), Oct. 12, 1987.

[27]*Manila Bulletin*, Aug. 26, 1987.

[28]Although no estimate of the percentages of NPA arms acquired either through capture or purchase is available, an insurgent spokesman for the Southern Tagalog region of Luzon has said that 90 percent of the NPA arms were captured from government forces (*Ang Pahayagang Malaya*, Apr. 13, 1987). This would be consistent with the estimate by Col. Isagani de los Santos, then commander of the AFP's Task Force Sugarland in Negros Occidental, that 10 to 15 percent of the NPA's weapons in Negros are acquired from criminal organizations (interview, Bacolod, Negros Occidental, Jan. 23, 1986).

[29]Interview with a cadre of the Central Secretariat of the National Democratic Front, Manila, Jan. 24, 1986. The NDF cadre admitted that the NPA must conserve its ammunition carefully and tries to plan its operations in a way so that not a single shot is fired needlessly.

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Even if the problem of weapons and ammunition for 25,000 guerrillas were to be solved, the NPA would still fall short of the firepower necessary for military parity with the AFP. The leadership of the insurgency understands that in order to achieve a military stalemate with the AFP, it would have to have the capability to carry out larger operations and defend larger troop concentrations against an AFP offensive. Both AFP and Communist sources agree that this would require heavier and more sophisticated weapons—recoilless rifles, antitank weapons, explosives, and mortars. The insurgents vow to capture such weapons if necessary,[30] but to do so would represent a far more difficult military problem than is the seizing of small arms.

Although the NPA has no short-term prospects for gaining military parity with the AFP, its military capabilities are not likely to be significantly diminished by AFP operations. The AFP estimates that the NPA can draw on an estimated manpower base of two million young people to replace casualties of just over 1,000 in 1986.[31] If, as AFP intelligence suggests, NPA manpower has leveled off since 1986, it is almost certainly because the NPA cannot use more *unarmed* guerrillas, not because it is incapable of recruiting new combatants. Surrenders by NPA cadres to the government number far less than casualties. During 1985, some 553 armed regulars surrendered to the government, while only 258 had surrendered through the first eleven months of 1986.[32]

Organizing the Barrios

The NPA would be little more than a nuisance were it not for its success in organizing villages, or barrios (the official village-level government administrative unit is the barangay), to provide it both physical and political support. The organizational framework, consisting primarily of mass organizations within which a party unit is imbedded, has been meticulously constructed barrio by barrio in a uniform pattern. Before a party organization is set up in a particular barangay, CPP/NPA organizers send in a small team, usually made up of activists from an adjoining barrio, who undertake a "social investigation" to analyze local socio-economic and political conditions and identify the issues of greatest concern to the population, as well as to determine which individuals would make effective, credible revolutionary activists.[33]

Once this task is completed, the informal group of activists then establishes an "organizing committee" (OC) of 10–15 people representing all major social groups of the barrio, such as women, youth, or fishermen. In some areas, a separate committee is set up for each sector. Only after this organizing committee has called mass meetings to discuss the main problems and what to do about them does it inaugurate mass organizations for youth, women, peasants, etc. At the same time, a Communist Party branch is also organized in the barangay. The OC then becomes the "barrio revolutionary committee" and takes on quasi-governmental functions, with subcommittees responsible for matters such as health or production.

The key mass organization at the barrio level is the peasant association, which excludes middle and rich peasants, at least initially, on the assumption that poor peasants need to build up their confidence. The peasant association represents tenant farmers in negotiations with landlords for lower rents or higher agricultural wages, and with traders and money lenders for lower interest rates. It even puts pressure on landlords to alter the distribution of costs of agricultural production from a 50:50 sharing to 25 percent for the tenant and 75 percent for the landlord.[34] Although in the early years of its expansion, the NPA had actually taken the leading role in such negotiations, this was found to leave the peasants themselves too passive. As a result, the NPA withdrew into the background.[35]

The newfound power of poor peasants to pressure landowners and moneylenders to make economic concessions ensures that the peasant associations will be the backbone of political support for the NPA. However, this redistribution of power tends to alienate not only landlords but also middle and rich peasants, who depend to some extent on peasant labor for their incomes. Because these wealthier rural strata have a disproportionate share of the capital and technical knowledge necessary to increase production—something the NPA desperately needs in order to sustain a long, escalating military conflict against the government—this alienation

[30]Ibid.

[31]*The Washington Times*, Nov. 28, 1986. The AFP estimate of NPA casualties is given in Radio ng Bayan, Dec. 11, 1986, transcribed in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Asia and Pacific* (Washington—hereafter *FBIS-APA*), Dec. 11, 1986, p. P/7.

[32]*Business Day* (Quezon City), Nov. 21, 1986. Despite AFP claims that 1,811 NPA cadres had sought amnesty in the second quarter of 1987 alone, only 1,309 had turned in their arms, suggesting that the vast majority of that number were not, in fact, armed regulars. See *Manila Standard*, July 3, 1987.

[33]Interview with a NDF secretariat cadre. For similar accounts of the organizing process, see Republic of the Philippines, *The Communist Insurgency in the Philippines*, Manila, 1985, pp. 19–21; Niksch, op. cit., pp. 30–31. On the "social investigation," see *Ang Bayan*, April 1984, pp. 9–11.

[34]*Liberation*, September-October 1986, p. 3; James Clad, "The Stalemate Island," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Jan. 15, 1987, p. 15; Clayton Jones, "Filipino rebels' 'class' dilemma," *The Christian Science Monitor*, Dec. 29, 1986, p. 6.

[35]Freney, loc. cit.

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

Peasants tying beans to send to market while NPA members clean their guns in a Central Luzon village.

—Susan Meiselas/Magnum.

is risky not only politically but economically. The CPP has tried, with varying degrees of success, to retain political support from rich peasants and landlords by curbing excessive infringement by the peasant associations on the interests of wealthier strata, and by postponing redistribution of land from noncultivators to the tillers until after the "national democratic revolution," and by promising landowners generous compensation for confiscated lands.[36]

Levels of Commitment

The data on the numbers of NPA supporters or sympathizers are complex and contradictory. Philippine military intelligence estimated in 1986 that the CPP/NPA had established mass organizations in 7,631 (18 percent) of the nation's 41,615 rural barangays, nearly three times as many as the 2,638 estimated in 1982. One-third of these barangays were considered to be "influenced" (defined as having 50 percent of the local population sympathic to the NPA), and two-thirds were considered "infiltrated" (defined as having 30 to 50 percent of the population sympathetic).[37] In testimony based largely on such estimates, US Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Armitage suggested in November 1985 that as many as five million people "might be controlled by the CPP and as many as five million more would be influenced by the CPP."[38]

By contrast, the CPP/NPA leadership has claimed that its "organized" mass base consists of 1 million people who are members of mass organizations associated with the party's underground political front, the National Democratic Front (NDF). It also claims a "general mass base" of 10 million people who are influenced "in varying degrees" by those organizations (presumably this figure includes the entire population of barrios dominated by the CPP/NPA).[39] Clearly, the broader mass base is less committed to the CPP/NPA organization than is

[36]See Michael D. Marasigan, "Liberating the Land," *Business Day Magazine*, Feb. 13, 1987, p. 12; Clad, loc. cit., p. 15; Jones, loc. cit., p. 6; Freney, loc. cit., pp. 8–9.

[37]"The National Security Situation," AFP briefing paper for Philippine government officials, July 2, 1986.

[38]*Recent Events in the Philippines. Fall 1985*, Hearings and Markup before the Committee on Foreign Affairs and its Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, House of Representatives, 99th Congress, First Session, Nov. 12 and 13, 1985, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1985, p. 76. Also see Armitage's testimony before the same subcommittee, May 15, 1986.

[39]Transcript of news conference by Antonio Zumel, described as a "ranking officer of the NDF" (National Democratic Front, the underground political front of the CPP/NPA), *Liberation*, February-March 1986, p. 6.

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the "organized" mass base. The CPP leadership also recognizes that President Aquino's popularity and the restoration of democratic institutions has created some ambivalence on the part of less committed supporters about the desirability of continued armed struggle.[40]

Selective assassinations of civilian officials, police, military personnel, and "criminal elements" by NPA Armed City Partisans (ACP's) or "sparrow units," have been used both to weaken the government's control and to increase popular support for the NPA.[41] The tempo of "sparrow" operations dramatically increased in 1987; according to government figures, 171 officials or military personnel, including some ranking police officials in Manila, were killed by "sparrow units"in the first five months of the year alone.[42] The majority of those killed by the NPA in urban areas have been alleged informers hired by the military to identify NPA guerrillas and CPP cadres.[43]

According to NPA guidelines, a thorough investigation of an individual suspected of having been an informer is supposed to be carried out before any accusation is made, and NPA personnel are supposed to "negotiate" with the accused, allowing the individual to cease his or her involvement with the military.[44] However, on the island of Mindanao, at least, this system of control over "sparrow units" has increasingly broken down in recent years. The rapid growth of the NPA on the island, with little or no screening of personnel or ideological training, has led to numerous killings without prior warnings or adequate investigation, angering many who were otherwise sympathetic.[45]

Some of the cadres carrying out such indiscriminate killings may have been simply undisciplined or even anti-social recruits; the CPP feels others may have been government agents infiltrated into CPP/NPA ranks with the aim of discrediting the insurgency. For example, by the early 1980's, some "deep penetration agents" (DPA's, or "zombies") had been able to advance into the higher echelons of party and military organs in Mindanao. They are alleged to have been involved in killings of innocent policemen or alleged informers without going through normal procedures, which has caused many mass base supporters to condemn the NPA as "no different from the AFP," and in some cases has facilitated the dispatch of AFP troops to given areas to protect the population from ostensibly NPA abuses.[46]

The discovery of the DPA network in the Mindanao CPP/NPA organization in 1985 provoked a wave of paranoia throughout the party. A major investigation led to a broad purge in which those found guilty of indiscriminate murders and other infractions of discipline were usually executed.[47] In Davao City, reports of executions of suspected DPA's frightened some "sparrow unit" personnel, who fled to the AFP for protection. The friends and family of suspected DPA's who were executed also turned against the NPA in March 1986. That gave the AFP the opportunity to get some former NPA supporters in the insurgent-dominated Agdao district to participate in an anticommunist vigilante organization called "Alsa Masa." By that time, the NPA had already decided to pull its guerrillas out of Agdao, leaving only its underground cadres to lie low.[48] The CPP in Mindanao had to admit to and make public self-criticism for its "excesses" in uncovering and punishing DPA's.[49]

Revolutionary Finances

The insurgency's political and military effort is supported by an ambitious program of "revolutionary taxation," a policy that was regularized in the late 1970's in areas where the CPP had established revolutionary organizations. Party guidelines provide that tenants

[40]"Negosyason Tungkol sa Ceasefire" (Negotiations about a Ceasefire), Memorandum from the Executive Committee of the CPP Central Committee to territorial commissions and other party organs, July 1986 (xerox of original document).

[41]According to Philippine government figures, the NPA assassinated 439 local government officials from 1981 through July 1985, of which 59 percent were barangay captains, 24 percent were barangay councilmen, and the rest were mayors, vice-mayors, or municipal councilmen. See *Recent Events in the Philippines. . . ,* p. 74.

[42]*Philippine Star* (Manila), June 9, 1987. The NPA's "Alex Boncayao Brigade," which claimed responsibility for the killing of police officials, asserted in a paid advertisement that its assassinations were not directed against policemen in general but only against those guilty of violent repression, organizing of vigilante groups, intelligence operations, or crime. *Ang Pahayagang Malaya,* June 15, 1987, p. 5.

[43]Interview with a high-level official of AFP Intelligence, Camp Aguinaldo, Jan. 6, 1986; interview with a Filipino journalist in Davao City who has kept careful records of unsolved killings in the city, Jan. 19, 1986. The journalist asked not to be identified for fear of reprisal.

[44]Interview with the anonymous source cited in fn. 43; interview with a foreign priest with long experience in the Davao City area. Also see the letter from an ex-school teacher in *Ang Pahayagang Malaya,* Jan. 15, 1986.

[45]Interview with a member of the NPA North Central Mindanao Regional Operational Command, *We Forum* (Quezon City), May 27-June 2, 1986, p. 15. At least in Davao City, however, observers note that this anger was offset in 1984 by anger at "salvagings" carried out by the AFP against suspected NPA cadres.

[46]For detailed descriptions of the "deep penetration agents" program, see *Veritas* (Quezon City), Apr. 3, 1986, pp. 10–12; and *We Forum,* May 27-June 2, 1986, pp. 10–15.

[47]*We Forum,* May 27-June 2, 1986, p. 15; Monica Feria, "Torture Inside NPA Camp: Bitter Lessons," *Ang Pahayagang Malaya,* June 16, 1986, pp. 1, 10.

[48]James Clad, "Losing Leftist Ground," *Far Eastern Economic Review,* Jan. 22, 1987, p. 14; Benjie Guevarra, "Alsa Masa and the LIC Strategy," *Ang Pahayagang Malaya,* Apr. 3, 1987; *The Manila Times,* May 29, 1987.

[49]Interview with the vice-chairman of the NDF in Mindanao by Virgilio Cristostomo, "The Coming Storm in Mindanao," *National Midweek* (Manila), June 10, 1987, p. 6.

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should give 2 percent of their net harvest if they are paying less rent because of NPA intervention; middle peasants should pay 5 percent of their net crop; landlords are to pay up to 10 percent of their net yearly income; and agricultural capitalists, 10 to 50 percent. Farm workers who have gotten substantial wage increases thanks to NPA intervention should give 5 to 10 percent of these increases.[50]

It is unclear whether or how much these guidelines have been changed to increase the level of financial resources for the insurgency. One NPA commander estimated in 1986 that taxes represented 2.5 percent of a family's income, which would suggest that the lowest level of taxation—that for poor peasants—has been increased by 25 percent over the original level.[51] There is evidence that NPA tax increases in some areas have alienated some former sympathizers—probably middle peasants.[52] Cadres and poor peasants in "organized" barrios insist that agricultural taxes are paid only voluntarily, while conceding that "social pressures" are applied to wealthier farmers to comply.[53] The distinction between voluntary and forced compliance in the political context of an insurgent-controlled barrio is, of course, difficult to maintain.

Commercial taxes are set locally at mass meetings and collected by the barrio revolutionary councils. Taxes are levied on every fish, pig, head of cattle, or piece of lumber sold at markets in NPA-dominated barrios. Half of the funds are allegedly retained by the barrio revolutionary committee for local economic projects; the rest goes to support the CPP/NPA. Taxes on "class enemies" such as big landowners and businessmen, however, are collected by the CPP/NPA directly, and the funds thus gatherd are used entirely to finance the insurgency.[54]

The largest sources of income are agribusiness and mining firms, which are sent formal letters demanding a particular tax payment based on a detailed appraisal of the business. A refusal to pay usually results in the sabotage of equipment or crops.[55] No estimates of the total

[50]*Manila Bulletin*, Dec. 6, 1986, pp. 1, 18; "A Look at the Left's 'Revolutionary Taxes' "; *Manila Chronicle*, Dec. 29, 1986, p. 4 (the latter is a reprint of an article in *Liberation*, December 1986).

[51]*The National Times on Sunday* (Broadway, Australia), Nov. 30, 1986.

[52]The most credible report on CPP taxation was that guerrillas collected one peso and one cup of rice per week from each individual in Polangui, Albay. See Armando Doronila, "Military Cuts Off Bicol Rebels from Mass Base," *Manila Chronicle*, Oct. 17, 1987. This rate would represent about one-third of the rates of taxation claimed by Senator Victor Ziga for the same municipality. See *Asiaweek* (Hong Kong), Oct. 9, 1987.

[53]Marasigan, loc. cit.; Freney, loc. cit.; and Jones, loc. cit.

[54]*Manila Chronicle*, Dec. 29, 1986.

[55]Ibid.; and *Manila Bulletin*, Dec. 6, 1986.

A rally of Alsa Masa, an anti-CPP vigilante organization that has emerged in Davao City on the island of Mindanao.

—Al Varga/Gamma-Liaison.

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amounts raised through taxation of such businesses is available, but the AFP estimates that the CPP/NPA raised between 8 and 15 million pesos (US$400,000–750,000) in the timber-rich Cagayan Valley of Northern Luzon alone in 1985 and were aiming at 18 to 20 million pesos ($900,000 to $1 million) in 1987.[56]

Party Organization

At the center of the mobilization structure is the CPP itself. The party started in 1968 with less than 12 members; by 1971, it had a 1,000 or so members, most of them urban intelligentsia who went underground in 1971, when the Marcos regime suspended the writ of habeas corpus. At that time, the CPP leadership turned to the recruitment of peasants, and already by 1972, members of peasant origin had reportedly come to outnumber those of urban petty-bourgeois origin (53 percent to 42 percent).[57] That trend continued through the 1970's, as most of the party's members were recruited from among NPA guerrillas and members of mass organizations.[58] The total membership increased from 8,000–9,000 in 1980 to well over 30,000 in 1985.[59]

Although the CPP was deprived of many of its leaders during the decade 1972–82 (including Jose Maria Sison and the NPA Commander Bernabe Buscayno, who were arrested in 1977 and 1976 respectively), the CPP organization has never been immobilized, thanks to its decentralized structure. From 1974 on, CPP/NPA regional subdivisions, based on existing provinces, islands, or regions of Luzon and Mindanao, were given virtual autonomy in developing their own political and military strategies within the broader framework of protracted people's war. They were expected to report to party headquarters (believed to be located in Central Luzon) only every month or two.[60]

After the AFP formed its Regional Unified Commands in 1980, however, the party leadership felt the need to increase its own ability to coordinate its forces across regions. "Territorial commissions" were created for Northern, Central, and Southern Luzon, the Visayas, and Mindanao. A sixth territorial commission created was the National Urban Commission, which gives guidance to cadres both in Metro Manila and in other urban centers, and directs the Armed City Partisans in coordination with the NPA.[61] In the mid-1980's, the CPP/NPA acquired a sophisticated communications system consisting of UHF transceivers that permitted better coordination among territorial units.[62] In some regions, however, CPP/NPA leaders have continued to show a considerable degree of independence from the central leadership. In 1986, for example, several regional units defied the CPP's prohibition against any ceasefire negotiations with the government.[63]

The ultimate authority for the CPP, as for other communist parties, is ostensibly the Party Congress, which elects the Central Committee and Political Bureau. According to the Party Constitution, a congress is supposed to be convened every five years, "unless it is deemed necessary to hold it later or earlier." In fact, the CPP has not had such a gathering since its founding congress in 1968. The major change in the Philippine political context following the overthrow of the Marcos regime has combined with a new level of dissidence within the party on ideological and strategic issues to prompt the CPP leadership to promise in the spring of 1986 that there would be a new party congress within a year.[64] However, there is no evidence to date that such a meeting has been held.

The Central Committee (CC) is the highest policy-making body in the CPP, providing theoretical guidance and establishing strategic guidelines. It has five "line commissions" (military, mass movements, united front, propaganda, and finance).[65] The archipelagic geography of the Philippines makes it difficult, however, for the CC—believed to have 29 members—to convene twice yearly as the party constitution stipulates.[66] Under normal circumstances, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee would be expected to handle the day-to-day

[56] *Business Day*, Dec. 2, 1986, pp. 9–10.

[57] Ibid., Dec. 2, 1986, pp. 13, 15; "Summing Up Our Experience after Three Years," CPP Central Committee, dated Mar. 3, 1972, mimeographed.

[58] *Business Day*, Dec. 2, 1986, pp. 13, 15.

[59] Interview with NDF Secretariat cadre, Jan. 24, 1986.

[60] Rosenberg, loc. cit., p. 37; Republic of the Philippines, *The Communist Insurgency in the Philippines*, p. 15.

[61] J. R. Alibutud, "Marcos is the Best Teacher," *Mr. & Ms.* (Quezon City), Oct. 25–31, 1985; *Philippine Daily Inquirer* (Manila), May 14, 1986, pp. 1, 2.

[62] The NPA command in the Visayas, for example, could maintain contact with commands in the Bicol region of Luzon as well as in Mindanao. *We Forum*, June 10–16, 1986, pp. 8–9. The Japanese-made radios were apparently purchased legally in the Philippines. See *The National Times on Sunday*, Nov. 20, 1986.

[63] For details, see the author's *The Politics of Counterinsurgency in the Philippines . . .*, pp. 111–12.

[64] *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, June 23, 1986. Satur Ocampo, who is believed to be a Central Committee member and who was a member of the NDF team that took part in the 1986 peace negotiations, told the author that a party congress "may be an excellent occasion for unifying the perspective on the national situation, strategy, and tactics." He also suggested that the idea of a party congress had been "in the cards for several years." Interview, Manila, Sept. 1, 1986.

[65] *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, May 14, 1986; Republic of the Philippines, *The Communist Insurgency in the Philippines*, pp. 23–24.

[66] The Central Committee has not been able to meet on a regular time schedule. Its Second Plenum was only in April 1971, and its third was not held until late 1975. See CPP Central Committee, "Summing Up Our Experience . . ."; and *Ang Bayan*, December 1983. For the AFP's list of the membership of the CC, see *Manila Chronicle*, Nov. 22, 1987.

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affairs of the party. Since the beginning, however, the Political Bureau's membership, too, was widely dispersed geographically, so it has also met too infrequently to play that role. As a consequence, day-to-day operational leadership is exercised by the CC's Executive Committee (EC), a five-man body made up of the highest-ranking officials in the party.

This situation has produced some frictions between the EC and its parent body, the 11-member Political Bureau. At major turning points, the EC is expected to consult with the full Political Bureau on party strategy. In December 1985, however, the EC made the decision to boycott the February 1986 Presidential election without such consultation, even though there was time for a Political Bureau meeting prior to the decision.[67]

As an underground party, the CPP has never revealed the composition of its leadership bodies. However, at the end of the Marcos era, the EC was believed to have consisted of the following members of the Political Bureau: Rodolfo Salas (Central Committee chairman), Rafael Baylosis (secretary general), Juanita Rivera (chairman, Military Commission), Antonio Zumel (chairman, United Front Commission), and Benito Tiamzon (chairman, Visayas Commission).[68] After the arrest of Salas by the military in Manila in September 1986, Tiamzon, a former engineering student at the University of the Philippines still in his 30's, was reported to have been named acting chairman.[69]

National Democratic Front

Overlapping with but extending beyond the CPP/NPA organization is the National Democratic Front (NDF), which is aimed at bringing nonparty groups and individuals into close collaboration with the CPP/NPA. The NDF is intended to be a "united front" in terms of social classes, but not in terms of diverse ideological orientations. Those affiliated with the NDF must accept what the CPP calls the "national democratic" position. "National democrats" are defined by the CPP as those individuals coming from the "middle forces" (social strata in between the "basic masses" and the ruling classes) who support the armed struggle, who "recognize in various degrees the leading role of the party," and who do not oppose the CPP on any "fundamental principle." They are depicted as the middle circle of three concentric circles representing the "organized forces" of the revolutionary mass movement—located between the party in the center and "anti-fascists" in the outer circle.[70]

The NDF was conceived before the imposition of martial law by Marcos in 1972 as an alliance of activist organizations sharing the Maoist perspective, primarily comprising the Kabataang Makabayan (Nationalist Youth—KM), and the Samahang Demokratiko ng Kabataan (Democratic Youth Association), which had spearheaded the violent protests of 1970 known as the "First Quarter Storm." An NDF Preparatory Commission headed by the CPP's Antonio Zumel, was holding preliminary meetings when martial law was declared, and those involved in the preparatory work were arrested.[71]

Subsequently, the CPP itself set up new underground organizations for groups in various sectors of society, which became constituent organizations of the NDF. These included the National Association of Health Workers (MASAPA), the Nationalist Teachers (KAGUMA), the National Association of Workers (KASAMA), the National Farmers Organization (PKM), and the Revolutionary Movement of Fishermen.[72] The party also reconstituted organizations that had dissolved at the national level after martial law was declared, including KM and the Nationalist Movement of New Women (MAKIBAKA).[73] The latter, which now claims a membership of 200,000 (mostly peasants), did not have its own separate national leadership until 1983, when a provisional council was set up.[74]

Also joining the NDF was Christians for National Liberation (CNL), founded in February 1972 as a legal organization by 72 priests and lay workers from the Student Christian Movement and the Khi Rho Movement—two Catholic groups that had worked with peasants and farm workers and had embraced Maoism and the CPP's

[67]Ibid.; and interview with CPP cadre, Manila, Aug. 24, 1986.

[68]Arturo C. Sampana and Cecilio Francisco, Jr., "Communists," in *A People's Variety Exclusive* (place of publication unknown), Vol. 2, No. 3, n.d. (1986). This source is based on military intelligence files. It may be incorrect on some points, but includes enough biographical data on the CPP leadership to indicate that it reflects actual intelligence files. A slightly different list of top policy officials is given in *Manila Chronicle*, Nov. 22, 1987.

[69]*Manila Chronicle*, July 5, 1987. Earlier in the year, however, some reports saw the power of Salas and Baylosis on the EC diluted by the addition of more seats to the five-man body. See *The Washington Post*, Sept. 15, 1986; *and Philippine Daily Inquirer*, *June 23, 1986.*

Juanita Rivera was captured in November 1987. See Kyodo dispatch, Nov. 15, 1987, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: East Asia* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-EAS*), Nov. 16, 1987, pp. 33–34.

[70]"Grasp the Principles of Revolutionary Mass Movements," CPP document dated January 1978, mimeographed, pp. 4–7; "Nature of the Church Sector, Orientation of Our Political Work, and Tasks of Comrades within the Sector," CPP Study Document, 1978 (mimeographed), p. 20.

[71]Interview with Antonio Zumel in "Features" column by Rosario A. Garcellano, *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, June 18–19, 1986, pp. 13–14; author's interview with NDF Secretariat cadre, Jan. 16, 1986.

[72]*Liberation*, April-May 1986, pp. 14–15; author's interview with NDF Secretariat cadre, Jan. 16, 1986.

[73]*Liberation*, April-May 1986.

[74]*Manila Chronicle*, Jan. 2, 1987, p. 3.

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Fr. Edificio de la Torre (right), leader of the Christians for National Liberation, is released from prison in March 1986 by the government of Philippine President Corazon Aquino.

—Susan Meiselas/Magnum.

national democratic line by 1971.[75] The first Chairman of CNL, Fr. Edicio de la Torre, was arrested after martial law was declared, but CNL grew as the NPA spread across Mindanao and the Visayas and an increasing number of priests, nuns, and layworkers came to view rural socio-economic and political conditions as part of a system of oppression.[76] This view was ultimately converted into sympathy and support for the armed struggle. Jose Concepción, a leading Catholic layman whose own political views are staunchly anti-Communist (he is now minister of trade in the Aquino government), spoke with priests and nuns in 10 provinces during 1984–85 and estimated that 25 to 30 percent of them had given up hope of change within the system and had adopted a position of "critical collaboration" with the NPA.[77]

Those sympathizers who worked within church structures or programs rather than at the parish level were invited by the CPP to join "national democratic cells"—small underground groups of people who are not interested in participating in the armed struggle themselves and who may not accept the CPP's goal of a communist system but who support the armed struggle.[78] The party's aim was to have at least one such cell within each church institution or "justice-oriented" church program.[79] A somewhat larger group was recruited into CNL; according to a CNL cadre, the organization now has a clandestine membership of more than 3,000 clergymen and lay workers, out of a total of 40,000 to 45,000 in the church sector nationwide.[80] CNL has achieved a greater degree of separate identity from the NDF since the early 1980's; in 1981, it convened its Second Congress and acquired its own secretariat.[81]

The most recent of the 10 underground organizations to affiliate with the NDF (and hence with the CPP/NPA) is the Cordillera People's Democratic Front (CPDF), representing the people of seven tribes, known collectively as the Igorots, who live in the mountains of the five Cordillera provinces of Northern Luzon. Like other NDF affiliates, the CPDF appears not to have had any separate organization until the 1980's. It held its first congress in January 1987, although its program was first drafted in 1981.[82] The fleshing out of an Igorot political organization by the CPP/NPA may have been prompted by the defection of the legendary Igorot guerilla leader and former priest Conrado Balweg from the CPP/NPA in April 1986 to form his own political-military organization, the Cordillera People's Liberation Army.[83]

The NDF still does not have an identifiable national leader or governing body.[84] In mid-1986, a high CPP official said a governing NDF council and an NDF pro-

[75]For background and useful insight into CNL, see Edicio de la Torre, *Touching Ground, Taking Root*, Quezon City, Socio-Pastoral Institute, 1986.

[76]For general background on the radicalization process, see Alfred W. McCoy, *Priests on Trial*, Victoria, Australia, Penguin Books, pp. 40–49; and Sylvia Mayuga, "A New Way of Being Church," *Veritas*, June 30, 1985, pp. 14–15.

[77]Interview conducted by the author, Washington, DC, May 30, 1985.

[78]On "national democratic cells" or "collectives," see "Our Urgent Tasks," p. 23; and *Ang Bayan*, August 1983. Many of the early members of the CNL did not consider themselves to be supporters of Maoism or of the CPP. Interview with Fr. de la Torre, *International Viewpoint* (Montreuil, France), Dec. 8, 1986, p. 7.

[79]See the quotation from a CPP position paper on the church sector in Dennis Shoesmith, "The Church," in Francisco Nemenzo and R. J. May, Eds., *The Philippines after Marcos*, London and Sydney, Croom and Helm, 1986, p. 84.

[80]Michael Richardson, *Pacific Defense Reporter* (Prahran, Victoria, Australia), November 1986, p. 30.

[81]Interview with de la Torre, loc. cit.; and Richardson, loc. cit. A 1978 CPP document noted that the CNL had "no organizational structure outside of the party and the NDF," but added that it might be valuable to endow it with such a structure. See "Nature of the Church Sector," p.23.

[82]See Interview with a spokesman and a cadre for the CPDF, *National Midweek*, Apr. 8, 1987, pp. 3–5.

[83]Balweg was a CPP secretary in a district of Abra Province as well as an NPA commander until his defection in 1986. On Balweg's defection and the CPLA, see *Business Day*, July 2, 1986, p. 22; *Veritas*, Oct. 2–8, 1986, p.20; and *Ang Pahayagang Malaya*, May 11, 1986, pp. 1, 6.

[84]Asked who was the chairman of the NDF, CPP spokesman Zumel replied at a press conference in March 1986: "We'd rather keep the enemy guessing." *Liberation*, February-March 1986, p. 7.

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gram would be formally approved at a future, but still unscheduled, national-level NDF congress.[85] The CPP Central Committee apparently decided later that year to turn the NDF into a national protogovernmental organ.[86] In February 1987, insurgents in Mindanao convened a conference of delegates representing 21 guerrilla fronts in 14 provinces of the island and elected a 19-member NDF provisional council, to serve as the highest decision-making body for the armed struggle in Mindanao.[87] The NDF later declared that similar councils would be established in Luzon and the Visayas, with the intention of forming a national revolutionary government that would be able to ask for recognition from other governments.[88]

Thus far, the NDF has apparently functioned as the insurgency's main organ of external relations. Through an office in Utrecht, the Netherlands, the NDF has established contacts with European church groups, noncommunist parties, and labor organizations—which have provided most of the financial assistance to the Philippine revolution.[89] It has also established relations with some communist parties in capitalist countries, particularly the Italian and Australian parties.[90] The only ruling political party to recognize the NDF, however, has been Greek Premier Andreas Papandreou's Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement.[91]

Other Linkages

United-front commissions at national and regional levels are also responsible for drawing the "middle forces" into collaboration with the CPP outside the framework of the NDF. "National democratic cells" exist not only within organizations affiliated with the NDF but within a wide variety of educational, church, and other sectoral institutions as well as in "cause-oriented" political groups. According to a Metro Manila cadre involved in united-front work, there are now more than 1,000 people in national democratic cells nationwide.[92] In mass organizations where the CPP has dominant influence, actual party members are complemented in leadership bodies by members of national democratic cells.

Organizations that publicly embrace the CPP's viewpoint on all major issues are referred to internally by the party as "open ND (national democratic) organizations."[93] Among these are the League of Filipino Students, which claims 250,000 members, and the Association of Concerned Teachers. However, the most important such organization to the CPP is the country's leading labor alliance, the Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) or May First Movement.

Founded in 1980 as a fusion of six national unions or union federations, KMU now has 19 affiliated labor federations and claims to have 650,000 members, half of whom are clustered in the Metro Manila area. Its main rival, the Trade Union Congress of the Philippines (TUCP), originally set up by Marcos to unify the labor movement under martial law, claims 1.2 million members.[94] The first chairman and first secretary general of the KMU were arrested by the Marcos regime in 1982, and the KMU was accused of being a "communist front."[95] While denying this, the KMU has not hidden its sympathy for the NPA's armed struggle. At the KMU's Third National Congress in December 1986, CPP Political Bureau member Zumel, then moving freely in Manila under a safe conduct pass granted him during the ceasefire, appeared on stage and read a statement of support for the KMU from the NDF-affiliated Revolutionary Council of Trade Unions.[96]

From the beginning, KMU has used both strikes and other political actions to advance what it calls "nationalist and democratic demands."[97] Its policy toward strikes has been subordinated to the broader political strategy of the left. In the summer of 1986, the KMU agreed to a six-month moratorium on strikes as a "gesture of our principled support for and cooperation with the Aquino government," but it ended the moratorium when the CPP broke with Aquino in December.[98]

Twice in the past two years, the KMU has tried unsuccessfully to launch a general strike. After the murder of its Chairman Rolando Olalia by an unidentified gunmen in November 1986, the KMU called for a four-day general strike, but called off the action after only two days

[85]Interview with Zumel, *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, June 18–19, 1986, pp. 13–14; author's interview with NDF Secretariat cadre, Jan. 16, 1986.

[86]Interview with NDF chief of staff Carolina Malay, Kyodo dispatch, Mar. 11, 1987, in *FBIS-APA*, Mar. 11, 1987, p. P/1.

[87]Interview conducted by Cristostomo, loc. cit.

[88]See fn. 86.

[89]*The Washington Post*, Oct. 18, 1986.

[90]The NDF's international representative, CPP Central Committee member Luis Jalandoni was present at the Australian CP's National Congress in 1987. See *Tribune*, June 10, 1987. The Italian CP is said to maintain *informal contacts with the NDF. See Paul Verschuur*, "Europe's Left Aids Filipino Insurgents," *The Nation* (Bangkok), Apr. 8, 1987, p. 4.

[91]*Far Eastern Economic Review*, Mar. 26, 1987, p. 19.

[92]Interview with CPP cadre, Manila, Aug. 24, 1986.

[93]See "The Current Situation and Our Immediate Tasks," CPP United Front Commission directive, Mar. 14, 1986, p. 8 (from a copy of the original document in the author's possession).

[94]*Philippine Labor Monitor* (Quezon City), Vol. 1, No. 2, 1985, pp. 39–43; *Business Day*, June 2, 1986; *New Day*, May 3–4, 1986.

[95]*Ang Pahayagang Malaya*, May 31, 1986.

[96]AFP dispatch, Manila, Dec. 20, 1986 (??? FBIS??)

[97]*Philippine Labor Monitor*, Vol. 1, No. 2, 1985, p. 45.

[98]*Business Day*, June 2, 1986; *Manila Chronicle*, Dec. 22, 1986.

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

Jaime Tadeo, second from right, at a press conference of the Peasant Movement of the Philippines (Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas, or KMP) denouncing the agrarian reforms of the Aquino government.

—Sygma.

when it failed to paralyze Metro Manila.[99] In October 1987, the KMU failed in its effort to organize a week-long general strike in Metro Manila over its demand for a 10-peso increase in the daily minimum wage.[100]

The other major open ND organization is the Peasant Movement of the Philippines (Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas, or KMP). The KMP, formed in 1985, claims 500,000 members and influence with 2 million peasants, particularly in Central Luzon, Panay, and Western and Northern Mindanao.[101] The chairman of KMP, Jaime Tadeo, is a devout Catholic who left a bureaucratic position with the National Irrigation Administration in 1981 to become vice-chairman of a farmers' cooperative. Since then, he has become an advocate of radical nationalism and has called for direct action by peasants to advance their interests, including the seizure of lands owned by Marcos cronies.[102]

Another aspect of CPP united-front work since the early 1980's has been the effort to effect legal alliances between "open ND organizations" and independent opposition forces, including both liberal democrats (who are pro-capitalist but anti-fascist and opposed to US bases) and social democrats (who are seen as opposed to the bases but also generally anti-communist). As the level of urban struggle and of the cooperation between NDF and independent opposition political forces increased in 1983–84, many felt the need for an organization that could coordinate future actions nationwide against Marcos. In April 1985, a congress was convened to form BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan), uniting representatives of the three ideological tendencies: national democratic, liberal democratic, and social democratic.

Liberal democrats and social democrats went to the conference under the impression that BAYAN would be organized on the principle of equality between the three

[99] *Manila Chronicle*, Nov. 19, 1986.

[100] AFP dispatch, Oct. 15, 1987, *FBIS-EAS*, Oct. 14, 1987, p. 33.

[101] *New Straits Times* (Kuala Lumpur), Mar. 5, 1986, p. 10.

[102] Eduardo B. Pacheco, "The Voice that Jimmy Tadeo Hears," *Veritas*, Dec. 15, 1985, p. 16. More than 50,000 peasant families are said to have occupied in excess of 70,000 hectares of crony-owned lands in at least 15 provinces. See Kyodo dispatch, July 23, 1987, in *FBIS-EAS*, July 23, 1987, p. L/12.

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ideological tendencies. The CPP leadership, however, conceived of the organization as having a national democratic orientation and a "unified command."[103] Party representatives insisted that national democrats have numerical superiority in the national council on the ground that they represented by far the most activists in the anti-dictatorship movement. Most of the liberal democrats and social democrats walked out of the congress, leaving BAYAN as a umbrella organization only for groups sharing the national democratic line, along with some independent democratic and nationalist anti-Marcos individuals.[104]

BAYAN began with 225 activist groups from various sectors, and now claims 1,300 affiliated groups; however, it has refused to identify many of them.[105] The bulk of the 2 million activists it claims to represent come from the KMU and the KMP. With seven regional chapters and 22 provincial chapters, BAYAN became during the last months of the Marcos administration a center for coordinating mass protests and "people's strikes" in the Visayas and Mindanao, under the direction of its "Popular Struggles Commission."[106]

However, the decision of Corazon Aquino to run in the snap presidential election of February 7, 1985, and the CPP policy to boycott that election caused severe problems for BAYAN. Implementing the boycott decision, by the organization's own admission, "seriously debilitated BAYAN politically and organizationally. . . ."[107] Many regional leaders of BAYAN disregarded the national-level policy and opted for participation, while many member organizations were divided or otherwise immobilized by the policy. And where BAYAN did implement the boycott, its rallies were many times smaller than those of the Aquino campaign.[108]

Another political organization reflecting the influence of the CPP but more autonomous from it is the Partido ng

Former New People's Army Chief Bernabe Buscayno seen at a campaign rally in December 1986.

—Manuel Ceneta/Black Star.

Bayan (PnB), a legal political party started in 1986 by some officials of BAYAN and ex-detainees who had once been high officials in the CPP. Among the founders were former CPP chairman Sison, former NPA commander Bernabe Buscayno, and KMU Chairman Rolando Olalia, who became the party's first chairman. Olalia publicly distinguished between PnB's agreement with the "principles, objectives and . . . programs of government" of the CPP/NDF, and renunciation of any interest in or support for armed struggle. The party, Olalia said, was committing solely to "parliamentary struggle."[109] Nevertheless, most of the delegates to PnB's founding convention in August 1986 appear to have been strongly committed to the armed struggle.[110] Some from Southern Luzon said they were members of an organization of tenant coconut farmers affiliated with the NDF.[111]

[103]Leandro Alejandro (Secretary-General), "BAYAN Annual Report," *Documents of the Second National Congress of the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan*, July 1986, pp. 5–6; author's interview with a CPP cadre, Aug. 19, 1986.

[104]Interview with several non-CPP participants in the negotiations before and during the congress. For an account of the negotiations from the viewpoint of one liberal democrat, see Ramon del Rosario, Jr., "Drawing the Line," *Business Day*, May 21, 1985. The CPP created a new term, "Popular Democratic Coalition," to refer to BAYAN. See "The Current Situation and Our Immediate Tasks," p. 8.

[105]"Speech of Sen. Lorenzo Tanada at BAYAN's Second National Congress," *Documents of the Second National Conference . . .*, p. 4; Cina Apostal, "The Futures of Their Causes," *National Midweek*, Feb. 25, 1987, p. 12. This latter source notes that the complete list of member organizations is "confidential."

[106]"BAYAN Annual Report," loc. cit., p. 13.

[107]*Ibid.*

[108]Ibid, p. 14; P. N. Abinales, "Cory Aquino's Presidency and BAYAN's Dilemma," *Veritas*, Mar. 16, 1986, p. 14; Candy Oyuimpo, "Boycotters Not Vital to Final Count," *Mr. & Ms.*, Feb. 7–11, 1986, p. 9.

[109]Interview with Rolando Olalia, then PnB chairman, *Filipino Times*, Sept. 12–18, 1986, pp. 1, 5, 6.

[110]The author, who attended the convention as an observer, heard a speaker representing the urban poor enthusiastically applauded after praising the NPA. The same speaker said that farmers in Samar had told him that if the NPA gave themselves up, the farmer would continue the struggle. Half of the delegates represented regions; the other half represented sectors of society—45 percent from the peasantry, 35 percent from the workers, and 20 percent from the middle class. See press conference remarks by acting Secretary-General Alan Jasmines, Quezon City, Aug. 19, 1987.

[111]Author's interview with members of the delegation from Southern Tagalog, Aug. 31, 1986.

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Despite the close personal and ideological links between the PnB and the CPP, the new party's leaders do not agree with the CPP on all tactical or even all strategic issues. Although the CPP probably agreed to the formation of PnB, it was also anxious that the PnB might contribute to the growth of "reformist illusions"—the belief that elections can resolve fundamental political and socio-economic problems—within the national democratic movement.[112] Those fears appeared to be realized when the PnB's best-known senatorial candidate in the May 1987 Congressional elections, Bernabe Buscayno (the former Commander Dante), publicly asserted during the course of the campaign that the continuation of the armed struggle would be a mistake for the revolutionaries.[113]

In the May 1987 elections, the new party combined with BAYAN and Volunteers for Popular Democracy[114] to sponsor an electoral slate under the name Alliance for New Politics. The results were disappointing: only three of 80 PnB candidates for the House of Representatives were elected, and the entire PnB Senate slate finished last, with fewer votes than those for the old Marcos KBL party.[115] Lack of funds was a major problem, as was military or paramilitary harassment—more than 50 people connected with the electoral slates led by the PnB were killed during and immediately after the campaign, and others were arrested and detained.[116] The PnB alleged irregularities in the counting of votes in some areas, which—it is suggested—contributed to the low totals for PnB candidates.[117]

There are also indications that the support provided by the CPP/NPA apparatus to PnB candidates was either ineffective or nonexistent. It is possible, of course, that the CPP was unable to influence its mass base to vote for PnB candidates rather than traditional candidates, just as it failed earlier to get them to boycott the presidential election or to vote against the constitution.[118] There were reports of NPA pressure on voters in their guerrilla zones in Leyte and Samar, but the NPA also made deals with an unknown number of traditional politicians running for the House. The politicians were told that they would be allowed to campaign freely in NPA areas in return for large financial contributions to the insurgents; otherwise, the NPA would "get in their way." The typical payment required by the NPA for traditional candidates to run without NPA opposition was reportedly 50,000 pesos ($2,500).[119]

The CPP seemed to take comfort in the PnB's electoral failure. CPP spokesman Satur Ocampo declared that the results "reaffirm for those who think that this is an option to armed struggle that they are wrong." In a news conference after the vote, Fr. de la Torre complained—in an obvious barb at the CPP—about the left's "half-heartedness" in entering the electoral arena.[120]

Strategic Failures

The nonviolent transition from the Marcos dictatorship to the Corazon Aquino government created an unprecedented political situation which forced the CPP to make significant adjustments in its strategy. It stimulated the first serious intraparty questioning of the strategy of protracted people's war since its adoption. During 1986, CPP leaders stepped back temporarily from the all-out pursuit of military parity to consolidate its political position, with the objective of convincing the barrio population that armed struggle was necessary.

Until 1986, it had been an unchallenged central tenet of the CPP's general line that the party would win power directly through a military victory. Mass political movements in the cities were viewed only as a means of supporting the armed struggle, not as a potential vehicle for overthrowing the old regime. The vision of final victory projected by the party in the mid-1970's was one in which NPA troops from the North and South would con-

[112]The CPP's concern about "reformist illusions" in the revolutionary movement is discussed in "Planning for a Post-Marcos Era," *Liberation*, January-February 1985. CPP leaders must have been concerned that the first secretary-general of the PnB was Romeo Candazo, who was once head of the Youth and Students Bureau of the CPP and a member of the Manila-Rizal Committee that defied the Executive Committee and participated in the 1978 Batasan elections. See *The New Philippines Daily Express* (Manila), Sept. 30, 1986.

[113]Interview with Paulynn Sicam, *Manila Chronicle*, Apr. 3, 1987, reprinted in *Ang Katipunan* (Berkeley, CA), June 1987, pp. 7–8.

[114]Volunteers for Popular Democracy was started in 1986 by former Chairman of Christians for National Liberation Fr. Edicio de la Torre and former NDF cadre Horacio "Boy" Morales, both ex-detainees released from prison by President Aquino. Although it identifies itself with national democratic forces, it advocates a distinctly different political line, which hinges on the idea of a multiclass coalition in which the middle class would be given an important role. For an explication of the concept, see Edicio de la Torre, "The Politics of Popular Democracy," and Horacio R. Morales, Jr., "Political Economy of Popular Democracy," in *Two Essays on Popular Democracy*, Quezon City, Institute for Popular Democracy, 1986.

[115]*Manila Chronicle*, June 9, 1987.

[116]*Philippine Daily Inquirer*, June 22, 1987, pp. 1, 10.

[117]Buscayno, for example, received only two votes in his home town in Pampanga province, according to running mate Nelia Sancho, speaking in Washington, DC, Aug. 13, 1987.

[118]After the boycott debacle, the Political Bureau observed that "a large, if not the larger, part of our own mass base did not heed the boycott call and voted for the opposition." Memorandum to Members of the Central Committee from the Political Bureau, "Resolution on the Party's Tactics Regarding the Snap Elections," May 7, 1986 (xerox copy of original document).

[119]Column by Jesus Bigornia, *Manila Bulletin*, June 5, 1987; talk by Prof. Carl Lande, Washington, DC, July 1987.

[120]Quoted in *Taliba* (Oakland, CA), June 1, 1987.

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verge on the capital area in a general offensive.[121] CPP leaders had dismissed electoral struggle as a means of ousting the Marcos regime, and had ruled out any cooperation with Senator Benigno Aquino's Laban Party in the elections for an interim National Assembly. Leading cadres in the Metro Manila branch of the party who participated in the election on their own were removed from their positions.[122] The CPP also joined with independent leftist opposition forces in boycotting the 1984 National Assembly election, but 85 percent of the registered voters went to the polls to elect opposition candidates.

When, in November 1985, Marcos called for a snap presidential election and the opposition united behind the candidacy of Corazon Aquino, the CPP's decision to boycott was almost automatic. In late December 1985, the EC adopted a memorandum calling for a boycott of the snap election, not only to expose the election itself as a sham, but also to "expose the conservative bourgeois opposition and bourgeois reform." Emphasizing Aquino's own "comprador-landlord class background," the memo depicted the election as simply "a noisy and empty political battle" between factions of the ruling class.[123]

This decision was extremely controversial among party cadres: the party's National Urban Commission had recommended to the EC that the party expose the rigged elections but also cooperate with other "progressive organizations" in the election campaign.[124] Nevertheless, it was only in the last few days before the election, long after the groundswell of popular support for Aquino and the unpopularity of the boycott policy even among national democrats were clear, that the EC recognized that the political costs of the boycott would be serious and ordered party cadres and ND groups to shift to a posture of merely opposing election fraud and terrorism.[125]

The ouster of Marcos by a combination of military revolt and massive popular nonviolent resistance was thus a stunning setback to the CPP, an event that unleashed a flood of criticism from within the party. Lower-level party units submitted papers taking the EC to task for "mechanical class analysis," and failures in united-front work (referring to the party's refusal to see the value of cooperation with the pro-Aquino forces).[126] Some cadres went further, arguing that the boycott policy was a "strategic" error rooted in the very line of "protracted people's war."

Corazon Aquino at the polls during the February 1986 election that saw her defeat incumbent Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos.

—Sandro Tucci/Gamma-Liaison.

In particular, a widely circulated paper by a cadre writing under the name Marty Villalobos argued that the party had been "so fixated on the 'protracted people's war' strategy" that it had failed to perceive the "clear signs of an insurrectionary situation developing" in Metro Manila. Villalobos blamed the CPP's own "serious tendency toward inflexibility and sectarianism" in dealing with other organizations for the failure of "people's strikes" to develop in the Metro Manila area as they had in other urban areas in 1984–85. He charged that the CPP had been so influenced by the Chinese conception of tactical alliances with the bourgeoisie—which demanded that the latter agree with the party's position on every issue—that it had lost opportunities for leading successful mass struggles in the capital.[127]

In a second paper, Villalobos called for an "insurrectional strategy," in which political struggle would play

[121]See Guerrero, *Philippine Society and Revolution*, pp. 281–84; "Our Urgent Tasks," a key Central Committee document, dated June 25, 1976, (mimeographed), p. 28.

[122]Interview with CPP cadre, Manila, Aug. 19, 1986.

[123]Memorandum from the CPP Executive Committee to party cadres, Dec. 23, 1985, quoted in "What CPP/NPA say about Elections: 'Boycott and Launch Military Operation'," *Mr & Ms.*, Special Edition, Feb. 7–13, 1986, p. 9.

[124]"Some Clarifications," *Praktika* (underground publication of the National Urban Commission), Vol 1, No. 2, August 1986, pp. 111–12.

[125]"Resolution on the Party's Tactics Regarding the Snap Election." Memorandum from the Political Bureau to members of the Central Committee, May 7, 1986 (xerox copy of original document).

[126]A. R. Magno, "CPP: Rethinking the Revolutionary Process," *Diliman Review* (Quezon City), Vol. 34, No. 4, 1986, p. 19.

[127]Marty Villalobos (pseud.), "Where the Party Faltered: An Analysis of the Snap Polls and the February Uprising," unpublished paper, n.d., pp. 4, 6–8, 13–20.

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the decisive role, while armed struggle would play a supporting one.[128] The party would be concerned less about moving to a higher stage of military development than with heightening mass consciousness and morale for an eventual urban insurrection. He cited Nicaragua as a case in which revolutionary forces were victorious without having to advance from guerrilla warfare to regular mobile warfare.

This critique of people's war was echoed by the party's National Urban Commission in a new journal, *Praktika,* first published in May 1986 in response to demands for intraparty debate on theoretical and strategic issues.[129] The journal called the boycott "an ultra-left maneuver" and a reflection of the party's "doctrinaire tendency" to slight the "anti-fascist movement" and its insistence on dominating any alliances with nonparty groups. The analysis ended with a plea for an "effort at rectification"—a term suggesting gross ideological and/or strategic errors and recalling the attack on the old PKP's leadership that had led to the formation of the new CPP in 1968.[130]

The EC's parent body, the Political Bureau, responded to the pressure from below by reprimanding the EC, but refused to endorse the argument of the "rectificationists." It published a resolution in May 1986 concluding that the EC had committed a "major tactical blunder," which had limited the party's maneuverability, while "rival political organizations reaped a bonanza . . . ." It criticized the EC's failure to give sufficient weight to the "anti-fascist struggle," which it said should have been primary during and after the election campaign. The boycott policy had concentrated on "consolidating the advanced section of the people," the resolution observed, just when the people as a whole were "gearing for a decisive battle with the fascist dictatorship."[131]

By defining the error as only "tactical," however, the Political Bureau chose not to probe the deeper implications of the boycott decision. In its resolution on "Present Situation and Tasks" following a meeting in May, the EC explicitly stated that past experience had "confirmed the correctness of the line and overall practice" of the CPP. It reaffirmed the centrality of armed struggle, stating that it would be the main method of gaining victory, although it now added that armed struggle must henceforth have "political impact."[132]

The resolution did appear to make some moves in the direction of giving greater prominence to united-front work and mass movements in urban areas. It endorsed preparations for urban "insurrection," but only in conjunction with "armed uprisings," i.e., as part of a plan for military victory. The resolution called for tactical alliances with the more progressive elements of the ruling class against "reactionary" elements centered in the military. However, this document viewed the Aquino government as representing the "semi-feudal, semi-colonial ruling classes" and as being obliged to maintain those classes in power. The EC also emphasized that the government's repressive apparatus remained unchanged from that of the Marcos regime and was still controlled by the right.

This analysis and prescription generated further critical reactions from the "rectificationists." *Praktika* published an unprecedented article critiquing the EC's resolution and presenting an alternative definition of the situation.[133] The author asserted that the Aquino government's victory over the Marcos regime was a great advantage to the revolution, that the government bore a "democratic character and orientation," with the liberal democrats having "considerable initiative and influence" within it. It described Aquino herself as keeping the Philippine military in check by her "moral ascendancy and political superiority" and her ability to retain overwhelming popular support. The author argued that the main danger to the "democratic and revolutionary forces" was fascism, meaning the right-wing opponents of Aquino and their military allies—not the "big comprador bourgeoisie and landlords."

The dissident cadre criticized the CPP's insistence that even liberal democrats accept the national democratic line as an example of "vulgar and mechanical interpretations of class analysis." It concluded with a plea for reconsideration of the "stale prescription" that political struggle must always take a "secondary or subordinate position in relation to armed struggle." Not only should the party accord political struggle a much larger role, argued the author, it should broaden its united front and focus on the possibility of urban insurrection.

By summer 1986, then, sharp debate had emerged within the CPP on at least three major issues: the roles and relative importance of armed struggle and political struggle in revolutionary strategy, the nature of the Aquino government, and the nature of the united front.

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[128]Marty Villalobos, "On the Insurrectional Strategy," unpublished paper, Mar. 30, 1986, p. 5.

[129]The CPP's theoretical journal *Rebolusyon* (Revolution), started by the Central Committee in 1976, had ceased publication in the late 1970's. See "Our Urgent Tasks," p. 10.

[130]"When a Zigzag Turn is Shorter than a Straight Route," *Praktika,* Vol. 1, No. 1, May 14, 1986, pp. 19–22. A companion piece by the "National Youth and Student Department" of the commission followed a similar line.

[131]"Resolution on the Party's Tactics Regarding the Snap Election."

[132]This description of the May 1986 EC resolution is based on Carol Victoria, "A Reply to the Resolution," *Praktika,* Vol. 1, No. 2, August 1986, pp. 60–69, and the author's interview with a CPP cadre, Manila, Aug. 24, 1986.

[133]"A Reply to the Resolution," pp. 53–75.

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

Negotiators agree on November 27, 1986, to a 60-day ceasefire between the forces of the Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army and the Government of President Corazon Aquino; from left to right, government spokesmen Teofisto Guingona, Chairman of the Audit Commission, and Ramon V. Mitra, Minister of Agriculture, and NDF representatives (on behalf of the CPP) Satur Ocampo, Antonio Zumel, and Carolina Malay.

—Sandro Tucci/Gamma-Liaison.

Satur Ocampo, a Central Committee member, confirmed to the author in an interview in September 1986 that there were "continuing discussions" and "exchanges of opinion" on strategic and ideological issues, "because the situation is still in transition."

Policy Shifts

Aquino's popularity and her offer to negotiate with the insurgent leadership on a ceasefire and political settlement, combined with pressure from within the party, resulted in significant adjustments in CPP policies. The first major policy shift after Aquino's inauguration was to try for a tactical alliance with the progressive wing of the Aquino government against its "fascist" opponents. The EC directed legal organizations under CPP direction to support the progressive policies of the Aquino government and suggested the possibility of cooperation with it in a "democratic coalition government."[134]

The second policy shift was to reduce the level of NPA tactical offensives and to be more selective in choosing targets. The new military line, reflected in an early party assessment, prohibited "arms-snatching with gunfire" and raids on municipalities or capitals.[135] The NPA was ordered not to attack AFP units unless the latter were engaged in offensive actions. The AFP firmed a "marked reduction" in NPA initiation of contacts.[136]

The most important readjustment in CPP strategy, however, was its willingness to begin negotiations with Aquino on a peace agreement. The rationale for the decision, articulated in a EC memorandum to all national

[134]"The Current Situation and Our Immediate Tasks," p. 9.

[135]*Veritas*, Apr. 3, 1986.

[136]Letter from the NPA Operational Command, Nueva Vizcaya-Ifugao Provinces to Commanders of AFP units in Nueva Vizcaya-Ifugao, July 12, 1986 (mimeographed); Brig. Gen. Edmundo Ermita, Deputy Chief of Staff, quoted in PNA, April 15, 1986, *FBIS-APA*, Apr. 16, 1986, p. P/9.

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and territorial units in July, had three main points. The first was the fear of being politically isolated: "We need to enter into political negotiations . . . to open the possibility of a ceasefire," it explained, because of the danger that "we can be isolated and lose the initiative on this issue." Second, the negotiations would offer the CPP both an opportunity to achieve "formal recognition of the national stature and role of the party in the revolutionary movement" and a platform to educate the population on "the need for . . . armed revolution in the present situation." Third, negotiations would "test the extent, limit, or capacity of the new government's reformism . . . " while "keep[ing] the door open as much as possible for tactical alliances against the diehard reactionaries . . . ."[137] The CPP's United Front Commission and National Urban Commission succinctly explained the primary reason for entering into peace negotiations in a joint memorandum which said that the party was in a "relatively defensive tactical position."[138]

As the CPP entered into negotiations with the Aquino government in August 1986, it was ready for a wide range of possibilities, including limited, temporary accords on humanitarian issues, depending on how the government's posture evolved.[139] Despite its skepticism about the government's willingness to negotiate on fundamental political and economic issues and a number of unresolved military-security issues, the CPP agreed to a 60-day ceasefire, beginning on December 9, that would permit the two sides to engage in substantive political negotiations.[140]

Before the ceasefire had expired, however, the CPP leadership had decided to reverse course and to resume the armed struggle. Three fundamental considerations underlay that decision: first, the party's assessment of the Aquino government grew markedly more negative during the December–January period. The CPP had already viewed Aquino as having moved to the right as early as the end of the summer, because of her appointments to the Constitutional Commission, her policies toward economic recovery, and the lack of change in the military.[141] By January, CPP leaders clearly viewed the government as having moved even farther to the right. The liberal wing of the government, which had figured prominently in the party's earlier assessments, had been dramatically weakened, in part because Aquino had replaced the left-leaning Labor Minister Augusto Sanchez and Local Government Minister Aquilino Pimentel with more conservative figures after the firing of Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile.

Moreover, the plebiscite on the draft constitution, scheduled for early February 1987, imposed a deadline on the CPP to adopt a clear position on Aquino. Sometime in December, after weeks of intraparty debate, the CPP decided to campaign against ratification of the constitution because of its "anti-people" and "anti-nationalist" provisions. Significantly, KMU followed suit and at its Third National Congress on December 22, voted for rejection of the charter on the grounds that it failed to define workers' rights or protect the economy against foreign domination; the KMU simultaneously ended the policy of "maximum restraint" regarding strikes that it had followed since June.[142] Suspension of the political talks thus appears to have been linked to the party's tactical decision to come out against the Aquino government and to seek to prevent it from consolidating power through a big victory in the constitutional plebiscite.

Finally, the CPP leaders were also worried that extending the ceasefire and negotiations would weaken both the will and capability of the revolutionary movement to carry out the strategy of "people's war." Even as they entered into the negotiations, the CPP leaders were haunted by the fear that a ceasefire and prolonged negotiations would tend to strengthen tendencies toward "reformist illusions" and "parliamentarist beliefs" among the people, especially the urban petty-bourgeoisie.[143] They may have seen further evidence during the ceasefire period of a tendency even within the CPP/NPA to favor peaceful political struggle over armed struggle. The further development of the NPA, moreover, required regular tactical offensives, which the ceasefire had brought to a standstill.[144]

Resuming the Struggle

In mid-January, new orders went out to NDF negotiators to disengage from the negotiations by January 22 and to the open ND organizations to step up mass

[137]"Negotiations about a Ceasefire."

[138]Text of Joint Memorandum by the National Urban Commission and the United Front Commission, July 1986 (cited below as "Joint Memorandum"), published in full in *The New Philippines Daily Express*, Nov. 28, 1986, p. 7.

[139]Ibid.

[140]For a detailed discussion of the ceasefire agreement, see Porter, *The Politics of Counterinsurgency*, pp. 116–18.

[141]Interview with Ocampo, Sept. 1, 1986.

[142]*Manila Chronicle*, Dec. 22, 1986.

[143]"Negotiations about a Ceasefire," p. 7.

[144]"Joint Memorandum." NDF spokesman were reported at the end of the ceasefire period to have expressed the fear that many NPA guerrillas might be attracted to offers of amnesty and material benefit in a prolonged ceasefire. See AFP dispatch, Feb.1, 1987, in *FBIS-APA*, Feb. 3, 1987, p. P/11. These fears had been heightened by the evident desire of some regional CPP/NPA units to negotiate on ceasefires with local governments. See *Manila Chronicle*, Oct. 23, 1986.

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movement protests against the government's policies.[145] On the morning of January 22, the NDF and government delegations jointly announced the indefinite suspension of the political talks. Shortly after that announcement, some 30,000 members of the KMP staged a march on Malacanang palace, during which 15 demonstrators were killed and 90 others were injured when government security personnel fired into the crowd. The incident was the culmination of a series of demonstrations by the KMP demanding land reform and, by implication, attacking the draft constitution as insufficient.[146]

The shift to open propaganda attacks on the Aquino government and the return to armed struggle was completed on February 7 when NDF negotiators announced that the insurgents would not renew the ceasefire upon its February 8 expiration. The NDF panel demanded, among other preconditions for a return to negotiations, that Aquino "thoroughly reform and reorient" the AFP and recognize that the NDF program has the support of a "considerable section of the population."[147] The CPP's official organ then launched its first harsh propaganda attack on the Aquino government, making reference to the "reactionary rule of the US-Aquino clique that is hell-bent on imposing its oppressive and exploitative powers."[148]

That the new hard line was not universally accepted was quite evident from the response of CPP/NPA and related national democratic activists to the constitutional referendum. It had, after all, been only after spirited debate that the KMU had voted in December to seek the defeat of the new draft constitution.[149] Although KMP also supported the defeat of the charter, a BAYAN meeting in December had seen 96 of its member organizations vote for a "critical yes" position on the referendum, while 75 voted for its defeat, and 10 voted for abstention. After a bitter struggle, BAYAN called in January for people to "vote according to conscience." The PnB, too, intially favored the "critical yes" posture, and only after intense pressure from the CPP, adopted a compromise position demanding that the plebiscite be postponed. However, some 50 leftist organizations combined to advocate critical ratification.[150] Moreover, the CPP/NPA leadership in regions of Mindanao and Negros (where the party is allied with the KMU-affiliated National Federation of Sugar Workers) openly defied the central leadership and adopted the position of critical ratification.[151]

After the overwhelming 77 percent vote in favor of the constitution on February 2, CPP leaders were quick to explain the failure of their campaign against the constitution as a result of the failed plot by Marcos loyalists and allies of former Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile to overthrow the Aquino government, which—they argued—switched many "No" votes to "Yes."[152] Even in such strongholds of the NPA as the Bicol region, Panay, Negros, and Samar, however, the party could not prevent people from voting for the new charter. In Barangay San Juan, in the Samal municipality of Bataan province, where there had been a demonstration welcoming NDF negotiators in December, the vote went 60:40 in favor of the constitution.[153]

Potentially more serious for the CPP than the break in the ranks of supporters over the constitutional poll is what appears to be a growing desire for peace on the part of the population in areas where the CPP/NPA effort has been well-organized. While CPP leaders were planning to renew armed struggle, party leaders in Northern, Southeastern, and Southern Mindanao were declaring publicly that the people in their respective regions wanted the ceasefire extended. Regional CPP officials in Northern and Central Mindanao attended a "peace summit" with bishops, governors, and military commanders and signed a resolution calling for a Mindanao-wide ceasefire and continued dialogue for peace, because "we cannot just negate the clamor of the people."[154] The official spokesman of the Northwestern Mindanao NDF reportedly signed a ceasefire agreement with the government in defiance of the national CPP policy and, in May, appeared at a rally for peace with government civilian and military officials and a Catholic bishop.[155]

Former NPA commander Bernabe Buscayno, released by Aquino in March 1986, warned his former comrades in the party that rural people "are in no mood

[145]Private communication from a Filipino journalist with wide contacts in the CPP, Jan. 22, 1987. See also AFP dispatch, Feb. 1, 1987, loc. cit.

[146]*Asiaweek*, Feb. 1, 1987, p. 22.

[147]Paid advertisement by the NDF, signed by Satur Ocampo, Antonio Zumel, and Carolina Malay, *Ang Pahayagang Malaya*, Feb. 8, 1987, p. 7.

[148]*Ang Bayan*, February 1987, quoted in *Ang Pahayagang Malaya*, Mar. 7, 1987, p. 1.

[149]*Correspondence*, Vol. 2, No. 1, January 1987, pp. 4–5. *Correspondence* is published by the KMU International Affairs Department. Two of KMU's major affiliates, the National Federation of Sugar Workers and the National Federation of Labor, broke with the KMU position and supported ratification. See *Ang Pahayagang Malaya*, Jan. 19, 1987.

[150]Paul Petitjean, "A Temporary and Fragile Success for Cory," *International Viewpoint*, Feb. 23, 1987.

[151]*Ang Pahayagang Malaya*, Oct. 20, 1987. Some NPA cadres in Negros were reported to have separated from the insurgent forces to form their own military units, while adopting the position of critical collaboration with the government. Ibid.

[152]*Manila Chronicle*, Feb. 9, 1987

[153]Ibid., Feb. 9, 1987, p. 8. For an eyewitness description and photographs of the welcoming celebration for NPA guerrillas in Samal on December 11, see *National Midweek*, Dec. 24, 1986, pp. 6–7.

[154]*Manila Chronicle*, Jan. 18, 1987, p. 2.

[155]Ibid., June 13, 1987. The NDF spokesman Ike de los Reyes, was apparently killed by government troops in a raid in June 1987.

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to support armed struggle except for those who are currently under armed repression . . . ." After spending a great deal of time in the rural areas as a senatorial candidate on the PnB/Alliance for New Politics slate, Buscayno observed that rural people had experienced peace during the ceasefire for the first time in many years, and that their mood was different from that in the Marcos period. "If [the CPP leaders] insist on armed struggle," he told an interviewer, "they will not get the support they used to get from the people . . . . The people want . . . to give Cory and democracy a chance."[156] Buscayno has been especially critical of the NPA's use of urban assassination as a political-military method—a practice that makes legal leftists like himself the likely target of right-wing counterassassination.[157]

Most of the CPP's central leadership, however, not only rejected such views but went on the political offensive to suppress them within the party. With the resumption of armed struggle, they demanded a return to ideological unity and discipline within the party. In May 1987, the CPP held a theoretical conference at which the need for ideological struggle against "right opportunism" and "reformism" was stressed. The message was aimed squarely at those within the party who had called for less emphasis on armed struggle and more emphasis on cooperation with "reformists"—or, even worse, had advocated a return to a ceasefire and negotiations. It was also directed at Buscayno and others in the legal left who had criticized the return to armed struggle.[158]

The lively intraparty debate that had flourished in 1986 was virtually dead by the summer of 1987. The National Urban Commission's journal, *Praktika,* never appeared again after publishing in August 1986 its strong critique of the May 1986 EC resolution. The Commission's officials, who had supported the "rectificationist" position, now toed the new party line. Party cadres who were known to have been dissenters were warned to support the line or face party discipline.[159]

Conclusion

With the breakdown of the ceasefire and political negotiations in February 1987, both the Aquino government and the CPP have girded for a more intense military conflict. President Aquino, after having tried a policy of negotiations during her first year in office, has now accepted most of the recommendations of the Philippine military for coping with the insurgency. She has increased military pay and the military budget in general, requested more helicopters and other military assistance from abroad, postponed plans to dismantle the untrained and often undisciplined CHDF units, and given up investigations of human rights abuses by the Philippine military. The government has apparently pinned its hopes for success against the insurgents on a combination of military pressure, economic growth, and some form of extensive land reform.

The CPP/NPA, for its part, is attempting to speed up the pace of the armed struggle. This includes extending the scope of its program of assassination to US personnel in the Philippines. In early November, Satur Ocampo said that the NDF took responsibility for the October killing of three Americans near Clark Air Force Base. He warned that US officials, both civilian and military, who are believed to be involved in the war effort would be targeted for assassination.[160] Later in November, the party newspaper spoke of an increasing possibility of direct American military intervention in the conflict and saw this as creating an "urgent need to secure heavier arms, like mortars, anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons."[161]

The escalation of violence by both sides is not likely to bring any clear advantage to either the government or the insurgents. The CPP/NPA armed insurgency is a strong political-military movement that does not appear vulnerable, at least in the short run, to any conceivable military pressures that might be placed on it. But it may have difficulty expanding its political base further, and there are also limitations on how far it can grow militarily. It also has certain clear vulnerabilities that could erode its political strength. Its primary support is among the poor peasants and agricultural workers whose livelihood has been improved by the reorganization of the communities under NPA auspices. However, rising demands by poor peasants could push middle peasants and landowners to abandon NPA zones, which would deprive the insurgency of productive resources.

Its ability to win the sympathies of a considerable segment of the intelligentsia had been one of the CPP's strengths during its period of rapid growth. By continuing a war against Aquino, however, the CPP risks the eventual possibility of serious erosion or even disintegration of a segment of its rural support base as well as of the sympathy of those in the "middle forces" who

[156]Interview with Buscayno, *Manila Chronicle,* Apr. 3, 1987, reprinted in *Ang Katipunan,* June 1987, pp. 7–8.

[157]Buscayno survived such an assassination attempt on June 8, 1987.

[158]Private communication from a Filipino journalist (see fn 145).

[159]The National Urban Commission itself was reported to have been disbanded, with some of its responsibilities turned over to the National Military Commission. See *Newsweek* (New York), Aug. 17, 1987, p. 18.

[160]Kyodo dispatch, Nov. 6, 1987, in *FBIS-EAS,* Nov. 6, 1987, p. 30.

[161]AFP dispatch, Nov. 25, 1987, citing *Ang Bayan,* in *FBIS-EAS,* Nov. 27, 1987, p. 36.

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have taken a national democratic stance in the past. Electoral politics are deeply embedded in Philippine society, and the possibility of party struggle in a democratic regime will continue to exert an attraction for CPP sympathizers and even some party cadres. The CPP leadership may calculate that the political costs of pushing forward the armed struggle will be more than outweighed in the longer run by popular revulsion at the AFP's counterinsurgency operations, at abuses by vigilante groups that have been associated with the government, and by a failure on the part of Aquino to deliver on promises of social justice. Even if it is wrong in that calculation, it is likely to be able to mobilize enough manpower and economic resources to escalate the conflict further in the coming years.

The inability of the NPA to arm its guerrilla forces adequately blocks the way to a military victory. But the insurgents can certainly deny victory to the AFP, even if the party suffers a net reduction in its mass base due to alienation of middle and rich peasants by its continued armed struggle and heavy taxation. Barring a renewed attempt at negotiating a political-military accommodation, therefore, the most likely prospect for the foreseeable future is a bloody, economically draining, and inconclusive war.

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China's *Nomenklatura* System

John P. Burns

In its attempt to ensure the success of the Four Modernizations drive, the leadership of the People's Republic of China has made major efforts in the 1980's to revitalize the cadre management system that was instituted in the 1950's and early 1960's and to reestablish control of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) over it. This undertaking marks official recognition of the fact that the success of innumerable reform initiatives hinges on correcting the shortcomings of the existing cadre system, especially those aspects of it that impede the large-scale qualitative elite transformation required by the modernization drive.[1]

A central target of recent changes is the *nomenklatura* system—the critical feature of the cadre management system. The *nomenklatura* (*zhiwu mingcheng biao*) system[2] consists of lists of leading positions over which party committees exercise the power of appointment, lists of reserve cadre for the available positions, and the institutions and processes for making the appropriate personnel changes. The system is arguably the major instrument of Communist Party control over contemporary China's political, economic, social, and cultural institutions. Through *nomenklatura*, a variant of which is employed by all communist parties in power,[3] authorities ensure that leading institutions throughout the country will exercise only the autonomy granted to them by the party.

China's *nomenklatura* operates within a complex hierarchy of authority. For example, organizations in China exist in a hierarchy of ranks. The state bureaucracy is organized territorially. Below the central government in Beijing are 22 provinces, five autonomous regions, and three centrally administered cities (Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin), all of equal rank. At the next lower level are 175 prefectures or prefecture-level units, and below them are more than 2,000 counties or county-level units.[4] A hierarchy of party committees, extending downward from the Central Committee in Beijing, parallels this structure.

In the Chinese administrative hierarchy, ministers and deputy ministers of central ministries in Beijing are of equal rank to governors and deputy governors of provinces. Heads of general bureaus (*zongju*) at the center are equivalent to heads of provincial-level commissions, and heads of bureaus (*ju* and *si*) of central ministries and commissions are of equal rank to heads of provincial bureaus (*ting* and *ju*) and to heads of prefectures.[5]

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[1]For further discussion, see Melanie Manion, "The Cadre Management System, Post-Mao: The Appointment, Promotion, Transfer, and Removal of Party and State Leaders," *The China Quarterly* (London), June 1985, pp. 203–33.

[2]Bohdan Harasymiw described the term "nomenklatura" (meaning "nomenclature") in the following terms: "a list of positions, arranged in order of seniority, including a description of the duties of each office. Its political importance comes from the fact that the party's *nomenklatura*—and it alone—contains the most important leading positions in all organized activities of social life." See Harasymiw's seminal article, "*Nomenklatura:* The Soviet Communist Party's Leadership Recruitment System," *Canadian Journal of Political Science* (Waterloo, Ontario), December 1969, p. 494.

[3]For examples from the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, see chapters in T. H. Rigby and Bohdan Harasymiw, Eds., *Leadership Selection and Patron-Client Relations in the USSR and Yugoslavia*, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1983. For Poland, see Takayuki Ito, "Controversy over Nomenklatura in Poland: Twilight of a Monopolistic Instrument for Social Control," *Acta Slavica Iaponica* (Sapporo), 1983, pp. 57–103

[4]Ministry of Civil Affairs of the People's Republic of China, Ed., *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingzheng juhua jiance* (Handbook of Administrative Divisions of the People's Republic of China), Beijing, Cehui chubanshe, 1985, p. 1.

[5]See Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg, *Bureaucratic Politics and Chinese Energy Development*, Washington, DC, US Department of Commerce, 1986, p. 124.

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Background

The *nomenklatura* system had its beginnings in the early 1950's, and by 1955 a system along Soviet lines had been established.[6] Party committees exercised formal authority over senior personnel appointments, removals, and transfers two levels down the administrative hierarchy; the Central Committee in Beijing approved personnel changes not only of leading cadres at the center, but of senior officials at the provincial and prefectural levels. By the 1960's, China's cadre system had become a powerful, party-dominated one.[7] A recent study states that a personnel dossier and cadre evaluation system was in place in the 1960's and that "cadre appointments, promotions, transfers and removals were deliberated and conducted in an atmosphere of secrecy."[8] Overlap existed both between party organization departments (which made personnel policy and examined and approved senior personnel appointments) and parallel state personnel departments, as well as between these various departments and party committees at different levels. Senior positions at the prefectural level, for example, appeared on the *nomenklatura* of both the Central Committee and of various provincial party committees.

During the Cultural Revolution (1966–76), intense conflict within the party prevented authorities from using the system effectively, and changes of leading personnel became highly irregular. There was no mention of the powerful Central Committee Organization Department in the Chinese press between 1967 and 1972, and its head was not officially identified until 1975.[9]

In the years immediately following the Cultural Revolution, the party attempted to reestablish regular procedures for controlling the selection and placement of leading personnel. Up to 1980, much of official attention was concentrated on the specifics of removing persons recruited or rehabilitating those demoted during the Cultural Revolution. By 1980, however, attempts to deal with the de-institutionalization that had occurred during the "lost 10 years" were being made and attention was focused once again on reshaping leading groups at all levels so that they were prepared to carry out China's modernization drive.

In 1980, the Central Committee repromulgated the list of cadre positions that it managed, and ordered lower-level party committees to do the same.[10] It also reaffirmed the two-level-down principle, and it ordered that in situations where positions on a party committee's *nomenklatura* were to be filled by election, authorities must first submit the names of the nominees to the relevant party committee for approval. Finally, the Central Committee extended its control to the party core groups (*dangzu*) of central ministries, commissions, and bureaus. These party core groups, which are appointed by central party officials and exist independently of the party committees that also exist in the ministries, commissions, and bureaus, play an important role in the implementation of the *nomenklatura* system. Within each ministry and commission of the State Council, for example, party core groups consisting of three to five people, each with a group secretary (usually the minister or a deputy minister) and a deputy secretary, maintain lists of positions over which they have authority of appointment, removal, and transfer of officials. In turn, judging from the example of the Bank of China, the secretary, deputy secretaries, and members of the core groups in similarly key central institutions were included on the *nomenklatura* of the Central Committee.[11]

Further detailed regulations followed these first steps. Because the numbers of cadres managed centrally was so great, the Central Committee divided them into grades. Grade "A" positions included, for example, heads and deputy heads of party central departments and State Council ministries and commissions; ambassadors stationed abroad; the heads of various mass organizations; party secretaries and standing committee members of provincial party committees; and provincial governors and deputy governors.[12] Positions of lesser rank were designated "B" grade. In October 1980, the Central Committee advised that before an "A" grade appointment, removal, or transfer could be made, it was necessary to seek the approval of the relevant "leading cadre of party central" or the vice premier responsible for the functional area.[13]

This process was not always followed—provincial

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[6]Central Committee Organization Department, "Notice on the Repromulgation of the Job Title List of Cadres Managed by the Party Central Committee, 1980," in People's Bank of China Personnel Bureau, Ed., *Renshi gongzuo wenjian xuanbian* (Selection of Personnel Work Documents—hereafter, *RGWX*), Beijing, Zhongguo jinrong chubanshe, 1985, pp. 324–29, trans. together with other documents from *RGWX* in John P. Burns, Ed., "Contemporary China's *Nomenklatura* System," *Chinese Law and Government* (Armonk, NY—hereafter *CLG*), forthcoming.

[7]A. Doak Barnett, *Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Political Power in Communist China*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1967.

[8]Manion, "The Cadre Management System Post-Mao . . . ," loc. cit., p. 205.

[9]Ibid.

[10]*RGWX*, pp. 324–29.

[11]Ibid., p. 44. For a short discussion of party core groups (which he calls fractions) and party committees in central ministries, see Barnett, op. cit., p. 24.

[12]For a list of "A" grade positions, see Central Committee Organization Department, "Notice on the Implementation of Several Detailed Questions on the 'Job Title List of Cadres Managed by the Party Central Committee,' 1980," in *RGWX*, pp. 339–44.

[13]Ibid.

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party committees tended to ignore the regulations. Local authorities often failed to make complete reports on proposed personnel changes and sometimes failed to seek central approval before they announced local appointments. In 1982, the Central Committee complained: "Sometimes the Central Committee wants to make changes to the [personnel] decisions of local people's congresses, but because the decision has already been taken and made public, it is not convenient to make a change. This produces work immobilism."[14] No doubt, this situation arose because the Central Committee was unable to manage the thousands of cadres under its authority, causing provincial party committees in many cases to view the approval process as a mere formality.[15]

1984 *Nomenklatura* Reform

At a National Conference on Organization Work, in July 1983, the Central Committee's Organization Department presented a plan to decentralize control of personnel management. Authorities proposed reducing the number of cadres directly managed by the Central Committee, from 13,000, to 7,000.[16] When the reform was implemented in August 1984, however, officials reported that they had transferred to provincial party committees and to party core groups (*dangzu*) of the central ministries, commissions, and bureaus *nomenklatura* authority over *two-thirds* of the posts previously controlled by the Central Committee. Further, officials restricted the authority of party committees to supervision of positions only one level down the administrative hierarchy.[17]

The reform drastically reduced the number of posts directly managed by the Central Committee. In one State Council ministry-level unit—the People's Bank of China—the number of posts on the Central Committee's *nomenklatura* fell by at least 87 percent (see Table 1).[18] Since 1984, only a handful of the top positions in the Bank headquarters appear on the CC list; most are now on the Bank's own *nomenklatura*. The latter are, however, reportable to the Central Committee. The names of other institutions, especially some enterprises and service units, disappeared completely from the CC list as a result of the reform. Control over the leading positions in them has presumably been transferred to party core groups within ministries and commissions or to provincial party committees.

In spite of the overall reduction in the number of posts on the Central Committee's *nomenklatura,* there was one significant addition—the 1984 list added the heads of discipline inspection groups organized throughout central administrative agencies, giving these groups additional clout in their fight against corruption and bureaucratic abuses.

Over the period from August to December 1984, provincial and prefectural party committees, in turn, moved to decentralize their control over their *nomenklatura* to prefectural, city, and county party committees. The impact of these changes on the number of cadres managed by provincial party committees has varied. For example, of those cadres previously managed by provincial party committees, Heilongjiang retained 23 percent;[19] Inner Mongolia retained 30 percent;[20] and Qinghai retained 50 percent.[21] In poorer provinces, such as Qinghai, there may have been too few party members in prefectural or other local party organizations to carry out further decentralization.

The reform did not reduce the total size of the *nomenklatura,* but rather it redistributed authority over many posts to lower-level party committees and to party core groups. (It should be noted that the inclusion of party core groups on the job title list of the party Central Committee or local party committees signaled an effort to retain some measure of control over lower-level appointments.)

By decentralizing cadre management, authorities sought to reduce to manageable proportions the number of cadres controlled centrally and by provincial party committees. This step amounted to recognition of the fact that the Central Committee in Beijing was out of touch with local needs and sometimes mistakenly overruled the personnel recommendations of local officials, and that the process of review was sometimes a formality, because the number of cadres involved precluded a

[14]Central Committee Organization Department, "Notice on the Revision of and Supplement to Several Regulations on Appointment and Removal Work of Cadres Managed by the Party Central Committee, 1982," in *RGWX,* pp. 360–63.

[15]Jerry Hough argues that in the Soviet Union, party committee approval of appointments is "at times" a formality. The Central Committee, he suggests, is "less absorbed in low-level personnel work than its nomenklatura suggests." See Jerry Hough and Merle Fainsod, *How the Soviet Union is Governed,* Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1979, pp. 431–32.

[16]The July 6, 1983 work report of the Central Committee Organization Department presented at a national conference on organization work, "Proposal on Reforming the Spirit and Quickening the Pace of the 'Four Changes' of the Leadership Group and the Cadre Ranks," in *RGWX,* p. 114.

[17]*Renmin Ribao* (Beijing), July 20, 1984, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: China* (Washington, DC—hereafter, *FBIS-CHI*), July 23, 1984, pp. K/1–6.

[18]The precise number depends on how many deputy, vice- , and advisory positions there are in the Bank.

[19]Radio Harbin, Aug. 14, 1984, in *FBIS-CHI,* Aug. 15, 1984, p. S/2.

[20]Radio Hohhot, Oct. 13, 1984, in *FBIS-CHI,* Oct. 15, 1984, p. R/6.

[21]Radio Xining, Aug. 5, 1984, in *FBIS-CHI,* Aug. 6, 1984, p. T/1.

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Table 1: The 1984 Decentralization of China's *Nomenklatura* System—The Case of the People's Bank of China

1. Excerpts from "Job Title List of Cadre Positions Managed by the Party Central Committee, 1979"

Position	Unit
President, vice presidents, advisers	Headquarters
Head, deputy heads, advisers	Political Department
Head, deputy heads	General Office
Head, deputy heads	Administrative Bureau (*xingzheng si*)
Heads, deputy heads	Various bureaus (*ju*)
Director, deputy directors	Counsellors Office
Director, deputy directors	Finance Research Institute
Editor-in-chief, deputy editors-in-chief	China Financial Magazine Publishing House
Party secretary, deputy secretaries, general manager (bureau head), deputy general managers (deputy bureau heads)	People's Insurance Corporation of China (People's Bank of China Insurance Professional Management Bureau)
Advisers	Various bureau-level (*si, ju*) units
Party secretary, deputy secretaries, general manager (bureau head), deputy general managers (deputy bureau heads), advisers	People's Bank of China Printing Corporation (People's Bank of China Printing Management Bureau)
Party secretaries, managers (*jingli*), factory managers (*changzhang*)	Donghe Printing Company and factories No. 541 and No. 542
Heads	Bank branches of various provinces, centrally administered cities, and autonomous regions
Party secretaries, presidents	Institutions of higher learning managed by Bank headquarters

2. Excerpts from "Job Title List of Cadre Positions Managed by the Party Central Committee, 1984"

Position	Unit
Chairman, vice-chairmen, president, vice presidents	Bank headquarters
Secretary, deputy secretaries, members	Party core group of Bank
Head	Discipline inspection group of Bank
Head	Political Department of Bank

3. Excerpts from "Job Title List of Cadre Positions to be Reported to the Party Central Committee, 1984"

Position	Unit
Head, deputy heads	Bank headquarters, General Office
Directors, deputy directors	Various bureaus (*ju* and *si*) of Bank headquarters
Head, deputy heads	Investigation and Research Office
Head, deputy heads	Counsellors Office
Chief engineer, deputy chief engineers	Headquarters
Chief economist, deputy chief economists	Headquarters
Chief accountant, deputy chief accountants	Headquarters
Bureau-level investigators (*diaoyan yuan*), researchers	Headquarters
Deputy heads, group members	Discipline inspection group of Bank headquarters
Party secretary, deputy secretaries	Party committee of organs of Bank headquarters
Chairman, deputy chairmen	National Bank Trade Union Work Committee
Party secretary, president	Sichuan Finance and Economics College
Party secretary, president	Hunan Finance and Economics College
Party secretary, president	Shaanxi Finance and Economics College

SOURCES: Excerpted from "Temporary Method for Managing Cadres of the People's Bank of China," in People's Bank of China Personnel Bureau, Ed., *Renshi gongzuo wenjian xuanbian* (Selection of Personnel Work Documents), Beijing, Zhongguo jinrong chubanshe, 1985, p. 10; "Job Title List of Cadres Managed by the Party Central Committee," ibid., pp. 398-405; and "Job Title List of Cadres Managed by the People's Bank of China," ibid., pp. 414-16.

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detailed examination of each case. A second objective in granting more autonomy to local party authorities on personnel matters, was to "spur their initiative" and lead them to appoint high-quality local officials and to supervise them efficiently. In addition, decentralization of cadre management was considered necessary to implement new economic reforms, which, among other things, emphasized increased autonomy for enterprises and other local units.[22]

Central Committee list. Since 1984, the list of positions over which the party Central Committee has authority to authorize appointments, removals, and transfers has been divided into two parts: (1) the "Job Title List of Cadres Managed by the Party Central Committee" (*Zhonggong zhongyang guanli de ganbu zhiwu mingcheng biao*),[23] and (2) the "List of Cadre Positions to be Reported to the Party Central Committee" (*Xiang zhongyang beian de ganbu zhiwu mingdan*).[24] On the first of these lists, party authorities have placed approximately 5,000 of the most senior positions throughout the country.[25] Before any cadre can be appointed to or removed from one of these positions, the Central Committee (usually through its Organization Department) must give prior approval. The CC's second list has tens of thousands of positions on it—most are those just below the primary positions in the administrative hierarchy. Appointments to or removals from these positions must be reported to the Central Committee. It may be that since 1984 the provincial and lower-level party committee *nomenklatura* has similarly been divided into two lists to parallel central practice.

The 1984 list of jobs directly managed by the Central Committee is divided into a number of functional areas (see Table 2). It includes the heads and deputy heads of Central Committee departments, and of the centrally controlled party media; the leading positions in the National People's Congress, the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), and the courts and the procuratorate; as well as the leading positions within the State Council and its ministries, commissions, and and subordinate bureaus (*zhishu ju*). Also covered are senior positions in the Chinese Academy of Sciences, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, the New China News Agency, and various important banks and corporations. Senior leaders of the People's Armed Police, and ambassadors and other foreign affairs officials are also on the list.

The list extends to the leadership of all important mass organizations, including the federation of trade unions, the youth league, the women's federation, and organizations of creative workers, overseas Chinese, and friendship groups. It also covers the leaders of provincial party and government organizations (to deputy governor level); leaders of provincial people's congresses and provincial CPPCC's; and heads of provincial courts and procuratorates. The presidents and party secretaries of the top 10 academic institutions appear on the list, as do the leaders of more than 30 economic enterprises or research units. These include well-known enterprises connected with the Datong coal fields, the Anshan steel complex, the Daqing oil field, and the Shaoshan petrochemical installation, as well as a host of lesser-known enterprises in such strategically important fields as aviation, ordnance, nuclear energy, and space research. Finally, a number of well-known museums, libraries, hospitals, and medical research facilities are listed.

The second list, covering positions reportable to the CC, extends party authority further down the administrative hierarchy. This list is as comprehensive as the primary job title list, and focuses on those posts immediately below the level of leader and deputy leader of organizations identified on the primary list. In addition, it includes prefectural-level appointments, the leaders of academic institutions not on the primary list, and 52 additional economic enterprises, units, and their affiliated research institutes. Finally, it includes the heads of all corporations subordinate to the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, various customs offices, additional hospitals and publishing houses, broadcasting stations, and travel services.

Every six months, party units must submit reports on the cadres holding these positions both to the Organization Department (10 copies) and to any other Central Committee department that shares responsibility for managing the position (2 copies). These reports are designed to keep the Central Committee advised of the situation with respect to local cadre management, and to help it further in supervising and promoting the develop-

[22]See Commentator, *Renmin Ribao*, July 20, 1984, in *FBIS-CHI*, July 23, 1984, pp. K/1–5.

[23]The list is published as Table 2.

[24]*RGWX*, pp. 405–12.

[25]If officials reduced the number of centrally managed cadres by two-thirds, the reform would have resulted in the Central Committee managing 4,290 *cadres* (one-third of the 13,000 cadres managed centrally in 1983). My estimate of approximately 5,000 *positions* is based on counting the number of positions on the list and estimating the number of deputies and advisers. Because some cadres hold more than one position (e.g., the same official could be both deputy minister of a ministry and secretary of the party core group of the ministry), there should be more *positions* managed centrally than *cadres* filling them. Note that in 1983, the Central Committee planned to retain control over 7,000 cadres after the reform, substantially more than I have reported here. If, indeed, the figure is 7,000, then I would expect the list of centrally managed positions to be 7,500 or more.

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ment of talented officials.[26]

Before 1984, the Central Committee probably exercised direct *nomenklatura* authority over those positions now on the list of reportable positions. For example, most of the positions that appeared on the 1979 CC *nomenklatura* for the People's Bank of China now appear on the list of reportable positions (see Table 1). Since 1984, provincial committees and party core groups have exercised authority to fill vacancies on this list. Presumably, in practice, the Central Committee, usually through its Organization Department, could intervene in these appointments if it wished to do so.

Central ministry party core group lists. At the central level, in addition to the CC's *nomenklatura,* the party core groups of the ministries and commissions of the State Council, other party and government agencies, and mass organizations maintain their own *nomenklatura* lists. These lists are divided into jobs for which the core groups must give approval and jobs upon whose filling the core groups are to receive reports.[27] In 1984, the *nomenklatura* of the People's Bank of China, for example, was divided into several categories. It included several tens of second-echelon positions in the headquarters on which the Bank's party core group was to report to the Central Committee's Organization Department (see Table 1). Second, it included a much longer list of other positions that the Bank headquarters (that is, the party core group) fills directly, but whose filling need not be reported to the Central Committee. A third list of positions, such as the heads of divisions and branch offices of the Bank in the provinces—also once reportable to the Central Committee—is now only reportable to the Bank headquarters (that is, to the party core group).

Local party lists. Although the *nomenklatura* lists of provincial and local party committees and local party core groups are not available to the author, these lists in all likelihood parallel the CC list. Provincial party committee lists probably include second-echelon positions for the provincial party committee, in addition to including, for example, senior officials of the provincial party newspaper. Senior provincial government positions, just below the governor and deputy governor level no doubt are also included (although it is possible that the governor and his deputies are on both the central and the provincial lists). The list probably also covers senior members of the provincial judiciary and procuracy; senior prefectural party and government positions; senior positions in the provincial branches of the New China News Agency, the Chinese Academy of Sciences, and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, as well as senior leaders of provincial branches of mass organizations, banks, corporations, institutions of higher learning, important enterprises and service units; and the secretary, deputy secretaries, and members of party core groups, and the heads of discipline inspection groups of each of these institutions.

The *nomenklatura* of party core groups of central ministries, commissions, and other units in Beijing probably overlaps with the provincial party committee lists. For example, presidents, vice presidents, advisers, party core group secretaries and deputy secretaries, core group members, and the party committee secretaries and deputy secretaries of provincial branches of the People's Bank of China, which appear on the *nomenklatura* of the Bank's headquarters party core group,[28] may also appear on provincial party committee lists. The party core groups of the provincial branches of the Bank, in addition, have their own *nomenklatura,* which includes division and office heads of those branches.

Only scattered information exists about the scope of the *nomenklatura* of prefectural and city party committees. According to one report, these party committees are responsible for the heads and deputy heads of offices in prefectural and city government and party organs, county party committee secretaries and deputy secretaries, county people's congress standing committee chairmen, county magistrates, and county CPPCC chairmen.[29] Also included must be the heads and deputy heads of mass organizations, educational institutions, and economic and service units under prefectural and city jurisdiction.

Scope of the Chinese and Soviet nomenklaturas. In many respects, the scope of the *nomenklatura* lists of Chinese and Soviet party central committees are similar. Both contain senior positions in the CC departments; senior party and state positions down to provincial level; senior public security appointments; senior positions in the mass media and mass organizations; senior diplomats; senior judicial officials; and leaders of

[26]The contents of the reports should include: "cadre particulars (name, sex, age, nationality, years at work, time of entering the party, cultural [educational] level, political orientation, occupation); the cadre appointment/removal report form; and investigation materials." See Central Committee Organization Department, "Notice on the Revision of the Job Title List of Cadres Managed by the Party Central Committee, 1984," *RGWX,* p. 397.

[27]For an example of the *nomenklatura* of the People's Bank of China, see "Job Title List of the Cadres Managed by the People's Bank of China, 1984, in *RGWX,* pp. 414–16.

[28]Ibid.

[29]Radio Nanning, Nov. 30, 1984, in *FBIS-CHI,* Dec. 3, 1984, p. P/3.

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Table 2: Job Title List of Cadres Managed by the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee (1984)

1. PARTY CENTRAL

Position	Unit
Secretary general	Party Central Advisory Committee
Secretary general	Central Discipline Inspection Commission
Secretary, committee members, secretary general	Central Commission of Political Science and Law
Head, deputy heads, members	Party Central Leading Small Groups (*lingdao xiaozu*)
Director, deputy directors	Party Central General Office
Head, deputy heads	Party Central Committee departments
President, vice presidents	Party Central School
Director, deputy directors	Party Secretariat Research Office
Director, deputy directors	Party Secretariat Rural Policy Research Office
Director, deputy directors	Party Literature Research Center
Director, deputy directors	Party History Research Center
Chairman, deputy chairmen	Commission for Collecting Party Historical Data
Director, deputy directors	Bureau for Translating Works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin
Director, editor-in-chief, deputy editors-in-chief	*Renmin Ribao*
Editor-in-chief, deputy editors-in-chief	*Hongqi*
Editor-in-chief, deputy editors-in-chief	*Guangming Ribao*
Director, editor-in-chief, deputy editors-in-chief	*China Daily*
Secretary, deputy secretaries	Party Committee of Organs directly under the Central Committee
Secretary, deputy secretaries	Party Committee of Central State Organs
Secretary general	Discipline Inspection Committee of the Party Committee of Departments under the Central Committee
Secretary general	Discipline Inspection Committee of the Party Committee of Central State Organs
Advisers	(For all the above units)

2. NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS (NPC),
CHINESE PEOPLE'S POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE CONFERENCE (CPPCC),
JUDICIARY, PROCURATORATE

Position	Unit
Chairman, deputy chairmen, members, secretary general, deputy secretaries general	Standing Committee of NPC
Secretary, deputy secretaries, members	Party core group of NPC Standing Committee
Chairmen, deputy chairmen	Specialized committees of NPC Standing Committee
Chairman, deputy chairmen	Legislative Affairs Commission of NPC
Secretary, deputy secretaries, members	Party core group of Legislative Affairs Commission of NPC
Chairman, deputy chairmen, members Standing Committee, secretary general, deputy secretaries general	National Committee of CPPCC
Secretary, deputy secretaries, members	Party core group of CPPCC National Committee
President, vice presidents	Supreme People's Court
Members	Judicial Committee of Supreme People's Court
Secretary, deputy secretaries, members	Party core group of the Judicial Committee of Supreme People's Court
Procurator general, deputy procurators general	Supreme People's Procuratorate
Members	Procuratorial Committee of Supreme People's Procuratorate
Secretary, deputy secretaries, members	Party core group of Procuratorial Committee of Supreme People's Procuratorate
Advisers	(For all the above units)

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3. STATE COUNCIL, BANKS, CORPORATIONS, POLICE, DIPLOMATS

Position	Unit
Premier, deputy premiers, councillors	State Council
Secretary general, deputy secretaries general	Secretary General's Office of State Council
Secretary, deputy secretaries, members	Party core group of Secretary General's Office of State Council
Ministers, vice ministers	Ministries and commissions of State Council
Auditor general, deputy auditors general	Auditing Administration of State Council
Chairman, deputy chairmen, president, vice presidents	People's Bank of China
Secretary, deputy secretaries, members	Party core groups of ministries, commissions, offices, and banks
Heads	Discipline inspection groups of ministries, commissions, offices, and banks
Heads	Political departments (*zhengzhibu*), where established, of ministries, commissions, offices, and banks
President, vice presidents	Chinese Academy of Sciences
President, vice presidents	Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
Secretary, deputy secretaries, members	Party core group of Chinese Academy of Sciences
Head	Discipline inspection group of Chinese Academy of Sciences
Secretary, deputy secretary, members	Party core group of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
Head	Discipline inspection group of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
Director general, deputy directors general	New China News Agency (Xinhua)
Secretary, deputy secretaries, members	Party core group of Xinhua
Head	Discipline inspection group of Xinhua
Director, deputy directors	Staff offices directly subordinate to State Council
Secretaries, deputy secretaries, members	Party core groups of staff offices directly subordinate to State Council
Heads	Discipline inspection groups of staff offices directly subordinate to State Council
Director, deputy directors	Bureaus subordinate to State Council (*zhishu ju*)
Secretaries, deputy secretaries, members	Party core groups of bureaus subordinate to State Council
Heads	Discipline inspection groups of bureaus subordinate to State Council
Heads	Political departments of bureaus subordinate to State Council
Head	State Councillors' Office
Chairmen and deputy chairmen of boards of directors, chief auditors, presidents, vice presidents	Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Agricultural Bank of China, People's Construction Bank, Bank of China, People's Insurance Corporation of China
Secretaries, deputy secretaries, members	Party core groups of the above banks and corporation
Heads	Discipline inspection groups of above banks and corporation
Chairmen, deputy chairmen, general managers, deputy general managers	China State Shipbuilding Corp., China National Petrochemicals Corp., China International Transportation Corp., China International Trust and Investment Corp.
Secretaries, deputy secretaries, members	Party core groups of above four corporations
Heads	Discipline inspection groups of above four corporations
Chairman, deputy chairmen	Everbright Industrial Corp.
Chairman, deputy chairmen, general manager, deputy general managers	China National Nonferrous Metals Industrial Corp.
Secretary, deputy secretaries, members	Party core group of China National Nonferrous Metals Industrial Corp.
Head	Discipline inspection group of China National Nonferrous Metals Industrial Corp.
Chairmen, general managers	China National Offshore Oil Corp., China Construction Industry Corp., China Automotive Industry Corp., China Silk Industry Corp., China Tobacco Industry Corp., China Packaging Corp.
Secretaries	Party core groups of above six corporations
Advisers	(For all the above units)

(Table continued on pages 44–45)

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Table 2: Job Title List (continued)

Secretary, deputy secretaries	Party committee of headquarters of Chinese People's Armed Police
Commander, deputy commanders, and heads and deputy heads of political committee	Headquarters of Chinese People's Armed Police
Chief of Staff, head of Political Dept., head of political committee of Political Dept., head of Logistics Dept., head of political committee of Logistics Dept.	Headquarters of Chinese People's Armed Police
Ambassadors	Chinese embassies
Heads of legations	Chinese legations
Consuls general	Chinese consulates general
Representatives, deputy representatives	China's Permanent Mission to the United Nations (UN)
Representatives, deputy representatives	UN organs
Head	Singapore Commercial Representative's Office

4. MASS ORGANIZATIONS

Position	Unit
President, vice presidents	All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU)
First secretary, secretaries	Secretariat of ACFTU
Secretary, deputy secretaries, members	Party core group of ACFTU
First secretary, secretaries, alternate secretaries	Secretariat of Central Committee of Chinese Communist Youth League
President, vice presidents	All-China Federation of Women
First secretary, secretaries	Secretariat of All-China Federation of Women
Secretary, deputy secretaries, members	Party core group of All-China Federation of Women
Chairman, deputy chairmen	China Association for Science and Technology
Secretary	Secretariat of China Association for Science and Technology
Secretary, deputy secretaries, members	Party core group of China Association for Science and Technology
Chairman, deputy chairmen	China Federation of Literary and Art Circles
Secretary, deputy secretaries, members	Party core group of China Federation of Literary and Art Circles
President, vice presidents	All-China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese
Secretary, deputy secretaries, members	Party core group of All-China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese
Chairman, deputy chairmen	Chinese Writers' Association
Secretary, deputy secretaries, members	Party core group of Chinese Writers' Association
President, vice president	Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries
Secretary, deputy secretaries, members	Party core group of Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries
Chairman, deputy chairmen	Chinese Council for Promotion of International Trade
Secretary, deputy secretaries, members	Party core group of Chinese Council for Promotion of International Trade
Advisers	(For all the above units)

5. LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS

Position	Unit
Secretaries, deputy secretaries, standing committee members	Party committees of provinces, centrally administered cities (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin), and autonomous regions
Secretary, deputy secretaries, standing committee members	Hong Kong and Macao Work Committee
Heads, deputy heads	Party advisory commissions of provinces, centrally administered cities, and autonomous regions
Secretaries, deputy secretaries	Discipline inspection commissions of provinces, centrally administered cities, and autonomous regions
Governors, deputy governors	Provinces
Mayors, deputy mayors	Centrally administered cities
Chairmen, deputy chairmen	Autonomous regions
Advisers	(For all above governors, mayors, and chairmen)

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Chairmen, deputy chairmen	Standing committees of people's congresses of provinces, centrally administered cities, and autonomous regions
Chairmen, deputy chairmen	Chinese people's political consultative conferences of provinces, centrally administered cities, and autonomous regions
Presidents	Higher-level people's courts of provinces, centrally administered cities, and autonomous regions
Chief procurators	People's procuratorates of provinces, centrally administered cities, and autonomous regions

6. INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER LEARNING

Position	Unit
Party secretaries, presidents	Chinese People's University, Qinghua University, Peking University, Beijing Teacher's University, Fudan University, Shanghai Jiaotong University, Xian Jiaotong University, Beijing Agricultural University, Beijing Medical College, Chinese Science and Technology University

7. ENTERPRISES AND SERVICE UNITS

Position	Unit
Party secretaries, managers	First and Second Automobile Manufacturing factories, First and Second Heavy Machinery factories
Party secretaries, presidents	No. 9 Research Institute [nuclear industry]
Party secretaries, managers	Songling and Liming Machinery companies [aviation industry]
Party secretaries, managers	No. 4400 and No. 714 factories [electronics industry]
Party secretaries, managers	No. 447 and No. 617 factories [ordnance industry]
Party secretary, manager	First Research Institute [space industry]
Party secretary, manager	Jilin Chemical Industry Company
Party secretary, deputy secretaries, bureau head, deputy bureau heads, chief engineer, chief accountant, chief economist	Datong Coal Service Bureau
Party secretary, deputy secretaries, manager, deputy managers chief engineer, chief accountant, chief economist	Anshan Steel Corporation
Party secretaries, managers	Capital, Wuhan, and Baoshan Steel corporations
Party secretary, president	Steel Research Institute
Party secretary, deputy secretaries, bureau head, deputy bureau heads, chief engineer, chief accountant, chief economist	Daqing Petroleum Management Bureau
Party secretary, director	Shengli Oil Field
Party secretaries, managers	No. 426 and No. 436 factories [shipbuilding]
Party secretary, deputy secretaries, manager, deputy managers, chief engineer, chief accountant, chief economist	Shaoshan Petrochemical Industry Corporation
Party secretary, manager	Shanghai Petrochemical Industry Corporation
Party secretary, president	Petrochemicals Research Institute
Party secretaries, managers	Zhengzhou Aluminum Factory, Jinchuan Nonferrous Metals Corp.
Party secretary, president	Institute of Nonferrous Metals Research
Party secretary, president	Geological Sciences Research Institute
Party secretary, head	Beijing Railway Bureau
Party secretary, president	Railway Scientific Research Institute
Party secretary, deputy secretaries, president, vice presidents	Chinese Agricultural Science Institute
Party secretaries, heads	Imperial Palace Museum, Museum of Chinese History, Museum of the Chinese Revolution, Beijing Library
Party secretaries, heads	Chinese Academy of Medicine, Chinese Medical Research Institute, Beijing Hospital, Capital Hospital, Chinese Center for Preventative Medicine
President	Central Institute of Socialism

SOURCE: "Job Title List of Cadres Managed by the Party Central Committee," in People's Bank of China Personnel Bureau, Ed., *Renshi gongzuo wenjian xuanbian* (Selection of Personnel Work Documents), Beijing, Zhongguo jinrong chubanshe, 1985, pp. 398-405.

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key economic enterprises.[30] Further, in both the Soviet and the Chinese systems, as a rule, party units exercise *nomenklatura* authority one level down the administrative hierarchy.[31] Finally, both systems operate primary and secondary lists.

The primary list contains positions staffed directly by the party unit. In China, the secondary list is a list of positions that must be reported to the party unit, whereas in the Soviet Union, the secondary list "consists of positions the staffing of which is another organization's primary responsibility . . . , but such appointments are made in consultation with the given party unit."[32] In practice, there may be little difference between the two kinds of secondary lists.

Although the scope of both lists is broad, the Soviet and Chinese *nomenklaturas* differ in several significant respects. First, the Chinese list, unlike the Soviet list, omits positions in the armed forces. Senior military positions in China appear on a separate list maintained by the party Central Military Commission. In the Soviet Union, "the general staff as well as senior staff of the Main Political Administration Directorate, political officers (down to the level of corps, division, and naval squadrons), and probably some military commanders are found on the CC list."[33]

Second, the Soviet list includes elected members of the Central Committee while the Chinese list does not. The position of the elected members may be included on a separate senior party job title list, maintained by the CCP's Secretariat or Politburo.[34] The addition of military personnel and members of the Central Committee would probably inflate the figure of China's centrally controlled *nomenklatura* by several thousand.

Finally, in China, apparently unlike in the Soviet Union, some delegates to the people's congresses have been covered by the *nomenklatura* system. In 1981, for example, the Chinese party Central Committee's *nomenklatura* included "patriotic personages" among the delegates to the National People's Congress and to the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.[35] Control over these delegates, however, does not appear on the 1984 CC list discussed above, and may now have passed to party core groups of the standing committees of the two institutions.

Table 3: Estimated Size of the Chinese Communist Party's *Nomenklatura*, 1982[1]

Category	Number
State organs and other work organs	894,910
Party and mass organs	1,286,251
Municipal street organs and rural people's communes	396,475
Enterprises, service units, and other work organs	5,553,151
TOTAL	8,130,787

[1]These are the numbers of "responsible people" (*fuzeren*) employed in each category.

SOURCE: State Council Population Census Office and State Statistical Bureau, Department of Population Statistics, Eds., *Zhongguo 1982 nian renkou pucha cailiao* (1982 Population Census of China), Beijing, Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1985, p. 448.

Although the total number of posts on the CCP's *nomenklatura* has never been published, it is possible to deduce its rough size. The provincial lists are probably as long as the Central Committee job title list, because most of the central institutions covered by the list have provincial counterparts. At lower levels, however, there may be fewer positions on the list. One gross indicator of the total number of covered positions was published in the 1982 census. Authorities identified 8.1 million "responsible people" (*fuzeren*), or leaders, who were employed by party and government organizations, service units, and economic enterprises (see Table 3). Given the scope of the system as revealed by the Central Committee job title list, this figure provides some indication of the numbers involved. No references to more precise figures, or references to the size of the provincial and local *nomenklatura* have been published. In the Soviet Union, Bohdan Harasymiw estimates, the CPSU Central Committee's *nomenklatura* extends to 51,000 positions,[36] or roughly ten times the number of posts covered since 1984 by the Chinese party's CC job title list. Although there are some differences in the scope of coverage, the figures suggest that the party in the Soviet Union exercises a more highly centralized control over personnel management than does the Chinese party. Because of the very large size of the CPSU CC list, *nomenklatura* authority is shared among the Central Committee's many departments.[37]

[30]Although the Soviet party Central Committee list has never been published, some positions on it have been identified. See Harasymiw, *Political Elite Recruitment in the Soviet Union*, London, Macmillan, 1984, p. 163.

[31]Ibid., pp. 163–67.

[32]Ibid., p. 161.

[33]Ibid., p. 163.

[34]Members of the Central Discipline Inspection Commission, the Central Advisory Commission, and the Central Military Commission may also be on this higher-level *nomenklatura*.

[35]Central Committee Organization Department and Central Committee United Front Work Department, "On the Request for Instructions on the Shared Management of Cadres by the Central Committee United Front Work Department," *RGWX*, p. 348.

[36]Bohdan Harasymiw, *Political Elite Recruitment in the Soviet Union*, p. 163. This figure presumably includes the military and delegates to the CPSU Central Committee. See the discussion below.

[37]Writing in 1983, Harasymiw identified 17 departments, which included party and organizational work, agitation and propaganda, education, and (fn. continued on p. 47)

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Total *nomenklatura* coverage as a percentage of the labor force is probably roughly equivalent in the two countries, however. T. H. Rigby estimates that the Soviet system covers approximately 2 million positions or 1.5–2 percent of the labor force.[38] My estimate of 8 million *nomenklatura* positions in China represents 1.5 percent of the Chinese labor force.[39]

List of reserves. A final component of the *nomenklatura* system is a list of reserve cadres called the "Leading Cadre Reserve List" (*lingdao ganbu houbei mingdan*), which records the names of cadres thought suitable to fill vacancies on the job title list. Each party committee with *nomenklatura* authority maintains such a list. The names of those officials proposed by lower levels for transfer to higher-level positions are placed on the reserve list of the higher-level party committee after the latter has given its approval.[40]

The size of the reserve list must be larger than the *nomenklatura* itself, or more than 8 million cadres, if my speculation is correct. As a result of administrative reforms undertaken since 1982, nearly one million elderly officials have been replaced, and party leaders have promoted younger leaders to fill their positions. In this process, the authorities have focused their attention on a much smaller group of potential successors than the entire reserve list. In the mid-1980's, the CC's Organization Department announced that it had placed 1,000 "middle-aged and young" officials on its reserve list for appointment to ministerial- and provincial-level positions. Prefectural-level reserve lists contain the names of another 20,000 officials, while authorities have identified a further 100,000 cadres as reserves at the county level.[41] Special training programs have been created to prepare these cadres for promotion.

Party officials are encouraged to make *personal* recommendations of cadres to fill the reserve list. According to the 1983 Organization Department handbook, "failing to recommend the qualified people one knows . . . [is] counterproductive to the cause of the party and the people."[42] To guarantee appointment of committed, loyal, and trustworthy successors, the party must rely on the personal advice of serving officials. In the party's view, to rely only on a candidate's qualifications on paper, without intimate knowledge of the person, can result in the employment of tricksters and charlatans.

Although party membership is not strictly a precondition for a position on the reserve list, most *nomenklatura* posts probably go to party members. In 1980, for example, all heads of State Council ministries and commissions were party members, and only three vice ministers, ten ministerial-level advisers, and three percent of bureau heads were not party members.[43] University graduates and young and middle-aged officials now make up an increasing number of reserve cadres,[44] but the majority of them probably are party members too.

Institutions

According to past practice, a senior party leader within the Politburo supervises organization and personnel work. By 1980, control of personnel matters was formally vested in a secretary-level position in the reestablished party Secretariat.[45] The post–Cultural Revolution Central Committee has vested principal control of the *nomenklatura* system in its Organization Department (*zuzhibu*), headed in 1987 by Song Ping. In the mid-1980's, the department was composed of a number of

industry and transport. Each, he estimated, could manage from 1,000 to 5,000 officials. See ibid., pp. 162–63. China's pre–Cultural Revolution Central Committee included departments with responsibility for the economy. These departments, which, according to Barnett, had responsibility for the *nomenklatura* in their own areas, were abolished in the Cultural Revolution. See Barnett, op. cit., pp. 4, 5, 22.

[38]T. H. Rigby, "Introduction," in Rigby and Harasymiw, op. cit., p. 3.

[39]As of the 1982 census, the labor force consisted of approximately 522 million people. See State Council Population Census Office and State Statistical Bureau, Department of Population Statistics, Eds. *Zhongguo 1982 nian renkou pucha cailiao* (1982 Population Census of China), Beijing, Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1985, p. 373.

[40]See Central Committee Organization Department, Ed., *Dangde zuzhi gongzuo wenda* (Questions and Answers on Party Organization Work—hereafter, *Questions and Answers*), Beijing, Renmin chubanshe, 1983, trans. in Melanie Manion, "Cadre Recruitment and Management in the People's Republic of China," *CLG*, Fall 1984, p. 36. This handbook is a compilation of guidelines and policies governing the general operation of the party as well as the specific party functions of cadre management. It provides relatively detailed information on cadre recruitment criteria, training and evaluation methods, contents and maintenance of personnel dossiers, lines of authority over cadres and veteran cadre management.

For a discussion of China's *nomenklatura* system based on this material, see Manion, "The Cadre Management System Post-Mao . . . ," loc. cit., pp. 203–33.

[41]Xinhua, Sept. 7, 1985, in *FBIS-CHI*, Sept. 9, 1985, p. K/2; and Xinhua, Sept. 10, 1984, in *FBIS-CHI*, Sept. 10, 1984., p. K/12.

[42]*Questions and Answers*, loc. cit., p. 44.

[43]Central Committee United Front Work Department and Central Committee Organization Department, "Report of Opinions on the Current and Future Situation of Arranging for Personalities Outside the Party to Assume Leading Positions in State Organs, 1980," in Ministry of Labor and Personnel, Ed., *Zhishi fenzi zhengce wenjian huibian* (Selection of Documents on Intellectuals' Work), Beijing, Laodong renshi chubanshe, 1983, p. 77.

[44]For reviews of the 1982 administrative reforms and their impact on the educational level and age of party and state officials, see Christopher M. Clarke, "China's Revolution in Administrative Structure: Implementing Central Party and State Reforms in Post-Mao China," in David M. Lampton, Ed., *Policy Implementation in Post-Mao China*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1987; also John P. Burns, "Reforming China's Bureaucracy, 1979–1982," *Asian Survey* (Berkeley, CA), June 1983, pp. 692–722.

[45]See *Dongxiang* (Hong Kong), April 1980.

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bureaus with obvious personnel functions.[46] Separate bureaus exist to manage cadres who worked for central institutions in Beijing; to manage cadres employed locally (now probably only at provincial level); to promote the further education of cadres; to arrange the employment of economic (e.g., finance and trade), youth, and veteran cadres; to handle cadre transfers; and to maintain the personnel files for those on the CC's *nomenklatura*, those filling positions reportable to the CC, or those on its list of leading cadre reserves.[47]

Since 1980, the Organization Department has shared management authority over the CC's *nomenklatura* with the Propaganda and United Front Work departments, as it did in the 1950's. By 1980, the Propaganda Department resumed control of the *nomenklatura* of party newspapers such as *Renmin Ribao* and *Guangming Ribao*, the news agencies, the Ministry of Culture, and various literary and art associations.[48] At the same time, authorities placed leading positions of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, the State Nationalities Affairs Commission, and various nationalities affairs and religious bodies on the *nomenklatura* of the United Front Work Department.[49] Nevertheless, under these arrangements:

the Central Committee Organization Department continues to manage general research on the policy of cadre management work, the rectification and reform of the cadre management system, the detachment and transfer of cadres in batches by various systems, the establishment of cadre dossier systems, cadre statistical work, and general reporting of the appointment and removal of centrally managed cadres.[50]

As we have seen, in addition to the Central Committee departments, the party core groups organized in all administrative units throughout the country play an important role in the implementation of the *nomenklatura* system.

At provincial and local levels, organization bureaus of party committees[51] maintain the provincial and local *nomenklatura* and lists of reserve cadres to fill these posts. They approve personnel changes for positions falling within the purview of their authority. The organization structure of these bureaus parallels the structure of the CC's Organization Department. Just as the latter shares cadre management with other CC departments and with party core groups, so local organization bureaus share management authority with other bureaus of local party committees and with local party core groups. In Guangxi, for example, the provincial party committee authorized its propaganda and united front work bureaus and its general office to share cadre management duties. In addition, the party core groups of the provincial economic, planning, construction, science and technology, and foreign economic relations and trade committees, as well as the regional government general office have *nomenklatura* authority over subordinate units.[52]

Process

The positions covered by the *nomenklatura* are both appointive and elective. In the January 1983 handbook of the Central Committee's Organization Department, the standard procedures to be followed by units wishing to make an appointment to a *nomenklatura* position are also spelled out:

A request for approval should be submitted to the higher government, in the name of the administrative organ, at the same time as the application report on a "cadre appointment or removal application form" is submitted to the party committee at the higher level. After the higher party committee examines and approves the application report, its organization department notifies the personnel department of the government in whose name the application report was submitted. According to the regulations, this government reports the matter to the government at the higher level, which then makes the appointment or removal.[53]

Based on these procedures, to fill the post of deputy head of a bureau in the headquarters of the People's Bank of China (on the *nomenklatura* of the party core group of the Bank since 1984), the bureau head would first submit a recommendation for appointment to both

[46]See *China Directory 1987*, Tokyo, Radiopress, Inc., 1986, p. 20.

[47]The Organization Department apparently also controls the personnel files of "some renowned scientists, technological experts, artists, writers, professors, actors, and athletes who have made important contributions," although they may not hold a position on the *nomenklatura*. See *Questions and Answers*, p. 93.

[48]Central Committee Organization Department and Central Committee Propaganda Department, "Notice Relating to the Shared Management of Cadres by the Central Committee Propaganda Department, 1980," trans. in Burns, "Contemporary China's *Nomenklatura* System," loc. cit.

[49]"Job Title List of Cadres Managed by the United Front Work Department of the Central Committee, 1980." *RGWX*, pp. 349–51.

[50]Ibid., p. 348.

[51]The Central Committee's Organization Department and the organization bureaus of lower-level party committees are linked by professional relations (*yewu guanxi*), not leadership relations (*lingdao guanxi*). The Organization Department cannot issue orders to lower-level organization bureaus. Orders can only come through local party committees. See Barnett, op. cit., pp. 148–49.

[52]Radio Nanning, Nov. 30, 1984, in *FBIS-CHI*, Dec. 3, 1984, p. P/2.

[53]*Questions and Answers*, loc. cit., p. 82.

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the party core group and the Bank headquarters. The recommended candidate is drawn from the list of reserves for the position, which would include division heads within the bureau, and perhaps a division deputy head, and one or two outsiders. After the party core group has reviewed and approved the appointment, it notifies the personnel bureau of the Bank. The bureau then notifies the Bank headquarters, which makes the appointment. Also, because the post is on the CC's list of reportable positions, the party core group notifies the CC Organization Department of the appointment.

Authorities have also worked out procedures to handle cases of *nomenklatura* overlap. In general, higher-level party committees have final authority in these cases. For example, before the 1984 decentralization, heads of provincial branches of the People's Bank of China appeared on the *nomenklatura* of both the CC and the provincial party committees. According to 1979 guidelines, the party core group of the Bank headquarters first recommended a cadre for the post. This was then discussed with the provincial party committee until agreement was reached. Then the party core group submitted the name to the CC Organization Department for approval. When this was received, the headquarters (presumably, its personnel bureau) submitted the name to the State Council, which made the formal appointment.[54] Because the 1984 reforms replaced the two-level-down principle with one-level-down, the extent of *nomenklatura* overlap has been greatly reduced.

Many of the positions on the CC's *nomenklatura* are elected. These include senior positions on the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress and the National Committee of the CPPCC. In addition, the NPC elects the premier, vice premiers, and councillors of the State Council, and its ministers, auditor general, and secretary general. It also elects the heads of the Supreme People's Court and the Supreme People's Procuratorate. Provincial people's congresses also elect provincial officials; congresses of mass organizations elect their own officials, and so on. Yet, before the elections take place, the list of nominees must be submitted to the relevant party committee for approval.[55] The party uses the *nomenklatura* to screen candidates, and thus to control the outcome of elections. This role for the party is not acknowledged in public documents, such as the state constitution, the 1979 election law, or the organization laws on local government.

Conclusion

For students of Chinese politics, the *nomenklatura* system is significant because it is *the* instrument of party control of leadership selection in institutions throughout the country. The job title lists demonstrate that the scope of party control is wider than generally imagined. The Central Committee, for example, and its United Front Work Department manage leading cadre positions on the Religious Affairs Bureau of the State Council, including its party core group. On the *nomenklatura* of the party core group of the bureau are the heads, deputy heads, and secretary generals of various national religious organizations.[56] Through party core groups, then, the party extends its control of personnel administration very widely.

Further, the *nomenklatura* provides an authoritative measure of the official status of various organizations in China. First, for an organization to be omitted from the Central Committee list is an indication of its lower status, and of the fact that it is probably less well connected to party officials in Beijing than are those organizations included on the list.

Second, the number of positions within any one organization that appears on the *nomenklatura* is an indication of the organization's status. For example, because the Academy of Sciences is part of the State Council, outsiders assume that it has a higher status than, say, Peking University. They are, of course, correct. Just how much higher the Academy's status is can be demonstrated by the CC job title list, which includes the institution's president and vice presidents; its party core group secretary, deputy secretaries, and members; and the head of its discipline inspection group (see Table 2). In addition, scores of positions within the Academy appear on the list of positions reportable to the CC. By contrast, only the president and party secretary of Peking University appear on the CC's *nomenklatura*, and no additional positions are reportable to the CC.[57]

Further comparisons can be made. In Hong Kong, the chairman and vice chairmen of Everbright Corporation are on the Central Committee's *nomenklatura*, while senior positions in the China Resources Corporation, long thought in Hong Kong to be very powerful, belong only to the party core group of a central ministry. Rank ordering of other economic enterprises is also possible from

[54]"Opinion on Strengthening the Cadre Management of the People's Bank of China," in *RGWX*, p. 25; *Questions and Answers*, loc. cit., pp. 84–85.

[55]*Questions and Answers*, loc cit., p. 86.

[56]These are: the Buddhist Association of China, the China Islamic Association, the Three-Self Patriotic Movement Committee of Protestant Churches, the Christian Council of China, the China Patriotic Catholic Association, the National Administrative Commission of the Chinese Catholic Church, and the China Taoist Association. See "Job Title List of Cadres Managed by the United Front Work Department of the Party Central Committee," in *RGWX*, pp. 349–51.

[57]Many additional positions from Peking University would appear on the *nomenklatura* of the party core group of the State Education Commission, however.

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the lists. The *nomenklatura* provides an authoritative clue to China's leaders' perceptions of which organizations are of most strategic or economic importance.

Finally, the lists provide additional evidence of the the central party's urban bias. The CC controls positions located mostly in China's major cities. Because of their lesser strategic or economic importance, organizations in the countryside have been assigned, for purposes of cadre control, to lower-level party committees.

For the system itself, however, the *nomenklatura* is significant because it encourages the development among the leadership of patron-client relations. In general, power, status, and wealth in China go to those who can climb the ladder of official position. Because there is no real alternative to employment outside of the "mono-organizational"[58] cadre hierarchy, and because officials are almost completely dependent on their official sinecures for their livelihood, they need patrons at higher levels of the bureaucracy, particularly those who are well-connected to party committees and party core groups, in order to further their careers. The *nomenklatura* system institutionalizes patronage, and indicates to clients where they should look for support. As T. H. Rigby has observed of the USSR and Eastern Europe:

Because of the nomenklatura *system, one of the resources, and surely the most valuable one—subject to administrative decision and, therefore, forming part of the stock of reciprocal favor—is position itself. Senior officials . . . are consequently much courted as "patrons" and are in a position to exact from their "clients" loyal service and reciprocal favors both on the official and personal levels.*[59]

The Chinese *nomenklatura* system is similarly suited to patronage politics. First, it centralizes authority over the national personnel system in the party. Although the party is not monolithic, its dominant role in personnel matters confines the search for patrons to those within the party. The 1984 reforms decentralized personnel power within the party, but did not transfer such authority to non-party units.

Second, the Chinese system endorses personal recommendation as the best method of filling organizational positions. Abuses like factionalism, nepotism, and localism can be easily accommodated in such practice. At least in the early 1980's, because the personal approval of vice premiers or other leading officials of party central was required before appointments to "A" grade positions could be made, the system placed these senior leaders in an excellent position to become heads of patronage networks. The 1984 decentralization means that the search for patrons or clients need concentrate only on the next higher or lower administrative level.

In practice, the Central Committee's role in leadership selection may be less pervasive than the formal system indicates. Because of the vast number of positions involved, the central leaders in Beijing cannot be personally acquainted with each case. They depend on recommendations of local officials and others on the scene. As a result, in normal times, the CC's *nomenklatura* authority may be a formality. In practice, the central figures may intervene only in exceptional circumstances, for example, when recommending authorities disagree on an appointment.

From the party's point of view, it has been necessary to retain some form of *nomenklatura* control. As a result, the party has tolerated patronage and other abuses, while attempting to control the distribution of patronage and limit its worst excesses. For economic development, however, further decentralization of personnel management is undoubtedly required. Directors of enterprises and heads of academic institutions, on whom economic development depends, need the autonomy to select personnel based on job performance rather than on party or personal loyalty. Indeed, in recent times, they have been among the first to demand that the party retreat from its tight control of personnel matters. Because party core groups in government central ministries and provincial bureaus vet leaders of enterprises and service units within their functional area, reform of leadership selection has focused on party/government relations.

In November 1987 the 13th Party Congress endorsed plans to reduce the size of the Central Committee's *nomenklatura* and to further decentralize cadre management. First, authorities called for the "gradual elimination" of the party core groups[60] now found in central and local government organs and in mass organizations. Because the leaders of government agencies and mass organizations often also are secretaries of party core groups within their unit, this reform will eliminate the overlap and thus rationalize *nomenklatura* control. If all party core groups are eliminated, the party Central Committee's *nomenklatura* could be reduced by up to 1,000 positions.

Second, party authorities announced a plan to establish a civil service system for state administration.

[58]The term is Rigby's. See T. H. Rigby, "Introduction," in Rigby and Harasymiw, op. cit., p. 1.

[59]Ibid., p. 6.

[60]See Zhao Ziyang's speech to the 13th CCP Congress, "On Advancing Along the Road of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics," *Wenhui Bao* (Hong Kong), Oct. 26, 1987, p. 11.

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According to Party General Secretary Zhao Ziyang's Work Report, civil servants (*guojia gongwuyuan*) will be divided into two categories: political affairs officers (*zhengwu gongwuyuan*), on fixed tenure appointments, who will be recommended as candidates for government posts to people's congresses by the Central Committee and local party committees; and professional officers (*yewu gongwuyuan*), on permanent appointments, who will be publicly recruited through examinations. The authorities will establish civil service institutions to manage the new system.[61]

Finally, party leaders proposed cutting back the dominant role that party committees now play in state leadership selection. The party would continue to manage "leading personnel of party organizations and work personnel of party organs," while civil service institutions would manage "leading personnel and work personnel of organs of state power, and judicial and procuratorial organs." Rather vaguely, the Work Report proposes that leadership selection in mass organizations, economic enterprises, and service units, now controlled by the party, would be managed according to the rules and regulations of these organizations.

Party officials maintain that these measures are necessary to increase government efficiency. They argue that reducing the party's role in leadership selection will encourage heads of government agencies to make personnel appointments based on job performance. In addition, economic enterprises and service units, now managed by party core groups, will also be able to adopt more rational, performance-based criteria in their personnel appointments. Finally, abolishing party core groups in government and mass organizations will reduce duplication and, thus, facilitate streamlining.

Although the reform, if implemented, would limit the role of the party in leadership selection, the proposals leave intact the party's dominant position. By retaining the power to "recommend" (*tuijian*) the appointment of cadres to the highest positions of state power (including presumably any new civil service organs), and the power to recommend political affairs officials throughout the civil service, the party retains *nomenklatura* authority over the state. Second, it is likely that one of the functions of the political affairs officers will be to implement party control of personnel matters. Third, if the limited experiments with open recruitment which some local authorities have carried out since the mid-1980's are any indication, then party committees will retain the right to vet candidates who have passed examinations before they are offered employment contracts for professional posts.[62] Finally, the influential role that party committees play in all other aspects of personnel administration —determining the criteria for civil service employment, participating in performance appraisals, drafting disciplinary codes, and approving compensation levels—is likely to continue.

Beyond calling for more decentralization, the Work Report says little about changing the method of selecting leaders of educational institutions, mass organizations, economic enterprises, and service units. Presumably the Central Committee will continue to play a role. If authorities gradually eliminate party core groups, as Zhao Ziyang proposes, heads of institutions previously controlled by the groups may have more power to make appointments. It is likely, however, that the heads of the most important of these institutions will continue to be on the party's *nomenklatura*.

The proposals of the 13th Party Congress call for a reduced role for the party in leadership selection. They do not, however, remove the party from personnel administration, nor do they dismantle the *nomenklatura* system. Rather, they further limit the number of positions over which party committees have *nomenklatura* authority, and they force party committees to use more indirect means, such as administrative law and personnel policy, to influence leadership selection.

Opposition to the reform can be expected from several quarters. Party core group members, for example, may resist the reduction of their authority, which will then be tied more directly to their position in the state bureaucracy. If an open recruitment system is adopted for professionals, party committees, too, may oppose the reduction in their discretionary power over personnel appointments that such a system would entail. Thus, a discussion of the extent of the implementation of the reforms must await further developments.

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[61]Ibid., p. 11.

[62]See John P. Burns, "Civil Service Reform in Post-Mao China," *The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs* (Canberra), forthcoming.

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Note

Soviet Arms Transfers to the Third World

Mark N. Kramer

FOR MUCH of the postwar era, arms transfers have been a crucial part of Soviet relations with the Third World.[1] This emphasis on military aid has stemmed as much from necessity as from design. Although the USSR has tried to establish close ties with the developing countries through a variety of nonmilitary means—including economic assistance, trade, educational exchanges, and political cooperation—it has been unable to sustain its economic aid at more than token levels in recent years and has lost nearly all its appeal as a "model" for development. Consequently, arms transfers have become the primary instrument that enables the Soviet Union to compete with Western countries and China for influence in the Third World. In the 1980's, military exports have also been a key source of hard currency, although problems have begun to arise for the Soviet Union in this lucrative trade because of the growing financial constraints that many of its Third World customers are experiencing.

This article will examine the evolution of Soviet arms transfers and military aid to the Third World, discussing briefly the historical context of Soviet arms transfer policy—particularly the conditions in the late 1960's and early 1970's that permanently changed the nature and level of Soviet weapons exports—and then concentrating on the period from the mid-1970's to the present. We will look at quantitative and qualitative trends in Soviet military assistance, questions of Soviet motivation in offering military aid, the advantages that the USSR enjoys over the West as an arms supplier, and various problems that have hindered Soviet military exports in recent years. The emphasis will be on arms transfers to the *noncommunist* countries of the Third World.[2]

Background

Soviet arms transfers began as early as the 1920's, soon after the founding of the Bolshevik regime, when military equipment was provided to Afghanistan and China and to communist rebels in Mongolia. The shipments were successful in extending Soviet influence in Mongolia and Afghanistan, but were strikingly unsuccessful in China, where the Kuomintang government broke off relations with the USSR and turned violently on erstwhile communist allies. The next major Soviet arms exports came in the 1930's during the Spanish Civil War, when the USSR provided large amounts of arms and support to procommunist elements in the Republican government. Although this assistance facilitated communist control over the Republican apparatus, it did not prevent that government from losing to Franco's forces. Other Soviet arms transfers at this time to anti-colonial movements in what was soon to be the Third World were too small and erratic to have any appreciable impact. On balance, then, Soviet weapons exports in the inter-

[1]The term "Third World" (or "developing world" or "less developed countries"), as used in this paper, refers to all countries in Africa except South Africa, all countries in South and East Asia except Japan, all countries in Latin America, and all countries in the Middle East. The term "arms transfers" refers to the provision of weapons, spare parts, support equipment, advisers, training, and information. Arms transfers normally occur in two phases: agreements or contractual promises to provide military equipment and services, and the actual delivery of goods or services.

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[2]Indeed, it is only to a few communist states of the Third World—such as Cuba and Vietnam—that the Soviet Union provides massive infusions of *economic* as well as military aid.

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war period were notably lacking in achievements.[3]

In the first few years after World War II, the devastation that the Soviet industrial base had suffered precluded any significant role for Moscow as an arms supplier to the Third World. Output from the reviving Soviet military industries went almost entirely to the Red Army. However, the USSR did have large stockpiles of enemy weapons, captured in the closing months of the war, which it distributed to communist forces in China and, in 1948, to Jewish independence forces preparing to set up the state of Israel. Large amounts of captured weapons, as well as Soviet-made arms, also went to the communist government in North Korea, which used them to invade the South in June 1950. The unexpectedly vigorous American military response to this aggression restored a degree of caution to Soviet arms transfer policy for the next several years.

In the case of Soviet arms shipments to the nascent Israeli government, Stalin undoubtedly perceived an opportunity to erode and eventually supplant British influence in the Middle East. But rather than provide arms directly to the Israelis—thus openly challenging British interests in the region—Stalin relied on Czechoslovak intermediaries to ship the weapons. This use of "surrogates" became common practice, as the USSR provided "Polish" or "Czechoslovak" arms to Guatemala in 1954, to Egypt in 1955, to Syria in 1956, to Indonesia from 1956 to 1959, and to Guinea in 1959.[4]

Aside from these shipments through East European intermediaries, Soviet arms transfers to the Third World remained at a relatively low level through the mid-1960's. A small number of countries—especially China (before 1960) and Egypt, plus India, Indonesia, Iraq, and Syria—did receive substantial quantities of Soviet weapons; but, on the whole, Nikita Khrushchev's attempts to forge amicable relations with the newly independent Third World states were oriented primarily around economic assistance and trade, rather than around military exports. Between 1955 and Khrushchev's removal in 1964, Soviet economic assistance to the Third World averaged the equivalent of US$425 million annually, some $50 million higher than the average annual level of military aid. Soviet trade with the less developed countries (LDC's) during this same period also grew rapidly.[5]

By the late 1960's, however, arms transfers began to take precedence in Soviet policy toward the Third World. That pattern has continued, with minor fluctuations, to the present day. At least nine major factors contributed to this change:

(1) By the mid- to late 1960's, serious doubts had arisen about the economic aid programs that Khrushchev had so strongly emphasized. Long delays and poor implementation hindered many projects; a backlog of unallocated credits had built up; and a number of Western countries, particularly the United States, had shown themselves to be far more capable than the Soviet Union when it came to promoting economic development in the Third World.[6] Moreover, economic assistance required extensive preparation and detailed planning and implementation before it could produce any results. Arms transfers, by contrast, often yielded immediate political benefits and required much less preparation.

(2) The major expansion of Soviet military production that began in the early to mid-1960's, especially after Khrushchev's ouster in 1964, enabled Soviet factories to assure a steady output of military goods and services for export abroad, even while meeting the requirements of the Soviet armed forces.

(3) Vast improvements in the Soviet Union's air and sea transport capabilities opened up new opportunities for Soviet arms transfers to distant Third World countries.[7] In particular, expanding airlift capacity enabled the USSR to dispatch arms rapidly in an emergency. Soviet military air transport (*voyenno-transportnaya aviatsiya*) was critical during the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war in resupplying both Egypt and Syria; similarly, in 1975–76, Soviet An–22 transport aircraft ferried large

[3]This period is covered in greater detail in G. P. Armstrong, *Soviet Arms Transfers to the Third World: History and Aims*, D Strat A Staff Note 8604, Ottawa, Canadian Department of National Defence/Operational Research and Analysis Establishment/Directorate of Strategic Analysis, June 1986, pp. 7–14. Also see Stephen S. Kaplan et al., *Diplomacy of Power: Soviet Armed Forces as a Political Instrument*, Washington, DC, Brookings Institution, 1981, pp. 149–51.

[4]See Gordon H. McCormick, "Proxies, Small Wars, and Soviet Foreign Policy," in John H. Maurer and Richard H. Porth, Eds., *Military Intervention in the Third World: Threats, Constraints, and Options*, New York, Praeger, 1984, pp. 50–51.

The $250-million "Czechoslovak" arms deal with Egypt—which included 50 Il–28 bombers, 150 MiG–15 fighters, 230 T–34 tanks, 300 other armored vehicles, and an assortment of naval weapons—was particularly important in establishing the Soviet Union as a credible supplier of military equipment and expertise.

[5]Roger E. Kanet, "Soviet Military Assistance to the Third World," in John F. Copper and Daniel S. Papp, Eds., *Communist Nations' Military Assistance*, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1983, p. 41.

[6]US Central Intelligence Agency (hereafter, CIA), *Communist Aid Activities in Non-Communist Less Developed Countries, 1979 and 1954–79*, ER 80-10318U, Washington, DC, October 1980, pp. 6–7; and Orah Cooper and Carol Fogarty, "Soviet Economic and Military Aid to the Less Developed Countries, 1954–78," in US Congress, Joint Economic Committee (hereafter—JEC), *Soviet Economy in a Time of Change*, Vol. 2, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., Oct. 10, 1979, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1979, p. 651.

[7]See Dennis M. Gormley, "The Direction and Pace of Soviet Force Projection Capabilities," *Survival* (London), November-December 1982, pp. 266–76; and Andrew J. Pierre, *The Global Politics of Arms Sales*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1982, p. 77.

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amounts of weapons and equipment to the forces of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) that were battling their way to power in Angola. In 1977–78, during the decisive stage of the Ogaden conflict in Ethiopia, the Soviet Union used 225 long-range Antonov and Ilyushin aircraft (nearly 15 percent of the Soviet military transport fleet) to turn the tide of the war. The aircraft took off almost continuously for three weeks, carrying weapons, 1,500 Soviet advisers, and 15,000 Cuban troops to aid the Ethiopian government.[8] Such a feat would have been impossible less than a decade earlier. The new Soviet Navy and burgeoning merchant marine fleet also played a major role in ferrying arms in each of these three cases.

(4) The number of potential customers for Soviet armaments was expanding rapidly. The dissolution of the French and British empires by the mid-1960's, and the breakup of the Portuguese empire in the 1970's, led to the creation of a number of states (Algeria, South Yemen, Mozambique, Angola) who were eager to receive Soviet arms. Other Third World governments, motivated by anti-Western sentiment and a desire to avoid dependence on the West for weapons supplies, welcomed the Soviet Union as an obvious alternative.

Revolutions and conflicts in the Third World, as in Indochina and Ethiopia, produced additional opportunities for Soviet military exports. Although the number of purchasers of Soviet weapons (roughly 40) was still small compared to the number of countries who received arms from the United States, the Soviet Union by the mid-1970's had expanded its Third World clientele from a mere handful of countries to a truly global network.

(5) The 1965 Indo-Pakistani war, the 1967 Middle East war—in which some 80 percent of Egyptian weapons were destroyed or captured—and the 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict brought requests from India, Egypt, Iraq, and Syria for massive resupply of their depleted arsenals. The Soviet Union met the demand, thereby firmly establishing itself as a reliable source of modern arms for the Third World.

(6) Israel's deep bombing strikes against Egypt during the war of attrition in 1970 prompted Moscow to sell to the Egyptians weapons of a much more advanced type than previously. Soviet policy thus underwent an important shift: rather than supplying old, outdated equipment, the USSR now was willing to provide its closest Third World allies with modern, sophisticated arms. In an important and related shift, the USSR also sent

[8]Colin Legum, "Angola and the Horn of Africa," in Kaplan et al., op cit, pp. 620–22.

Table 1: Soviet Share of Arms Transfers to the Third World, 1981-1985

(Estimated value in current US$ millions)

Recipient	Cum. value Soviet transfers	Cum. value transfers from all suppliers	Soviet transfers as a percent of total transfers
ALL LDC'S	$49,140	$151,055	33
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA	6,075	13,170	46
Angola	2,600	2,975	87
Benin	50	65	92
Botswana	10	15	67
Burundi	30	50	60
Cape Verde	30	30	100
Congo	180	190	95
Ethiopia	2,000	2,100	96
Ghana	5	30	17
Guinea	20	25	80
Guinea-Bissau	60	60	100
Madagascar	90	115	78
Mali	60	65	92
Mozambique	775	825	94
Nigeria	80	1,820	2
Tanzania	70	140	50
Zambia	10	75	13
Zimbabwe	5	255	2
EAST ASIA	4,950	15,225	33
China (PRC)	80	385	21
Cambodia	350	360	97
North Korea	390	990	39
Laos	160	170	94
Mongolia	470	470	100
Vietnam	3,500	3,645	96
LATIN AMERICA	4,150	13,530	31
Cuba	3,500	4,010	87
Guyana	10	20	50
Nicaragua	250	645	39
Peru	390	1,150	34
MIDDLE EAST & N. AFRICA	26,175	90,460	29
Algeria	3,200	3,890	82
Egypt	40	7,120	1
Iran	370	6,435	6
Iraq	7,400	23,925	31
Jordan	525	3,805	14
Kuwait	90	1,005	9
Libya	4,600	10,455	44
Syria	8,000	8,950	89
South Yemen	1,100	1,110	99
North Yemen	850	1,675	50
SOUTH ASIA	5,730	10,050	57
Afghanistan	1,500	1,590	94
Bangladesh	30	150	20
India	4,200	6,070	69

SOURCE NOTE: Calculated from data in US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1986*, ACDA Publication 127, Washington, DC, April 1987, pp. 143–46. Totals for the developing world as a whole and for individual regions include transfers to states that receive no weapons from the USSR (e.g., Saudi Arabia). As defined here, the regions differ slightly from those used by ACDA.

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7,500 Soviet combat troops to operate the Frog missiles, ZSU–23-4 mobile anti-aircraft guns, and SA–2 and SA–3 air defense missiles shipped to Egypt in 1970–71.

(7) The emergence of strategic nuclear parity between the superpowers by around 1970 (and its codification in SALT I) inspired Soviet leaders to seek parity in other areas as well. Soviet officials believed that as a coequal superpower, the Soviet Union could compete on an equal basis with the United States in the Third World. As one Soviet diplomat put it, the superpowers should have "an equal right to meddle in third areas."[9] Since the United States had long maintained an extensive network of arms supply relationships with Third World countries, officials in Moscow viewed Soviet military exports to such countries as a natural concomitant of superpower status, as well as a means of undercutting US influence in these countries.

(8) The post-Vietnam disillusionment and "neo-isolationism" in the United States reinforced the growing confidence and buoyancy among Soviet officials. The uncertainty and lack of resolve in American policy in the 1970's enabled the Soviet Union to exploit new opportunities in the Third World, most notably in Angola and Ethiopia. By shipping large amounts of arms and Soviet advisers to these countries, the USSR created entirely new arms markets for itself.

(9) Finally, the steep increase in oil prices after 1974 gave many Arab states the hard-currency resources to replace the arms lost in the 1973 war and to upgrade their arsenals with more sophisticated arms. Soviet military exports to Arab countries in the period 1974–79 were five times greater than in 1967–73.[10] Because most of the sales were transacted directly in cash, the Soviet Union was all the more willing to transfer costly, advanced weapons.

Recent Trends

As a result of these factors, the Soviet Union has been, since the late 1970's, the largest supplier of military equipment and services to the Third World, having dislodged the United States from the top position. For the period from 1981 through 1985, Soviet arms transfers accounted in value terms for 33 percent of all weapons exported to the Third World (see Table 1), compared to only 19 percent supplied by the United States. Soviet military deliveries to noncommunist Third World states during this seven-year period were worth nearly four times as much as the Soviet arms supplied during the 20 years from 1955 through 1974 (see Table 2). Even if, as some estimates suggest,[11] Soviet arms shipments to most regions have leveled off or declined since the early 1980's as a result of the reduced demand for weapons among indebted Third World states, both the quantity and the quality of arms supplied by the USSR remain at very high levels.

Table 2: Soviet Arms Transfers to the Non-Communist Third World, 1955–84

(Estimated value in millions of current US dollars)

Year	Value of agreements	Value of deliveries
1955–74	$18,910	$13,520
1975	3,185	2,035
1976	6,140	3,110
1977	9,645	4,815
1978	2,700	6,075
1979	8,835	8,340
1980	14,635	8,125
1981	6,505	8,105
1982	11,765	8,065
1983	2,995	7,130
1984	9,155	7,135
TOTAL	$94,470	$76,465

SOURCE AND METHODOLOGY: US Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, *Warsaw Pact Economic Aid to Non-Communist LDCs, 1984*. Publication No. 9345, revised May 1986, p. 19. Numbers are rounded to the nearest 5, and hence individual year totals do not add up to precise 30-year totals. For purposes of this table, noncommunist Third World countries include all countries of Africa except South Africa, Angola, and Ethiopia; all countries of South and East Asia except China, Hong Kong, Japan, Afghanistan, North Korea, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia; all countries in the Caribbean and Latin America except Cuba, Guyana, and Nicaragua; and all countries in the Middle East except Israel and South Yemen. Agreements refer to promises to provide goods and services, either on credit or free of charge (as grants). Deliveries refer to the shipment of goods or the use of services.

[9]Interview with Genrikh Trofimenko, August 1979.

[10]See CIA, *Communist Aid Activities in Non-Communist Less Developed Countries, 1979 and 1954–79*, p. 5.

[11]A decline in Soviet military deliveries to the Third World is suggested in three charts appearing in US Joint Chiefs of Staff, *United States Posture FY 1988*, February 1987, Washington, DC, pp. 29–30. On the other hand, the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency recently disclosed that American "estimates of Soviet arms transfers in value terms . . . are currently under review. A preliminary finding of this review is that . . . dollar estimates of Soviet transfers of support materiel, particularly to countries engaged in hostilities, need to be substantially raised. This would mean an increase on the order of 40–50 percent in the estimated annual value of total Soviet arms transfers over a series of years . . . ." See *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1986*, ACDA Publication 127, Washington, DC, April 1987, p. 159.

The CIA estimates that Soviet military deliveries to Warsaw Pact countries and the Third World in 1985 amounted to $9 billion; see JEC, Subcommittee on Economic Resources, Competitiveness, and Security Economics, *Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and China—1985: Hearings*, Part II, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess., Mar. 19, 1986, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1986, p. 113. Extrapolating from the previous decade, one can estimate shipments to Eastern Europe in 1985 of some $1 billion; thus, deliveries to the Third World were worth roughly $8 billion.

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The numbers are staggering. For the years 1974–85, the USSR delivered 14,775 tanks, 18,760 armored vehicles, 5,600 fighter aircraft, 17,020 artillery pieces, 1,805 combat helicopters, 18 submarines, 66 surface ships, and 93 missile attack boats.[12] Throughout the 1980's, the USSR has substantially outstripped the US as the largest arms supplier to the Third World in all categories of major weapons systems except subsonic combat aircraft (see Table 3). Soviet deliveries accounted for more than half the total numbers of supersonic combat aircraft, surface-to-air missiles, and military helicopters that developing countries received in the early 1980's from all suppliers. The USSR also provided vastly greater numbers of tanks, armored personnel carriers, submarines, and anti-aircraft artillery pieces than did any other supplier. With military shipments on a scale this large, it is scarcely surprising that the dollar value of Soviet arms deliveries has risen as sharply as it it has.

The expansion in Soviet arms transfers also has its *qualitative* aspects. Whereas in the 1950's and 1960's, the USSR transferred mostly old, even obsolescent, military equipment to Third World purchasers, the quality of weapons supplied has improved dramatically since the mid-1970's. Some countries, most notably Syria and India, receive top-of-the-line Soviet equipment, sometimes even before the same equipment is provided to the Soviet Union's Warsaw Pact allies. The improved quality of the Soviet-made arms now shipped to the Third World is manifest in virtually all categories of weapons, including:

- fighter aircraft like the MiG–29 Fulcrum (shipped to India, Syria, and Iraq), which is the most advanced fighter now in the Soviet arsenal;
- ground-attack aircraft like the Su–25 Frogfoot (to Iraq), the MiG–27/–27M Flogger D/J (to India); and the Su–17/–20/–22 Fitter D/H (to Algeria, Iraq, Libya, Syria, Peru, and South Yemen);
- the medium-range Tu–22 Blinder bomber (to Iraq and Libya);
- combat helicopters like the Mi–24 Hind D gunship (to Nicaragua, Ethiopia, Peru, Syria, South Yemen, and Libya, among others);
- naval systems like the Kilo-class attack submarine (to India);
- surface-to-surface missiles (SS–21's to Syria, reportedly now equipped with chemical warheads) and air defense missiles (SA–5's and SA–8's to Syria and Libya, SA–8's to India, Mozambique, Jordan, and others, and portable SA–14's to Nicaragua);
- large quantities of T–72 main battle tanks and other sophisticated armored vehicles (to many countries, with India due to receive the T–80 as well); and
- Il–76 Candid transport aircraft (to a number of countries) and Tu–126 Moss reconnaissance and early-warning aircraft (to Syria).

The modern tanks, medium-range bombers, ground-attack aircraft, and surface-to-surface missiles that the USSR has provided are particularly useful for offensive operations.

As impressive as the aggregate totals of Soviet arms transfers may be, these figures tend, if anything, to understate the impact of Soviet weapons in key parts of the Third World. The Soviet Union provides roughly three-fifths of all arms purchased by South Asian countries and roughly half of those bought by states in Sub-Saharan Africa (see Table 3), and hence is well situated to use its military shipments to affect the outcome of conflicts in those regions, particularly since, as noted, much of the advanced equipment provided to these critical regions is offense-oriented. And although the Soviet share of the total weapons shipped to the Middle East is lower (some 35 percent of the total received in the region), this heavily armed and volatile region has been by far the largest recipient of Soviet weapons in absolute terms.

From 1954 through 1981, approximately two-thirds of total Soviet arms shipments went to countries in the Middle East and South Asia, the remainder going largely to East Asian states, primarily Vietnam, North Korea, and (before 1960) China. Over the past decade, the share of total Soviet arms shipments going to the Middle East and South Asia has become even more disproportionate, rising to 74 percent.[13] As Table 4 shows, the non-communist Third World countries that receive the largest amounts of Soviet weapons are all located in the Middle East and South Asia, with Syria, Iraq, and Libya actually outstripping communist states such as Vietnam and Cuba in the value of military equipment received from the Soviet Union.

What is more, despite the general diminution of Soviet arms shipments to the Third World over the past two years, Soviet military exports to the Middle East and South Asia have remained much higher, in both proportional and absolute terms, than they were a decade earlier. Military deliveries to Syria more than doubled in the 1980–85 period compared to 1974-79, rising from $4.5 billion to $10.3 billion. Shipments to all the leading recipients of Soviet arms in the Middle East and South Asia

[12]See JEC, Subcommittee on Economic Resources, Competitiveness, and Security Economics, *Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and China—1985: Hearings*, p. 19.

[13]Ibid., p. 165.

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Table 3: Numbers of Soviet Weapons Delivered to the Third World, Cumulative Totals, 1981–85

(Absolute numbers and share of total deliveries, by type, to Third World)

Weapon type	To Africa		To East Asia		To Latin America	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Tanks	1,070	51	485	38	445	54
Anti-aircraft artillery	1,095	73	180	62	220	52
Field artillery	1,750	55	295	21	555	43
Armored personnel carriers	1,915	45	450	33	185	16
Major naval surface combatants	19	44	4	15	4	7
Other naval surface combatants	17	12	31	53	36	40
Submarines	5	100	0	0	1	11
Missile attack boats	9	47	2	20	6	100
Supersonic combat aircraft	535	82	195	55	100	53
Subsonic combat aircraft	15	13	0	0	0	0
Other aircraft	110	20	75	22	40	12
Helicopters	255	57	60	22	85	27
Surface-to-air missiles	4,745	89	320	12	1,295	69

Weapon type	To Middle East		To South Asia		Third World Total	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent[1]
Tanks	1,790	20	605	77	4,395	32 (12)
Anti-aircraft artillery	340	10	130	50	1,965	33 (2)
Field artillery	825	8	455	60	3,880	23 (17)
Armored personnel carriers	3,210	30	1,000	87	6,760	36 (21)
Major naval surface combatants	4	20	2	20	33	24 (11)
Other naval surface combatants	17	11	6	14	107	22 (5)
Submarines	2	20	0	0	8	31 (0)
Missile attack boats	9	23	0	0	26	26 (0)
Supersonic combat aircraft	625	49	165	46	1,620	57 (14)
Subsonic combat aircraft	85	61	0	0	100	17 (46)
Other aircraft	35	18	125	37	385	22 (2)
Helicopters	340	69	130	93	870	53 (11)
Surface-to-air missiles	5,385	38	520	72	12,265	50 (13)

[1]In parentheses, US share of total shipments to Third World.

SOURCE: US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1986*, ACDA Publication No. 127, April 1987, pp. 151-54.

underwent similar increases—with the exception of Libya and Iraq, whose purchases rose in current dollars but declined slightly in constant dollars (See Table 4).

Although annual Soviet arms exports to the Middle East have apparently been declining since 1982, much of this trend is attributable to the contraction of Middle Eastern oil revenues and to a cyclical lull in regional arms purchases while recipients absorb the weapons they have already bought. A recovery in oil prices combined with the inevitable aging of the weapons recently deployed by local states is likely to bring a renewed upswing in Soviet arms sales to the region.

Not only has the volume of Soviet arms transfers to the Middle East been much greater in the 1980's than in the 1960's and early 1970's; so too have the risks that Moscow is willing to take, if the resupply of Syria after the 1982 Lebanon conflict is any indication. Previous Soviet resupplies of Arab states—after the 1967 and 1973 Middle East wars and during the 1970 war of attrition—had been aimed at restoring a balance between Israel and the Arab states and had eschewed providing top-of-the-line weapons that might induce the Arabs to escalate hostilities. Although the resupply of Syria in 1982–83 was not a radical departure from these principles, it nevertheless entailed risks considerably greater than any the Soviet Union had previously been prepared to run.[14]

At the time of the resupply, there was ample reason to believe that hostilities between Syria and Israel might soon resume; indeed, by providing the Syrians with the latest SS–21 surface-to-surface missiles and SA–5 air defense missiles, the USSR almost seemed to be encouraging a new round of warfare. The danger for the

[14]See Francis Fukuyama, *Moscow's Post-Brezhnev Reassessment of the Third World*, R-3337-USDP, Santa Monica, CA, RAND Corporation, February 1986, pp. 64–69. For a somewhat different view, see Cynthia A. Roberts, "Soviet Arms-Transfer Policy and the Decision to Upgrade Syrian Air Defenses," *Survival*, July-August 1983, esp. pp. 157–58.

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USSR stemmed from the thousands of Soviet combat troops sent to operate the new systems. If, as appeared likely, the conflict flared up anew, the Israelis would have been openly attacking front-line Soviet soldiers. Events after 1983—most notably, the sale of MiG–29's to Syria and the gradual transfer of control over the SA–5's to Syrian personnel—have provided mixed signals about Soviet risk-taking in the region. On balance, the 1982–83 resupply operation, although not betokening a sweeping change of Soviet arms transfer policy in the Middle East, did indicate a greater Soviet willingness to risk the escalation of regional conflicts through the introduction of new weapons.

Soviet arms transfer policy vis-à-vis the Iran-Iraq war has evidenced a similar propensity to accept increased risks. During the first two years of the war, the USSR severely curtailed its arms shipments to both sides and exerted pressure on the Iraqis to bring the war to an end. By the summer of 1982, however, as the Iranian position strengthened and the prospect of a humiliating Iraqi defeat loomed, the Soviet Union resumed large-scale supply of arms to Baghdad. This was balanced by shipment of some Soviet weapons to Iran via third parties, including Syria, Libya, North Korea, and South Yemen. The USSR was thus in the position of arming both sides in the war.[15] However, toward the end of 1983, the Soviet Union abandoned its "even-handed" approach and clearly began "tilting" to the Iraqi side, both to shore up Saddam Husayn's faltering regime and perhaps also to discourage Iraqi purchases elsewhere, especially from France. Over the past few years, Soviet weapons shipments to Iraq have exceeded those to any other country, and the shipments have included some of the most advanced weapons available, such as the MiG–29 Fulcrum and SU–25 Frogfoot.[16] More recently, the Soviet Union decided to resume sizable arms shipments to Iran as well, which would greatly compound the risks that Moscow is now taking.

Soviet Motives

What does the USSR expect to gain by shipping such large quantities of military materiel to Third World countries? For many years Soviet arms transfer policy appeared motivated primarily by political and military concerns rather than economic considerations. Since the mid-1970's, however, economic considerations have played a greater role in Soviet arms shipment decisions, at times to the detriment of political objectives. Of course, the distinction between politico-military and economic considerations should not be overplayed; most shipments of weapons involve a blend of several (or all) of the motivations described below.

[15]Michael Lenker, "The Effect of the Iran-Iraq War on Soviet Strategy in the Persian Gulf," in Thomas Naff, Ed., *Gulf Security and the Iran-Iraq War*, Washington, DC, National Defense University Press, December 1985, pp. 85–86; and John Devlin, "Iraqi Military Policy: From Assertiveness to Defense," in ibid., p. 147.

[16]James Bruce, "Soviet MiG Reinforcements for Iraq," *Jane's Defence Weekly* (London), Mar. 21, 1987, p. 472.

Table 4: Soviet Military Deliveries to Third World Countries, 1974–85

(Estimated value in billions of current US dollars and of 1984 US dollars)

Recipient	1974–79 Current dollars	1974–79 Constant dollars	1980–85 Current dollars	1980–85 Constant dollars	1974–85 Current dollars	1974–85 Constant dollars
Syria	4.5	7.7	10.3	11.4	14.8	19.1
Iraq	6.0	10.3	8.2	9.1	14.2	19.4
Libya	5.4	9.2	5.8	6.4	11.2	15.6
Vietnam	2.1	3.6	4.9	5.4	7.0	9.0
India	2.0	3.4	4.8	5.3	6.8	8.7
Algeria	1.6	2.7	3.6	4.0	5.2	6.7
Cuba	1.3	2.2	3.9	4.3	5.2	6.5
Ethiopia	1.5	2.6	2.6	2.9	4.1	5.5
Angola	0.7	1.2	2.8	3.1	3.5	4.3
60 (62) other[1] countries	7.7	13.1	11.3	12.7	19.0	25.8
TOTAL	32.8	56.0	58.2	64.6	91.0	120.6

[1]The constant-dollar calculations are for a slightly larger group of countries.

SOURCES: For figures in current $US, see US Central Intelligence Agency and US Defense Intelligence Agency, *The Soviet Economy Under a New Leader*, Washington, DC, Mar. 19, 1986; for figures in constant $US, see data provided by US Central Intelligence Agency in US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Subcommittee on Economic Resources, Competitiveness, and Security Economics, *Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and China—1985: Hearings*, Part II, Washington, DC, Mar. 19, 1986.

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Political-military motives. The Soviet Union has used arms transfers to advance a number of political and military objectives, with varying degrees of success. In many cases, Soviet arms exports are intended primarily to curry favor with local states and compete with the West for political influence in such states. Although this aspect of Soviet policy has been most conspicuous with regard to communist countries such as Cuba, Vietnam, Ethiopia, and South Yemen, it has also been a prominent factor in the Middle East, where large-scale shipments of Soviet weapons to radical Arab states have been intended to counterbalance US support for Israel and for moderate Arab regimes.[17] Much the same is true of Soviet arms transfers to India, which have been designed largely to gain influence with the Indian government and to offset US support for Pakistan.

The importance that Moscow attaches to maintaining good relations with such key states as India and Syria is evident from the sophistication of the weapons that it has been willing to supply them, including MiG–29 fighters, SS–21 surface-to-surface missiles, and SA–5 and SA–8 air defense missiles. For their part, many recipients of Soviet arms—India, Libya, Syria, Iraq, and Ethiopia, among others—have offered diplomatic support for Moscow at the United Nations and have refrained from such actions as condemnation of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan.

A second motive for Soviet arms transfers to the Third World, especially since 1960, has been to erode Chinese influence. In Angola and Rhodesia, for example, Soviet military support for the MPLA guerrillas and for rebels of the Zimbabwe Africa People's Union (ZAPU) was aimed at propping up these groups against Chinese-backed rivals (in the former case, successfully for the USSR; in the latter case, unsuccessfully). Soviet military assistance to India and Afghanistan since the early 1960's has been intended, at least in part, to "contain" China in South Asia. The same applies to Soviet support for Vietnam: the Vietnamese have depended on Soviet military aid both in their occupation of Cambodia and in preparing for a possible renewal of the direct hostilities with China that occurred in 1979. Moscow's desire to attenuate Chinese influence also lies behind the recent Soviet overtures to North Korea, including an agreement to ship fifty MiG–23 Flogger fighters, thirty SA–3 Goa surface-to-air missiles, and AA–7 Amos air-to-air missiles. These supplies, Soviet leaders hope, will counter Chinese influence in Pyongyang as well as offset US backing for South Korea.[18] Moscow's use of arms transfers to "contain" China will undoubtedly continue in the future, for despite the improvement in Sino-Soviet relations over the past five years, enmity between the two countries is likely to persist.

Another, increasingly important, goal of Soviet military shipments has been to obtain overflight and landing rights, port facilities, bases, and prepositioning of equipment. In the 1960's and 1970's, for example, Soviet arms transfers to West African countries (Congo, Benin, Guinea-Bissau, and Mali) enabled the USSR to gain access to airfields that proved crucial during the Angola supply operation in 1975–76. Soviet weapons shipments to South Yemen have been even more fruitful in gaining for the USSR permission to use the base at Khormaksar and the port facilities at Aden, to anchor at the islands of Socotra and Perim, and to land at Yemeni airfields (this last played a critical role in the Soviet intervention in Ethiopia in the late 1970's).[19]

Soviet arms transfers to other African and Middle Eastern states—including Syria, Angola, Libya, Mozambique, Ethiopia, and the Seychelles—have proven equally effective in securing access for the USSR to air and naval bases. In East Asia, too, the Soviet Union has used weapons supplies to gain access to military facilities; for example, the base at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam has been open to the USSR over the past seven years in exchange for regular arms shipments and economic aid.[20] Similarly, the Soviet Union in 1985 obtained important overflight rights and port facilities in return for its arms shipments to North Korea. By securing access to all these foreign facilities in return for arms transfers, the USSR has augmented its global political role and acquired the capacity to project force in distant regions of the Third World.

Soviet weapons shipments have also frequently been geared toward supporting Third World allies who are at war, whether on the offense as with Vietnam in Cambodia, or on the defense as with Angola's battle against the UNITA rebels. Short of the direct involvement of Soviet combat troops, arms transfers are the most visible means of demonstrating the Soviet Union's commitment to an ally. A side benefit of this aspect of Soviet arms transfer policy is that Soviet military planners can gain valuable information about the performance of their

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[17]The Soviet Union has not limited itself to courting radical Arab states; in recent years, Moscow has also used arms transfers to better its relations with moderate Arab states such as Jordan. The Jordanians have received anti-aircraft guns (ZSU–23-4's) and air defense missiles (SA–8's, SA–13's, and SA–14's), among other weapons, from the USSR.

[18]*Sankei Shimbun* (Tokyo), Nov. 26, 1985.

[19]US Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *The Soviet Union in the Third World, 1980–85: An Imperial Burden or Political Asset?* (report prepared by the Congressional Research Service), 99th Cong., 1st Sess., Sept. 23, 1985, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1985, p. 413.

[20]Brendan M. Greely, Jr., "Soviets Extend Air, Sea Power with Buildup at Cam Ranh Bay," *Aviation Week & Space Technology* (New York), Mar. 2, 1987, pp. 76–77; and Alvin H. Bernstein, "The Soviets in Cam Ranh Bay," *The National Interest* (Washington, DC), Spring 1986, pp. 17–29.

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weapons in combat. The Middle East, in particular, has provided extensive data about how the latest Soviet armaments fare against comparable Western systems.[21]

Soviet arms transfers have also been designed to support guerrilla movements and terrorist groups who are fighting pro-Western regimes. Although the Soviet Union sometimes provides arms directly to subnational groups (such as the Palestine Liberation Organization, the African National Congress, and the Southwest Africa People's Organization) and offers training for guerrillas at camps in the southern USSR and near Moscow, the usual procedure is to provide weapons and training to Third World insurgents and terrorists through third parties such as Libya, Syria, and Cuba.[22] The use of intermediaries enables Soviet officials to issue public denials that the USSR "supports terrorism."

A further strand in Soviet arms transfer policy has been to foster the dependence of Third World states on the USSR for new weapons, training, expertise, servicing, and spare parts. Partly for this reason and partly because of concerns about the compromise of sensitive technology, the Soviet Union has generally been reluctant to export plans or equipment for co-production of major weapons. Transfers of manufacturing technology for major arms have been granted so far only to India, North Korea (through the early 1970's), and China (before 1960). A number of other Third World states, including Egypt, Peru, and South Yemen, have received technology for the manufacture of small arms, selected spare parts, and ammunition, and for the performance of maintenance.[23] In general, though, without facilities for indigenous production of a whole range of weapons and spare parts, Third World states have no alternative but to depend on the Soviet Union for supplies, modernization, and even proper maintenance. This dependence can, at least in principle, augment Soviet bargaining leverage on other matters.

Finally, arms transfers have been a valuable means for the USSR to carry out espionage through the dispatch of advisers and technicians to accompany the weapons. The Soviet Union almost always sends advisers along with its arms shipments—an understandable practice, given the complexity of the weapons the USSR is now providing and the lack of technically skilled personnel in the recipient states. However, the number of these Soviet "advisers" is often so large as to suggest that at least some of them are engaged in intelligence-gathering and covert activities rather than in providing advice.[24] Such was the case, for example, in Afghanistan in the late 1970's, when Soviet "advisers" helped shape the policies of the Kabul regime after the communist coup of April 1978 and then laid the groundwork for the Soviet invasion 20 months later. Likewise, in South Yemen in early 1986, the presence of Soviet military personnel enabled the USSR to regain control of events after bloody fighting erupted between rival factions of the local communist party.[25] The many thousands of other Soviet advisers and technicians stationed throughout the Third World no doubt include a sizable number whose chief function is to ensure the maintenance of pro-Soviet regimes (or what in Soviet parlance are known as "states of socialist orientation").

A rough tabulation of Soviet advisory personnel stationed abroad, excluding combat troops, is provided in Table 5. This role doubtless took on new significance in the wake of the Soviet setbacks in Indonesia, Ghana, and Egypt in the 1960's and 1970's.

The training of indigenous security forces in the Third World—by East German as well as Soviet advisers—is perhaps even more important, from the Soviet perspective, in preserving the "socialist orientation" of "progressive" regimes.[26] Indeed, Soviet military writers regard the development of a strong security apparatus as indispensable to the survival of a local Marxist-Leninist government.[27]

In addition to sending advisers and technicians abroad to Third World countries, the Soviet Union and its

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[21]For an analysis of some of the "lessons" (including some highly dubious ones) that Soviet military writers drew after the 1982 Lebanon conflict, see Benjamin S. Lambeth, *Moscow's Lessons from the 1982 Lebanon Air War*, R-3000-AF, Santa Monica, CA, RAND Corporation, September 1984.

[22]See US Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power 1986*, 5th ed., Washington, DC, March 1986, pp. 125, 128–29; Pedro Ramet, "The Soviet-Syrian Relationship," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), September-October 1986, p. 36; and Jiri Valenta and Virginia Valenta, "Leninism in Grenada," *Problems of Communism*, July-August 1984, p. 11.

Soviet arms transfer contracts normally include a provision allowing the USSR to veto re-transfers to third parties. This provision is honored more in the breach than in the observance. For an example of such a contract, see the series of "top secret" (marked *sovershenno sekretno*) Soviet military aid agreements with Grenada, in US Department of State and Department of Defense, *Grenada Documents: An Overview and Selection*, September 1984, Documents 13, 14, and 15. The revelant articles are Article 6 in the 1980 agreement and Article 7 in the 1982 agreement.

[23]James P. Nichol, "The Soviet Union," in James Everett Katz, Ed., *The Implications of Third World Military Industrialization: Sowing the Serpents' Teeth*, Lexington, MA, Lexington Books, 1986, pp. 71–89.

[24]Pierre, op. cit., p. 76.

[25]David Pollock, "Moscow and Aden: Coping with a Coup," *Problems of Communism*, May-June 1986, pp. 56–60.

[26]On this matter, see Roger E. Kanet, "Military Relations Between Eastern Europe and Africa," in Bruce E. Arlinghaus, Ed., *Arms for Africa: Military Assistance and Foreign Policy in the Developing World*, Lexington, MA, Lexington Books, 1983, pp. 87–89; and Melvin Croan, "A New Afrika Corps?" *The Washington Quarterly* (Washington, DC), Winter 1980, pp. 21–37.

[27]See Mark N. Katz, *The Third World in Soviet Military Thought*, Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982.

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Table 5: Soviet Military Advisors and Technicians Stationed in Third World Countries, 1981-86

Country	Number of Soviet personnel					
	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986
THIRD WORLD TOTAL	16,750	24,200	30,700	24,100	20,010	21,410
Algeria	n.a.	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000
Angola	200	200	200	500	500	1,500
Congo	n.a.	350	n.a.	100	100	100
Cuba	2,600	2,800	4,600	4,600	5,900	5,200
Ethiopia	1,000	1,350	2,400	1,700	1,500	1,500
India	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	200	200	200
Iraq	1,000	1,200	2,000	600	600	600
Cambodia	300	300	800	n.a.	200	200
Laos	n.a.	500	500	500	500	500
Libya	1,750	1,800	1,800	1,800	1,400	2,000
Mali	200	200	200	200	200	200
Mauritania	200	200	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Mozambique	400	300	300	300	300	300
Nicaragua	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	100	50	50
Peru	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	100	160	160
Seychelles	100	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Syria	2,500	7,000	7,000	7,000	2,500	4,000
Vietnam	4,500	5,000	7,000	2,500	2,500	2,500
Yemen (North)	500	500	500	500	500	500
Yemen (South)	1,500	1,500	1,500	1,500	1,000	n.a.
Remainder of Africa	n.a.	n.a.	900	900	900	900

SOURCE: International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance*, London, volumes for 1981-82 through 1986-87.

East European allies provide training on their own soil for military personnel from the LDC's (see Table 6). Between 1955 and 1984, nearly 80,000 military officers from some 45 Third World countries were trained in Warsaw Pact states, primarily in the Soviet Union. The trainees learn a wide range of military skills, with a special emphasis on air defense operations, flight combat, tank operations, and weapons maintenance and repair.[28] Although experiences of this sort sometimes produce tension between Third World officers and their Soviet-bloc counterparts, the training for the most part begets a sense of camaraderie and a greater affinity of political-military views. Military personnel who have been trained in the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe tend to be staunch advocates of a pro-Soviet orientation for their own countries upon their return.

Economic motivations. Until the early 1970's, Soviet motivations for arms transfers to the Third World were overwhelmingly military and political, rather than economic. Indeed, the highly favorable terms of financing that the Soviet Union provided (including a substantial number of grants) meant that arms transfers were a net economic drain. No doubt, this burden was considered tolerable because it was outweighed by political and military benefits.

By the early 1970's, however, the situation had changed dramatically: the Soviet Union had begun experiencing hard-currency trade deficits when it had to import large quantities of grain to make up for a series of crop failures. These trade deficits were particularly unwelcome because Moscow needed hard currency to purchase advanced Western technology. Consequently, Soviet officials were eager to earn hard currency from whatever source they could, including increased military sales to the Third World.[29] The prices for Soviet weapons were raised, and the terms of financing were tightened. Moreover, the geographical distribution of Soviet arms shipments shifted disproportionately to the Middle East, where oil-rich states were able to pay promptly in hard currency. Today, nearly 80 percent of all Soviet military deliveries to the Third World are paid for in hard currency.[30]

The results of this shift in orientation have been striking. In the early 1970's, arms transfers provided only about 3 percent of Soviet hard-currency revenues; by the end of the decade, they accounted for 10–15 per-

[28]CIA, *Communist Aid to Less Developed Countries of the Free World, 1977*, ER 78-10478U, Washington, DC, November 1978, p. 4.

[29]Pierre, op. cit., p. 79.

[30]House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *The Soviet Union in the Third World, 1980–85 . . .*, p. 224.

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Table 6: Numbers of Military Personnel from Non-Communist Third World Trained in the USSR and Eastern Europe, 1955-84

Country	1955-76	1955-79	1955-81	1955-84
TOTAL	43,325	51,930	57,795	78,445
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA	8,050	12,045	13,800	14,895
Angola	—	60	180	380
Benin	25	30	120	n.a.
Burundi	75	75	n.a.	105
Cape Verde	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	160
Chad	75	n.a.	n.a.	170
Congo	400	590	630	660
Equat. Guinea	200	200	200	200
Ethiopia	n.a.	1,790	2,095	2,120
Ghana	175	180	180	245
Guinea	900	945	1,005	1,025
Guinea-Bissau	100	100	n.a.	140
Madagascar	0	0	0	285
Mali	200	370	495	855
Mozambique	325	430-	530	530
Somalia	2,475	2,495	2,600	2,605
Sudan	325	350	350	350
Tanzania	1,325	1,980	2,125	2,205
Uganda	900	n.a.	n.a.	990
Zaire	0	0	0	140
Zambia	25	190	600	625
Other	n.a.	1,375	1,840	n.a.
EAST ASIA	9,275	9,300	9,300	9,300
Cambodia	25	30	30	30
Indonesia	9,250	9,270	9,270	9,270
LATIN AMERICA	550	780	1,050	1,320
Grenada	0	0	0	5
Nicaragua	0	0	260	405
Peru	550	780	790	910
MIDDLE EAST	19,720	23,010	25,280	37,750
Algeria	2,225	2,395	2,395	3,555
Egypt	6,250	6,250	6,255	6,340
Iran	325	325	395	845
Iraq	3,600	4,400	4,410	8,140
Kuwait	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	170
Lebanon	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	15
Libya	1,125	1,595	1,990	7,630
Morocco	145	n.a.	145	145
Syria	4,150	5,455	5,515	8,115
Yemen (North)	1,100	1,360	2,060	4,130
Yemen (South)	800	1,095	1,115	1,485
SOUTH ASIA	6,720	6,795	8,365	12,360
Afghanistan	3,975	4,010	5,580	8,380
Bangladesh	445	445	445	445
India	2,250	2,285	2,285	3,480
Pakistan	50	n.a.	45	45
Sri Lanka	negl.	10	10	10

SOURCES: Compiled from US Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, *Warsaw Pact Economic Aid to Non-Communist LDC's, 1984*, Publication No. 9345, revised May 1986, p. 21; idem, *Soviet and East European Aid to the Third World, 1981*, Publication No. 9345, February 1983, p. 15; US Central Intelligence Agency, *Communist Aid Activities in Non-Communist Less-Developed Countries 1979 and 1954-79*, ER 80-10318U, October 1980, p. 16; and idem, *Communist Aid to the Less-Developed Countries of the Free World, 1976*, ER 77-10296, August 1977, p. 6.

cent of such earnings. With the decline in world commodity prices in the mid-1980's—especially for oil, natural gas, and gold, which are prime Soviet exports—the share of hard currency that arms sales bring in has risen to 25–30 percent for the USSR. This contrasts to approximately 5 percent in the case of the United States.[31] Even if the price of oil increases, Soviet revenues from oil exports are unlikely to rise significantly.[32] Thus, arms sales will continue to bring in a substantial portion of Soviet hard-currency earnings.

To the extent that Mikhail Gorbachev's economic modernization program depends on technology imports from the West and Japan, the hard currency that the Soviet Union earns from arms transfers could prove enormously beneficial to the Soviet economy. If for no other reason than this, Soviet military exports to the Third World are unlikely to decline significantly in the years ahead. Indeed, Soviet officials will probably seek to increase those exports.

Arms transfers also benefit the Soviet economy by maintaining excess capacity in Soviet defense industries at virtually no extra cost. In Soviet military factories, according to the CIA, "most weapons for export are manufactured concurrently with those for Soviet forces, [though] the Soviets have often dedicated entire production lines and runs to export variants."[33] In the event of a crisis or conflict, such facilities can be swiftly diverted to war production. Thus, arms transfers bolster the readiness and "surge" capacity of the Soviet military-industrial base at minimal cost.

In addition, arms transfers help spread the burden of the Soviet Union's research and development (R & D) costs for particular weapons.[34] Prices for most Soviet arms include a surcharge that is intended to recoup R & D expenses; the surcharge is small enough to avoid discouraging potential customers but large enough, when taken cumulatively, to defray a significant portion of such expenses. This may be particularly important in the case of advanced weapons systems, which entail huge R & D costs.

In a similar vein, arms transfers generally reduce the unit cost of Soviet weapons through the economies of scale attendant to longer production runs. The quantity of Soviet tanks and combat helicopters sold to the Third

[31]William Lewis, "Emerging Choices for the Soviets in Third World Arms Transfer Policy," in US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1985*, ACDA Publication 123, Washington, DC, August 1985, p. 31.

[32]See Jonathan P. Stern, *Soviet Oil and Gas Exports to the West*, London, Gower, 1987.

[33]US Central Intelligence Agency, *The Soviet Union Weapons Industry: An Overview*, DI 86-10016, September 1986, p.8.

[34]Lewis, loc. cit.

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World between 1980 and 1986 was equivalent to 32 percent of all such weapons produced in the USSR during that period. For submarines, the percentage was 17 percent; and for fighter aircraft, nearly 39 percent.[35] This has the benefit of lowering procurement costs for the Soviet armed forces. Thus the unit cost to the Soviet military of its MiG–23 aircraft was considerably reduced by the large quantities sold to Third World countries. For complex weapons like the MiG–29, which have very high unit costs, the sale of even small quantities to states such as India and Syria can bring a significant saving to the Soviet military itself.

Finally, arms transfers can occasionally lead to economic concessions for the USSR akin to the political benefits discussed in the previous section. In the case of Peru, for example, the US$1.6 billion worth of military goods and services that the Soviet Union has delivered over the past 12 years have prompted the Peruvian government to allow the nearly 200 Soviet fishing vessels operating in South American waters to use Peruvian ports. The revenue from these fishing vessels amounts to roughly $120 million a year for the USSR. In addition, Peru, unlike most other Latin American countries, has accepted regular service from the Soviet state airline, Aeroflot.[36] Economic concessions of this sort, while obviously not of decisive importance in most Soviet arms transfers, tend to reinforce the other political and economic factors that induce the USSR to export arms.

Soviet Advantages in Supplying Arms

In supplying arms to the Third World, the Soviet Union enjoys a number of advantages over the West.

Speed of delivery. The Soviet Union usually takes less than 12 months from contract to delivery of major weapon systems, whereas the United States often takes 24 to 36 months or longer.[37] The Soviet Union's faster delivery times are due in part to Moscow's flexibility in policy-making and to the large stockpiles of surplus equipment that Soviet factories produce; but the prompter deliveries are also due to the Soviet policy of allocating whole production lines to the export market. As the CIA has noted, "producing for export on a dedicated line facilitates scheduling and eliminates the need for frequent changes in equipment, tooling, and material supply to accommodate any differences in the design of an export variant."[38] Being able to ship weapons in large quantities soon after agreements are concluded often gives the Soviet Union a crucial edge in competing for Third World arms markets.

Flexibility in policy-making. The Soviet Union can supply arms whenever the situation warrants, without pressure from public opinion and without the need for interagency and legislative review. In the United States, by contrast, proposals for arms exports are subject to lengthy scrutiny by the State Department, Defense Department, and Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; and they must also be submitted to Congress, where they can be voted down. The mere knowledge that sales can be rejected can lead a US president to back away from sales (e.g., those for Jordan and Saudi Arabia) and induces foreign governments to forgo requests.[39] The Soviet Union on occasion has been able to step in and sell arms to Third World countries that have been turned down by the United States, as with the sale of fighter aircraft to Peru in 1976.

Large stockpile of surplus equipment. The USSR's huge military production base generates large amounts of surplus arms that can either be stored as war reserves or be shipped to Third World states. These stockpiles of surplus equipment tend to expand over time because of the Soviet Union's practice of retaining weapons for decades after they are first deployed. As one Western military official recently observed, "the Soviets never throw anything away. They just upgrade weapons and provide them to client states."[40] The availability of so much surplus equipment allows Moscow to export arms to developing countries without having to draw on the Soviet armed forces' operational weapons. Western governments, by contrast, must draw on operational equipment if they want to transfer arms rapidly, which means that their own front-line or reserve forces may suffer in readiness. This happened with US forces in Europe in 1973 when large quantities of equipment had to be supplied to Israel during the war with its Arab neighbors.[41] If the Western governments wish to avoid drawing on their

[35]Percentages calculated from data in US Central Intelligence Agency and US Defense Intelligence Agency, *The Soviet Economy Under a New Leader*, Mar. 19, 1986, p. 25; JEC, *Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and China—1985*, pp. 163–65; and US Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power 1986*, p. 131. It should be noted that the percentages are only a rough indicator, since weapons shipped abroad can come from stockpiles rather than from production lines.

[36]US Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power 1986*, p. 131.

[37]Lewis, loc. cit., p. 30.

[38]CIA, *The Soviet Weapons Industry*, p. 8.

[39]See John H. Cushman, Jr., "US Arms Exports Dip in the Third World," *The New York Times*, Feb. 8, 1987; Len Famiglietti, "Arms Export Act Will Hit US Sales," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, Mar. 21, 1987, p. 513; and John H. Cushman, Jr., "Congress: Arm Wrestling, As It Were, with White House," *The New York Times*, Jan. 8, 1987.

[40]Quoted in Bernard E. Trainor, "US Reports New Iranian Missiles; Threat to Hormuz Oil Traffic Seen," *The New York Times*, Mar. 15, 1987.

[41]US General Accounting Office, *Foreign Military Sales: A Potential Drain on the US Defense Posture*, ID-77-56, Washington, DC, Sept. 2, 1977, pp. 35–38.

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armed forces' operational equipment, they have to wait three to four years until new weapons come off the production line for delivery; by that time, the purchaser may have gone elsewhere.

Concessionary sales and terms of financing. Until recently, the Soviet Union provided arms to the Third World either free of charge or at subsidized prices. Through the early 1970's, moreover, the terms of financing for Soviet weapons—the interest rates (2–3 percent), repayment periods (10–12 years), and form of payment (local currency or barter exchange)—were extremely favorable for Third World customers. Over the past decade, though, the situation has changed. The Soviet Union is no longer eager to subsidize its arms shipments or to accept payments other than in hard currency, for the reasons discussed above.

Despite this shift in emphasis, the USSR will still provide concessionary terms of financing when the situation warrants. For example, recent large shipments of arms to India have been financed through 17-year loans at 2.5 percent interest, with payment permitted in rupees rather than in Western currency. Arms are supplied to sub-Saharan Africa on similarly favorable terms, and shipments to Cuba and Vietnam are probably free of charge, as was all the Soviet military aid provided to Grenada before October 1983, under a series of "top secret" agreements.[42]

Experience with countertrade and barter. Unlike most Western countries, the Soviet Union has many years of experience with barter (which is what trade between the USSR and its East European allies largely amounts to). That experience has come in handy in the 1980's because many Third World states, beset by economic woes, are now seeking to provide "nonmonetary" compensation for military shipments. Although Soviet leaders obviously prefer receiving hard currency, they have been willing to arrange countertrade deals if it allows them to expand their weapons shipments and gain a foothold in new regions. Western countries have shown less flexibility in this respect (though Western states are also feeling the need to offer offsets).[43]

Ease of weapons maintenance. In terms of performance and capabilities, most of the weapons the Soviet Union sends abroad are on a par (or nearly so) with comparable Western items.[44] The Soviet weapons, however, tend to be easier to maintain in the field and more reliable than their Western counterparts. As the CIA recently noted:

> *Rigorous design specifications—such as mirror-like finishes and tight tolerances—are called for (in Soviet weapons) only where necessary for performance. Circuit designs are simple by US standards, and materials that are costly and difficult to machine are avoided where possible . . . . Soviet designers have also developed a knack for keeping parts to a minimum . . . . What appears to be crude, however, often conceals very potent combat capabilities. The "simple, rugged design" of Soviet weapons has not interfered with their combat effectiveness in the hands of well-trained troops.*[45]

In the case of Soviet weapons shipped to the Third World, soldiers in the field are expected to perform only the most rudimentary of maintenance tasks. Major overhauls of the weapons and systems are generally expected to be performed at centralized depots or factories. This turns out to be an important plus for Third World countries, whose armies consist of conscripts who lack technical skills. This permits the small number of technicians in those countries who are trained for weapons maintenance to be stationed at factories at their regular posts, where their services can be utilized to greater overall effect.

Availability of surrogates. The Soviet Union's Warsaw Pact allies, especially Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, and East Germany, maintain close military links with a large number of Third World countries.[46] Although the East Europeans may not perceive their own interests in the Third World to be identical to the interests of the Soviet Union, their activities do tend to promote Soviet objectives. Weapons worth $11.5 billion were supplied by East European states to the Third World between 1973 and 1984; moreover, the stationing of East European (that is, East German) military advisers and security

[42]House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *The Soviet Union in the Third World, 1980–85*, pp. 224–25.

[43]US General Accounting Office, *Trade Offsets in Foreign Military Sales*, GAO/NSIAD-84-102, Washington, DC, Apr. 13, 1984; Gordon Jacobs, "Soviet Arms Exports," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, Nov. 1, 1986, p. 1040; and Robbin F. Laird, "Soviet Arms Trade with the Noncommunist Third World," in Erik P. Hoffmann, Ed., *The Soviet Union in the 1980's*, New York, Academy of Political Science, 1984, pp. 210–11.

[44]The notable exception, at least until recently, was Soviet combat aircraft, which lagged well behind Western aircraft. This may be changing now with the advent of the MiG–29 and Su–27.

[45]CIA, *The Soviet Weapons Industry*, p. 23.

[46]See Thomas H. Snitch, "East European Involvement in the World's Arms Market," in US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1972–1982*, ACDA Publication 117, Washington, DC, April 1984, pp. 117–21; and Trond Gilberg, "Eastern European Military Assistance to the Third World," in Copper and Papp, op. cit., pp. 72–95.

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forces throughout Africa is an extremely useful service from Moscow's perspective. This dual East European contribution—of arms and of advisers—has increased significantly in the 1980's; arms shipments from these countries has reached an annual level four times higher than the average for the 1970's.[47]

More important still is the role played by Cuba. Cuban troops and advisers in Africa and Central America provide crucial support to pro-Soviet regimes and "national liberation" movements. In countries such as Angola, the Cuban presence is the only thing enabling the USSR to forgo the direct involvement of its own combat units.

Problems with Soviet Arms Transfers

Soviet arms transfers to the Third World are not without their problems. Some of these problems have plagued other arms suppliers as well, but many are unique to the Soviet Union. These problems can be separated into two categories: political-military, and economic.

Political-military problems. First, and most important, the political and military influence that the Soviet Union derives from arms transfers has, in all too many cases, proven ephemeral. Soviet arms shipments to China were futile in the 1920's and just as futile in the 1950's. Large-scale supplies of Soviet weapons did not win a lasting presence in Egypt or permanent basing rights at Berbera in Somalia.

The failure to convert arms supplies into genuine influence is hardly a problem unique to the Soviet Union, as the US experience with Iran demonstrates. Nevertheless, the USSR seems to have had particular difficulty in acquiring lasting influence with Third World states on the basis of military exports alone. The sudden rift with Egypt in 1972 is perhaps the best illustration of this, coming as it did despite the infusion of huge quantities of Soviet arms and the presence of some 21,000 Soviet advisers.

Soviet arms transfer policy has been further hindered by the poor showing of Soviet arms in the 1982 Lebanon conflict and the good showing of US and Israeli arms in Lebanon and of French and British arms in the Falklands War. To be sure, the relative performance of these weapons may have been due more to the skills of those using them than to the characteristics of the weapons themselves.[48] What is important here, though, is that the perception of many Third World governments after the 1982 Lebanon conflict has been that the quality of Soviet arms is at best problematic. The performance of Soviet-made air defense missiles during the US strikes against Libya in April 1986, and the unhindered flight of a small Cessna–172 into Red Square in May 1987, will certainly do nothing to dispel this perception.

Concerns about the quality of Soviet-made weapons have been reinforced by the USSR's tendency to provide many of its Third World customers arms that were produced exclusively for export to the Third World. Echoing the complaints of Egypt in the early 1970's, a number of Third World states (e.g., the Algerian government) have recently objected that the equipment they get from Moscow is nearly obsolescent and does not measure up to the sophisticated arms deployed by potential adversaries.[49] Complaints of this sort are likely to persist so long as the USSR ships top-of-the-line equipment to only a few select countries. However, even if the Soviet Union does export higher-quality arms more widely, there is no guarantee that the situation of its clients will be permanently improved; after all, Syria had been receiving advanced weaponry for many years prior to its humiliating defeat in 1982.

Another obstacle to increased Soviet military exports is the behavior of Soviet advisers. The intrusiveness and overbearing manner of Soviet advisers have created frictions in the past, most notably in Egypt in the early 1970's. These frictions are compounded by local concerns that many of the advisers are there for espionage rather than for genuine advising. By the same token, a large number of Third World countries—even long-time clients such as India, Syria, and Iraq—are reluctant to have their officers trained in the Soviet Union because of concerns about what the training will include. Such concerns became acute after the April 1978 coup in Afghanistan (which was carried out by a small group of Soviet-trained Afghani officers), as well as after the January 1986 coup in South Yemen.

One final problem that has hampered Soviet arms transfers is the poor quality of servicing, training, and

[47]Of the $11.5 billion delivered in 1973–84, some $7.2 billion came in 1981–84. These figures are adapted from US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1985*, ACDA Publication 123, Washington, DC, August 1985, p. 42. See also International Institute for Strategic Studies, *World Military Balance*, London, IISS, annually 1982 through 1985. The overwhelming proportion of East European arms transfers to the Third World go to noncommunist countries, judging by the data in US Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, *Warsaw Pact Economic Aid to Non-Communist LDC's, 1984*, Publication 9345, Washington, DC, revised May 1986, p. 19.

[48]Not surprisingly, this is what Soviet officials have claimed; see, in particular, Colonel F. Kazanchuk, "Encounters on Syrian Soil," *Krasnaya Zvezda* (Moscow), Jan. 29, 1983; and Colonel G. Kashuba, "In the Bekaa Valley," ibid., Aug. 31, 1982. For further comments, see Craig Oliphant, "The Performance of Soviet Weapons in Lebanon," Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty, *Radio Liberty Research* (Munich), RL 68/83, Feb. 7, 1983.

[49]Lewis, loc. cit., p. 32.

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technical support that Soviet advisers and technicians provide. Soviet personnel are often ill-qualified and unfamiliar with the weapons they are supposed to service. The training that Soviet advisers offer to foreign personnel has been so deficient at times that it has provoked bitter complaints from countries such as Syria (in 1967 and 1982), Egypt (1970–72), and Libya (1986).[50] Moreover, logistical support for Soviet weapons is constrained by shortages of spare parts and by a lack of indigenous maintenance facilities. Although some developing countries have sought to remedy this problem by stocking up on supplies of spare parts, the Soviet Union has generally discouraged such practices. Until the quality of Soviet weapons-servicing and training improves, many Third World states will be leery of depending too heavily on Soviet armaments.

Economic problems. Of the economic problems that have plagued Soviet arms transfer policy in the mid-1980's, the most significant in the short term is the sharp decline in the price of oil. The drop in revenues for oil producers has meant that Middle Eastern states, who are by far the largest purchasers of Soviet weapons, are no longer willing or able to buy the quantity of arms that they once did from the USSR unless they receive highly concessionary terms. This compounds the adverse effect that the declining price of oil has had on the Soviet economy. Soviet oil revenues, which provide more than half the USSR's total export earnings, have contracted sharply; yet the one thing that might have made up for those lost revenues—an increase in arms sales—is itself made more difficult by the drop in oil prices.

To make matters worse, most countries outside the Middle East are also finding it harder to buy Soviet weapons because of the debts they accumulated in the 1970's and early 1980's. Loans from Western banks to the Third World in the 1970's facilitated the purchase of both civilian and military goods at a time when most arms suppliers (including the Soviet Union) had begun to emphasize hard-currency sales rather than outright grants. Arms purchases accounted for more than 5 percent of total Third World imports in the 1970's. By the early 1980's, with the mounting debt burden in the Third World and the sharp contraction of Western credits, many developing countries found themselves compelled to cut back precipitously on imports, including weapons purchases.[51] Consequently, as the economic problems and indebtedness of LDC's have intensified in the mid-1980's, there have been still fewer opportunities for Soviet military exports.

Moreover, there has been a trend toward a buyers' market for weapons, with many Western and Third World arms suppliers now vying for customers. In recent years, many of the largest purchasers of Soviet arms, such as India and Iraq, have turned to Western suppliers to diversify their arsenals. The French have used sales of the Mirage 2000 aircraft to make inroads into what formerly were exclusive (or nearly exclusive) Soviet markets. Third World suppliers like Brazil and Taiwan have been capturing an ever larger share of the market, as has Israel, which benefited from its showing in the 1982 Lebanon conflict. Combined with the economic problems facing most developing countries, the growing competitiveness of the world arms market has prompted many Third World purchasers to demand highly concessionary terms, including low interest rates, long repayment periods, and permission to pay in local currency. The Soviet Union has become reluctant to go along with these demands, especially at a time when Gorbachev's plans for economic revitalization would suffer if resources had to be diverted to finance large-scale arms exports.

Alternatively, many Third World states have been seeking to work out "offsets," either indirect or direct, to mitigate the costs of buying arms from the Soviet Union (and from other suppliers).[52] Indirect offsets usually amount to barter arrangements, or "non-monetary" compensation, for military equipment. In recent years, a number of developing states have exchanged local commodities for Soviet weapons—Ethiopia, for example, has traded coffee for arms, and Nicaragua has traded sugar and fruit as well as coffee. Other states, such as Libya, have "paid" for Soviet weaponry with shipments of oil or grain.

Occasionally, the offsets will involve "triangular" trade, whereby developing countries retransfer Western goods (especially high technology not exported by Western countries to the USSR) to the Soviet Union in exchange for arms. India is the most notable example of a country that has worked out arrangements along these lines, retransferring both technology (e.g., computers

[50]See Roger Pajak, "Soviet Arms Transfers As An Instrument of Influence," *Survival*, July-August 1981, p. 169; and Lewis, loc. cit., p. 33.

[51]See Walter F. Kitcherman, *Arms Transfers and the Indebtedness of Less Developed Countries*, N-2020-FF, Santa Monica, CA, RAND Corporation, December 1983.

[52]On the question of offsets in the international arms trade, see Thomas Friedman, "Defense Sales Offsets," *National Defense* (Arlington, VA), March 1987, pp. 28–33; Grant T. Hammond, "Offset, Arms, and Innovation," *The Washington Quarterly*, Winter 1987, pp. 173–85; and Stephanie G. Neuman, "Offsets in the International Arms Market," in ACDA, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1985*, pp. 35–40. On the role of offsets in Soviet arms transfer policy, see Nichol, loc. cit., pp. 71–89; and Lewis, loc. cit., esp. pp. 32–33.

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and photocopiers) and grain to the USSR, including trans-shipments of American wheat during the US grain embargo in 1980.[53] The Soviet Union has generally gone along with Third World requests for indirect offsets (including barter, countertrade, reciprocal investment, and triangular trade), though often unenthusiastically.

More troublesome still for Soviet policy-makers are the growing expectations among Third World countries that they will be granted "direct" offsets. Direct offsets most often take the form of agreements for co-production of weapon systems or of weapons components. In a co-production venture, the Soviet Union transfers technical data and equipment that enable the recipient country to manufacture weapons or components on its own. In the past, the Soviet Union allowed China, North Korea, and Egypt to co-produce major weapons as well as components and small arms. More recently, the USSR has granted India co-production rights for the T–72 tank; for MiG–21, MiG–23, MiG–25, and MiG–27 aircraft; and for components and add-ons for the MiG–29. Other countries, such as Peru, Afghanistan, and South Yemen, have received co-production licenses for small arms, ammunition, spare parts, and (for Peru's Su–22s) local overhaul and maintenance.[54]

In the future, as Third World demands for direct offsets increase, the Soviet Union may be willing to transfer manufacturing technology for spare parts and small arms to a larger number of states. Transfer of technology to produce major weapons, however, will be more of a sticking point. Although the experience with India (and earlier with China and North Korea) suggests that Soviet leaders are occasionally willing to provide Third World countries with the capacity to produce top-of-the-line weaponry, the widespread diffusion of Soviet arms-manufacturing technology would run the risk of compromising key Soviet military technology. Not surprisingly, Soviet officials have been loath to accept such a risk.

For example, when SA–5's were first deployed in Syria and Libya, Soviet personnel maintained strict control over the missiles until local troops were deemed sufficiently reliable to operate them. Officials in Moscow are aware that if several Arab states were to gain co-production rights for the latest Soviet weapons (e.g., the MiG–29), the Israelis might be able to capture the weapons-manufacturing plans and technologies during a future conflict, as they did with older Soviet equipment in the 1967, 1973, and 1982 wars. The capture of facilities that can produce advanced Soviet weapons would be far more damaging to the USSR than the seizure of weapons alone. Thus, it is questionable whether the Soviet Union will seriously contemplate granting co-production rights for major arms to a large number of states.

Furthermore, on purely economic grounds, direct offsets would be disadvantageous for the USSR, at least in most cases. The granting of co-production licenses tends to convert purchasers of Soviet arms into competitors, as happened with China and to a lesser extent with North Korea and even India.[55] If many developing states were allowed to co-produce major Soviet weapons, the demand for such items from the USSR itself would undoubtedly shrink. A further drawback to co-production arrangements is that by shortening production runs for Soviet military factories, they preclude a reduction of the unit costs of the given weapons for the Soviet armed forces.

Conclusion

The military dimension of Soviet policy toward the Third World has expanded enormously over the past decade. And while this expansion appears to have been at least temporarily halted, arms transfers will continue to figure strongly in Soviet initiatives not only in the Middle East and South Asia, but in virtually all other parts of the globe as well.

Although political and military considerations have been the dominant impetus behind the growth of Soviet weapons exports, economic considerations are assuming a growing importance in Soviet calculations. Indeed, a renewed growth of Soviet arms sales to hard-currency purchasers in the Third World could relieve some of the pressures on Gorbachev's economic modernization program. However, Third World arms clients are increasingly seeking financial concessions and offsets, which run counter to this economic interest of the Soviet Union.

At some point, Soviet leaders may eventually have to chose between political-military objectives on the one hand, and economic objectives on the other. In the 1970's, both sets of goals could be pursued simultaneously, but they have been far less compatible in the 1980's. It is possible that the international economic climate will change and that the two sets of objectives will again be compatible. But if, as appears likely, the competitiveness of the international arms market and the requirement to "sweeten" arms deals with economic concessions remain unchanged, Gorbachev may face a

[53]Marie Lavigne, "Soviet Trade with LDC's," in JEC, *Gorbachev's Economic Plans: Study Papers*, Vol. 2, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, Nov. 23, 1987; and Lewis, loc. cit., p. 31.

[54]Nichol, loc. cit., esp. pp. 74–83.

[55]Nichol, loc. cit., pp. 76–77, 80; and Joseph F. Clare, Jr., "Whither the Third World Arms Producers?" in ACDA, *World Military Exenditures and Arms Transfers, 1986*, p. 26.

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hard trade-off between important political and military objectives and the wish to maintain arms transfers on a sound economic footing.

So far, political-military considerations seem to have won out in Gorbachev's calculations, as subsidies and offsets for Soviet arms transfers continue to rise (in contrast to the reduction of the transfers themselves). However, as more resources are needed for industrial modernization at home, the prospect of having to finance arms exports may reverse these priorities and even engender a fundamental reassessment of Soviet goals in the Third World.

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Books

Perspectives on Afghanistan

Anthony Arnold

BHABANI SEN GUPTA. *Afghanistan: Politics, Economics, and Society*. Boulder, CO, Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1986.

EDWARD R. GIRARDET. *Afghanistan: The Soviet War*. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1985.

JAN GOODWIN. *Caught in the Crossfire*. New York, E. P. Dutton, 1987.

J. BRUCE AMSTUTZ. *Afghanistan: The First Five Years of Soviet Occupation*. Washington, DC, National Defense University Press, 1986.

JOSEPH J. COLLINS. *The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan*. Lexington, MA, and Toronto, Lexington Books, 1986.

M. NAZIF SHAHRANI and ROBERT L. CANFIELD, Eds. *Revolutions and Rebellions in Afghanistan*. Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1984.

OLIVIER ROY. *Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan*. Cambridge, London, New York, New Rochelle, Melbourne, and Sidney, Cambridge University Press, 1986.

"The person who is responsible is always somewhere else, the horses are in the mountains, and the truth is in the depths of the well." (Roy, p. 22)

BEFORE the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, recognized scholars of the country were rare indeed. An anthropologist like Louis Dupree could—and did—write a single volume that covered virtually every aspect of Afghan life, past and present, without much fear of contradiction or dispute. Today, as never before, Afghanistan and the Afghans are being subjected to examination from a number of angles spanning the entire range of approaches from the microscopic to the macroscopic. The books reviewed here are only a small sampling of the mushrooming literature.

Interest in Afghanistan is especially keen at the present time because the Soviets have in recent months dropped hints of a possible withdrawal.[1] For those who have had to reexamine their conviction that the Soviet Union would ultimately prevail, as well as for those who have steadfastly predicted an Afghan victory, it is a time of suspense. Each of the above books, therefore, will be viewed in part for its bearing on the central theme of a possible Soviet withdrawal and what might follow in its wake.

But first, let me address a secondary, but not unimportant, issue. If the books under review here represent an average quality, the standards of editing have slipped badly in recent years. Most contain not only misspellings and other typographical errors, but simple misstatements that never should have been allowed to pass unchallenged. Per-

[1]See Bohdan Nahaylo, "When Ivan Comes Marching Home," *The American Spectator*, July 1987, pp. 15-18. In December 1986, Yevgeniy Primakov, who directs the Institute of World Economics and International Relations in Moscow and is an adviser on foreign policy to Mikhail Gorbachev, told journalists that Soviet troops ultimately would be withdrawn whether or not there was a political solution. *The Washington Post*, Dec. 26, 1986, p. A1.

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haps the most entertaining of these is Bhabani Sen Gupta's assertion in his "Very Select Personal Bibliography" (p. 197) that Thomas T. Hammond, the author of *Red Flag Over Afghanistan,* obtained access to secret US State Department documents "by invoking the Fifth Amendment." As an Indian, Sen Gupta may be forgiven for confusing the Freedom of Information Act and the constitutional guarantees against self-incrimination, but his American publisher has no such excuse.

Of the books under review, five are more or less general accounts, and two present specialists' views. Only one should be avoided: that is the most general of them all, Sen Gupta's *Afghanistan: Politics, Economics, and Society*. This judgment comes in spite—not because—of the fact that Sen Gupta's interpretation and analysis of events are in many cases diametrically opposed to my own. Supported by cogent arguments and accurate data, differing conclusions can and should be even more stimulating to those who disagree than to those who share the same views. But Sen Gupta's work is flawed by basic omissions, inaccuracies, and internal contradictions that impel the reader to verify even the cited quotations.[2]

IN HIS PREFACE, Sen Gupta has said that his purpose is to be "fair and objective," and he is quick to label others as partisan. The difficulty —factual errors aside—is that he tends to list the diametrically opposed Soviet and Western versions of events without trying himself to resolve the contradictions. Where he does seem to offer a firm opinion of his own (for example, on p. 1 where he writes that "the Afghan Marxist regime's survival is not in doubt," or on p. 85 where we read that "the Soviets had nothing to do with the PDPA's (People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan) actual seizure of power in Kabul," he does not back it with evidence, and he does not always acknowledge that there is a conflicting view.

In fairness to the author, it must be added that he was ill served by his editors, and, according to the preface, was working at a time of considerable personal strain. Also, he has done a service by listing some of the more general Soviet sources that otherwise might be overlooked. Moreover, it was fascinating to learn from this text that the Soviets were trying to heal a split in the Indian Communist Party at the same time (1976–77) that they were urging the Afghan Parchamis and Khalqis to mend their differences (p. 25).[3]

Sen Gupta's reputation as India's foremost Sovietologist means that his book will be taken seriously not only in New Delhi, but elsewhere as well. Thus, it deserves examination for that reason alone. Readers are cautioned, however, against accepting his raw data, let alone interpretations derived from them, without reference to other sources. Unfortunately, it is evident from Sen Gupta's book that his familiarity with Afghanistan is largely second-hand and academic.

EDWARD GIRARDET approaches the topic from an entirely different perspective, using his hands-on experience in Afghanistan as a correspondent of *The Christian Science Monitor* to write an unforgettable book, *Afghanistan: The Soviet War*. This is not a scholarly book, nor does it pretend to be. In fact, using it as a reference might be risky due to minor inaccuracies and omissions in the text when the author strays from his own experiences into political analysis and history. There is an index but no source notes and no bibliography, and the preliminary acknowledgments are only to individuals, though many of these are authors in their own right, whose writings are sometimes reflected in Girardet's text.

Yet Girardet's contribution is unique, and it more than compensates for whatever criticism a pedant might level at him. There is an Ernie Pyle-like quality to his prose that makes the reader a participant in the author's combat experiences with the mujahedin. I, for one, almost literally reexperienced the mysterious

[2]A random and by no means comprehensive sampling of implicit and explicit errors includes the following: Great Britain declared war on Afghanistan in 1919 (p. 7) (actually it was Amanullah who declared the *jihad* against Britain and attacked first, as Gupta himself later acknowledges). Gupta dates the split between Parcham and Khalq to 1977 (p. 14) instead of 1967. On several occasions (e.g., p. 82), he describes Hafizullah Amin's foreign minister, Shah Wali, as having sought refuge in the Soviet Embassy in the fall of 1979. (Other Afghan officials—Watanjar, Mazdooryar, Gulabzoy, and Sarwari—did find refuge there, but Shah Wali remained at Amin's side as one of the dictator's most trusted colleagues to the end.) On p. 70, the December 1978 Treaty of Friendship, Good-neighborliness, and Cooperation with the Soviet Union is dated November 1978. Taher Badakhshi, chief of a splinter Marxist group, is described several times as having been given a cabinet position after the April 1978 coup. (His highest rank in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan [DRA]—was the utterly inconsequential post of chief of the translations and compilations department of the ministry of education.) The author claims (p. 120) that no statistics were released concerning the number and makeup of the party conference of the People's Democratic Party Afghanistan (PDPA) held in March 1982, when in fact it was one of the rare occasions when such information was published in detail. Assadullah Sarwari, Taraki's detested Khalqi secret policy chief and personal torturer of leading Parchamis, is described (pp. 114-15) as "a Parcham leader who had been jailed and tortured when Taraki was in power." For scholarly purists, Gupta's most heinous sin is perhaps the altering of a quotation by inserting a term that was not in the original: a parenthetical (Maoist) inserted after Sitami Milli in a 10-line quotation from *Revolutions and Rebellions in Afghanistan*, p. 76.

[3]This probably ties in with a similar brief and abortive move to unite Pakistan's leftists under one flag during those same years. It would be interesting to see whether the same phenomenon occurred elsewhere simultaneously.

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scents of nighttime Afghanistan, forgotten for a dozen years. He successfully projects the infinite courage and patience of the Afghans, as well as their total commitment to evicting the invaders.

Girardet is ambivalent on the subject of which side will ultimately prevail. He sets considerable store by the conventional wisdom that says time is on the side of the Soviets, citing (as have so many others) Stalin's slow but sure mincing of anti-communist movements in Central Asia in the 1920's and 1930's. As a highly motivated journalist, he sees the media playing a key role in shaping world opinion and, ultimately, perhaps having an effect on moderating Soviet behavior by bringing international pressure to bear on the Kremlin.

The author is not, however, very sanguine about the effect of internal Soviet pressures as a moderating influence. Although he does not say so himself, certainly the crucial missing ingredient is a Soviet Girardet—or Ernie Pyle—to bring home to the Soviet public what the war means in human terms to the boys at the front. Granted, there have been some Soviet efforts to "Kipling-ize" the conflict. Writers like Aleksandr Prokhanov, whose portrayal of combat as an existential means of purifying and rejuvenating the nation might have been written by a Nazi propagandist, were widely published in 1985. The military newspaper *Krasnaya Zvezda* today still carries an occasional piece with a hero theme. But Prokhanov has undergone severe literary criticism lately, and the number of "heroic" stories fell off sharply after Mikhail Gorbachev publicly called Afghanistan an "open wound" in February 1986.[4]

[4]Sergey Yurenem, "The Vulnerability of Armor: Aleksandr Prokhanov Under Fire from Literary Critics," Radio Liberty 207/86, May 26, 1986; *The New York Times*, Feb. 18, 1986, p. 1.

The absence of a pro-war theme, however, does not mean that there has been an equivalent rise in open anti-war literature. Except for a few isolated *samizdat* items,[5] there have been only a few, cautious efforts in the Soviet press to portray the real plight of Soviet fighting men in Afghanistan. As more and more soldiers return home, however, the grim realities of the war will become better known.

JAN GOODWIN'S *Caught in the Crossfire* deserves special attention if only because it was published with unusual and refreshing alacrity.[6] It deserves notice for much more than that, however, for the redoubtable Ms. Goodwin has done what other reporters can only dream of: she first covered the war from the mujahedin viewpoint, trekking through combat zones inside the country; then, expelled from Pakistan for disobeying police orders to stay clear of such activities, she used a subterfuge to wangle an official invitation to Kabul to interview the government's leading female personage of that time, Anahita Ratebzad; reentering Pakistan illegally after this trip, she accompanied the mujahedin on hair-raising combat missions; and then —armed with letters and diaries taken from dead Soviet soldiers—went into the USSR to look up and interview their next of kin. Unfortunately, most were inaccessible or ruled out for other reasons, and the two families she did contact—both in Central Asia—had relatively little to say. This is not too surprising in view of Goodman's foreign passport, Caucasian features, and sudden, unannounced appearance. Even so, she was able to elicit some comments that transcended the party line as well as many that did not. In any case, it is intriguing to follow her sleuthing (and her evasion of KGB sleuths) as she tries to find the survivors of the killed Soviet servicemen.

For a variety of reasons, this book will unquestionably sell better than any of the others reviewed here. The war is presented not only firsthand and up close (the experience of being hounded by helicopter gunships is the stuff of nightmares), but from the rare vantage point of a woman. As with Girardet, however, there are individual points that can be disputed. For example, Goodwin repeats a commonly voiced belief that there are troops from other communist countries committed to combat in Afghanistan (p. 213), and she cites Soviet defector Arkadiy Shevchenko's belief that they are needed by the Soviets to preserve the image of an "internationalist" endeavor. If so, the effect has been lost, since the presence of such troops has never been acknowledged by the USSR or by any of the purported donor nations. There appears to be no convincing evidence that any have been deployed.

Minor stumbles are unavoidable in a work by someone who came on the Afghan scene only recently, and the only reason for bringing them up is to caution readers against using second-hand information (especially statistics) from this kind of book. Jan Goodwin was in a hurry, she gathered it all in and noted it all down, and it appeared promptly in print; the freshness of her impressions more than compensates for the absence of long deliberation.

[5]Girardet mentions two such items but unfortunately misses the most moving example, an Estonian boy's personal experiences as an unwilling conscript. See Radio Liberty, *Materialy Samizdata*, Munich, document AS5395, Issue 6/85, Feb. 4, 1985.

[6]Her last information dates from November 1986, and the book was out three months later. One gets the impression that Goodwin, the executive editor of *The Ladies Home Journal*, wields influence with E. P. Dutton that academics, military officers, and even foreign correspondents can only dream of.

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Sen Gupta would call Goodwin's book "partisan," and he would be absolutely correct. Almost everyone who has lived among Afghans is partisan and—except for those who refuse to accept the Afghans' own egalitarian outlook—that partisanship is fervently pro-Afghan. I used to think this applied only to Americans, because our root values of individualism, independence, and self-reliance were so obviously related, but Europeans as mutually dubious about each other as the French, Germans, and Yugoslavs, all seem to feel the same affection and admiration for the Afghans. Goodwin's love of her Afghan hosts is neither misplaced nor unusual, and it should be noted that the author also reserves compassion for the pro-regime Afghans and Soviets who have become casualties of the war, a commendable exercise in objectivity for someone who was under fire from them.

Like Girardet, Jan Goodwin leans toward pessimism rather than optimism on the outcome of the war but makes no predictions. Her involvement in the personal tragedies of the war's victims could not help but affect her view of the future; it is hard to be very sanguine about tomorrow when the desperate sufferings of today and yesterday are still remembered so vividly. Moreover, her list of sources includes works by certain analysts who tended to be exceptionally gloomy in the late summer of 1986, and their views undoubtedly affected her perceptions.

LESS evocative but far more useful as a source reference is J. Bruce Amstutz's *Afghanistan: The First Five Years of Occupation*. It is an impressive tome—nearly 550 pages—and it is probably the best modern fact book about the country. It is conveniently arranged in short subchapters, liberally sprinkled with photographs, maps, and tables, well-indexed, equipped with a huge bibliography and five appendixes, and supported by 80 pages of endnotes. If it were necessary to depend on a single source reference for what has happened in Afghanistan in recent years, this unquestionably would be a top choice.

One reservation must, however, be registered. The American official position in Afghanistan, at least in the pre-communist phase, was not as pure and prescient as Amstutz makes it out to be. For example, he indicates (p. 23) that "Western diplomats," presumably including Americans, warned the Afghans about the danger of Soviet penetration of their military establishment but received only scoffing responses. Although that might have been the case in isolated instances, the shoe was usually on the other foot. The American Embassy was victim to considerable complacency in the pre-1978 period and ignored the warnings of some knowledgeable Afghans that communist trouble was brewing.

Regarding the outcome of the struggle, Amstutz—while acknowledging that he is personally optimistic about an ultimate Soviet withdrawal—does a better job than Girardet of summarizing the pros and cons. He devotes seven pages at the end of his book to a crisp balance sheet of the pressures on the Soviet leadership both for staying and for leaving. These include political, economic, psychological, military, and sociological forces, both domestic and international. Readers may ascribe different weights to his various inputs—some analysts may even add to his list—but none can fault him on the effort to pinpoint what the pressures are. As a Foreign Service officer, Amstutz naturally looks more to "continued international diplomatic, humanitarian, and material support to the resistance" than the psychological/media aspects emphasized by Girardet. Both kinds of support, needless to say, have their place.

A MILITARY man's view of events in Afghanistan is presented by US Army Major Joseph J. Collins, whose *The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: A Study in the Use of Force in Soviet Foreign Policy* is the last of the five general works reviewed here. An associate professor of international studies at the US Military Academy at West Point, Collins is a very sound scholar. Although he does not introduce new or startling material to his review of Soviet-Afghan relations—a subject that has been covered in a number of other books[7]—he provides a different angle of approach, and he utilizes Soviet sources extensively. Unlike Sen Gupta, Collins offers the reader not only what the Soviets said but also his own, often penetrating, analysis of events.

Unfortunately, this book provides an illustration of the damage that delay in publication can do to a work before it sees the light of day. The book's information runs only through December 1984, yet it was not published until 1986. The events of 1985—especially Gorbachev's takeover as Soviet leader—had a considerable impact on Soviet theories and practices worldwide, and they are not reflected here. Thus, for example, in Chapter 7, which deals with the factors motivating the Soviet Union's 1979 invasion of Afghanistan, the author rightly takes note of the bellicose statements of Soviet leaders and theoreticians, who at that time hinted at making the

[7]Anthony Arnold, *Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion in Perspective*, Stanford, Hoover Institution Press, 1985; Henry S. Bradsher, *Afghanistan and the Soviet Union*, Durham, NC, Duke University Press, 1983; Thomas T. Hammond, *Red Flag over Afghanistan*, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1984.

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Brezhnev Doctrine applicable to "wars of national liberation" wherever they might be occurring. Yet that swaggering approach has given way to more sober Soviet self-appraisals of capabilities. By January 1986, for example, the deputy chief of the defense ministry's Main Political Directorate was defining the duties of the armed forces outside the socialist camp as giving aid to "progressive regimes and national liberation movements *in the appropriate form: giving moral aid and support, training specialists, etc.*"[8] Nothing was mentioned about a combat role for Soviet troops. Inasmuch as Afghanistan is technically outside the socialist camp, this formulation offers no justification for commitment of troops there.

One disappointing gap in Collins's treatment of the Soviet invasion itself is his failure to highlight the importance that Soviet planners of military operations gave to seizing control of enemy communications facilities immediately, regardless of the cost. Moscow even dispatched to Afghanistan the then minister of communications (now a first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and head of the State Planning Committee) Nikolay Talyzin, together with a large "delegation," to be on hand when hostilities commenced there. Risking the life of a civilian of this rank deserves emphasis for the light it sheds on Soviet priorities when the use of military force is contemplated.

In my view, Collins is at his best in his concluding chapter, where he disposes of the frequently encountered assumption that the USSR always acts logically and on the basis of some extraordinarily clever long-range plan. Collins shows that this is wrong by citing evidence of Soviet disarray over the Afghan question, but he falls into a similar trap when he accepts as a given the Soviet will and capability to carry on the war in Afghanistan indefinitely. It would be interesting to know whether recent events have changed his mind in this regard.

THE VOLUME edited by M. Nazif Shahrani and Robert L. Canfield, *Revolutions and Rebellions in Afghanistan: Anthropological Perspectives*, was published in 1984, making it the first of the works reviewed here to appear in print. Fortunately, the material it contains is more timelessly Afghan than the ephemeral national policies emanating from Moscow, Washington, or Kabul, and the book is thus more current than many that have appeared subsequently. The 13 authors are all anthropologists at major American and English institutions.

The book consists mostly of narrowly focused essays on particular Afghan communities and their reactions to the advent of a Marxist-Leninist central government. Most of the places under examination are too small for most people to recognize, but Shahrani generalizes on his findings in his excellent introductory essay "Marxist 'Revolution' and Islamic Resistance in Afghanistan." Although much of the book can be heavy going for the non-anthropologist, it is well worth the effort to absorb the authors' collected wisdom.

Most of the contributors to the work are well known to students of Afghanistan, and all of them have had firsthand experience in the Afghan communities they describe. In many cases they draw on historical parallels, on instances when the same communities took up arms against previous unpopular rulers in Kabul. The whole series is most commendable for the light it casts on the realities of Afghan society at the rural level. This is a subject little understood not only by non-Afghans, but, as the authors convincingly demonstrate, by present and past rulers in Kabul as well.

The book helps dispel a number of myths about "backward" Afghan society before 1978. The pattern of landholdings, for example, reflects a more egalitarian distribution of land ownership than is generally recognized.[9] The authors also illustrate how the intricate interplay of political authority and society at the local level is organized in various communities.

THE MOST fascinating book of all is Olivier Roy's *Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan*. If, as the author writes, "the truth is in the depths of the well," then he has gone deeper into the Afghan well than any other contemporary author.

The vital first chapters of Roy's study do not make easy reading. The author is a brilliant man with a vast fund of information on an extremely complex subject, and he tries to get all of it across. He writes in French academese, a language that delights in complex sentences that do not always translate happily into English. Paragraphs drag out interminably, covering several different subjects. His translator, Michael Barry, appears to have followed the author doggedly in a word-for-word translation, instead of breaking up the sentences and paragraphs into more easily digestible units. An occasional error slips in, apparently the result of the translator's having lost the thread. Happily, the text is occasionally illuminated by quotes like that cited at the start of

[8] *Moscow Television, Jan. 22, 1986, in* Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Soviet Union: Daily Report* (Washington, DC), Jan. 28, 1986, Supplement, p. V/2. Emphasis added.

[9] It is to Gupta's credit that he quotes at length from this book—and excerpts even more from it—to offset his reflection of the Soviet propaganda line on Afghanistan. Regrettably, he gives both scholarly and blatantly tendentious views equal weight.

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this article, lines that will strike a nostalgic note for anyone who has camped in Afghanistan's physical and political wildernesses.

Roy's daunting task is to show the reader how religion, society, and government each act independently in the Afghan political context and how they interact under different circumstances. (The title of the original—*L'Afghanistan: Islam et modernité politique* [Afganistan: Islam and Political Modernity] is a more accurate title than the English rendition.) The concepts are not easy to follow. Our separation of church and state is as alien to the Afghan as his allocation of a judiciary function to the church is to us. The concept of a *qawm*, a community whose boundaries are as tight or as loose as their members choose, is fundamental to an understanding of Afghan politics, and Roy has done a signal service in pinning down and putting in proper context this elusive entity.

After the initial theoretical groundwork, the author moves on to a discussion of the various resistance groups, including their strengths and weaknesses. The going is easier here, but the full value can only be obtained if the reader has absorbed the initial concepts. The author is convincing in his analysis of the various groups and in his arguments in favor of moderate Islamists like Burhannudin Rabbani (a sympathy also reflected in the Shahrani/Canfield book). Roy's description of society and government in liberated areas (particularly in Chapter 10, "Society and the War") is both detailed and heartening. He perceives the emergence of a new Afghan society, one in which many of the old local authority patterns are being successfully challenged without destroying basic Afghan traditions of respect for the law and of its embodiment in the religious community. For example, military commanders who detect Kabul "plants" among their forces may not execute them out of hand but must first secure a legal judgment from an authorized member of the clergy. Responsible government appears to be in the making.

Roy does not underestimate the political contradictions that plague the resistance—for example, he observes (p. 130) that "warfare demands a degree of politicization and organization which is at odds with the character of Afghan civil society." He notes that local authority, in the form of loyalty to the community (*qawm*), usually is the dominating political force. Local ties are so strong that they can outweigh the basic question of loyalty to the *jihad* or to the Kabul regime: for example, the resistance must be extremely careful that any vengeance taken on a government collaborator not be interpreted as an attack on the guilty party's *qawm* itself.

Roy, who is with the Centre Nationale de la Recherche Scientifique in Paris, is an excellent scholar and an accomplished linguist. He is not, however, one of those academics who remains behind a comfortable desk and collects information second hand. His intellectual researches have been augmented by personal observations during annual, extended field trips with the mujahedin into the heart of Afghanistan. (Until 1986, he was accompanied by his equally competent wife, Chantal Lobato, a practice that stopped only after Soviet air attacks became too massive and indiscriminate.) If Amstutz's book can be taken as the best compilation of facts, Roy's work is the best portrayal of what makes Afghan society tick. As a political interpretation, it has no peer.

OF THE above books, only the Shahrani/Canfield and Roy volumes provide a realistic framework for predicting how a post-Soviet Afghanistan might develop, and none sees the problem as one calling for immediate attention. Yet a Soviet withdrawal in the foreseeable future is becoming an ever greater probability.

A hard-line view of the Soviet Union may seem inconsistent with optimism about an eventual Soviet withdrawal, but there is no inconsistency unless one makes the error of confusing—or worse, identifying—Soviet capabilities with Soviet intentions. Let there be no doubt that Moscow today, Gorbachev or no Gorbachev, is just as expansionist and absorptionist in its world view as it was under his communist and precommunist forebears. But its priorities in the closing years of the 20th century are of necessity located elsewhere. Expansionism has had to take a back seat to consolidation.

Western observers usually measure dissent in the Soviet Union only by such manifestations as *samizdat*, protest movements, or civil disobedience. These, after all, resonate with the familiar revolutionary heritage of the Declaration of Independence, Committees of Correspondence, and the Boston Tea Party. But dissent in the Soviet Union, as in Russia before it, has also found expression in such negative social phenomena as malingering, drunkenness, and pilferage of state property. Unable to wage a successful open fight against authority, the people have resorted to these indirect means of registering their resentment.[10]

The Soviet Union that Mikhail Gorbachev inherited is one that was not only steadily lagging behind the West economically but also threatening to sink to Third World status. To change this drift, Gorbachev is

[10] I am indebted to Vladimir Krasnov, Professor of Russian Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, whose paper "Lev Timofeev and Soul-Searching within the Soviet Elite" (Oct. 16, 1986, unpub.) ays out this concept in convincing depth and detail.

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now trying to preserve the essential strengths of his command economy while at the same time invigorating it by injecting the work force with discipline and enthusiasm. Those two qualities, however, are noticeably absent in a country fighting an unpopular war.

Is the war unpopular? Yes, and becoming ever more so. Around a half million veterans have returned from the field, and whereas some have emerged more patriotic and "morally purified" from their experiences, a great many more have suffered deep psychological wounds, the effect of which will haunt Soviet society for years to come. The swiftly rising incidence of narcotics addiction is just one of the current social ills that can be traced at least in part to Afghanistan. Surveys among Soviet travelers in Western Europe confirm that public opinion about the war is polarizing the USSR, with an ever-increasing weight being lent to the negative pole. These indications are confirmed by reports from within the country about demonstrations at conscription points, incidents of draft dodging, and other manifestations of militant pacifism.[11] If Gorbachev pursues his campaign of *glasnost'* (openness), the consolidation of negative opinion and its open display are likely to increase.

The USSR is now roughly where the United States was in 1968 in Vietnam, when it was said of President Lyndon Johnson that he no longer wanted to win the war, he just wanted to end it. However, Gorbachev's desire to be quit of his albatross does not yet seem as strong as his desire to establish a friendly, stable government in the client state before Soviet troops withdraw. He may or may not yet grasp the incompatibility of these two goals, but eventually he must do so. Meanwhile, the priority of setting his own house in order takes precedence over other considerations, and—assuming he survives—the changes Gorbachev is introducing will absorb the lion's share of available Soviet energies for the next decade or more.

If the above analysis proves correct—or if other factors lead to a Soviet withdrawal—what would such a move mean for Afghanistan? First of all, as all the authors but Sen Gupta would almost certainly agree, the Marxist regime's remaining life span would be extremely brief. The Afghans have not been fighting all these years for some kind of compromise settlement. But would there be a complete breakdown of social order, widespread massacres, and anarchy? No one can be completely confident about this, but books like Shahrani and Canfield's or Roy's show a basic political solidity in Afghan society, even under the strains of the ongoing war.

It would seem likely that initially there would be a patchwork of areas with effective government and of ones with partial anarchy, determined by how well local resistance commanders had already established the roots of civil authority. Re-establishment of strong central control by a new Kabul government, if possible at all, will take many decades. A more likely solution is the emergence of something like the cantonal system of Switzerland.

Under a new government, previously underprivileged minorities like the Hazaras (and to a lesser extent Tajiks) would no longer accept the old, traditional Pashtun domination. For their part, the Pashtuns will not willingly give up their monopoly on power. They will, however, have little choice. The other minorities have already set up self-rule in liberated areas, and the resistance commanders in the field already hold the reins of political power.[12]

Fortunately, this does not imply the Balkanization of Afghanistan. Although Afghan ethnic groups do tend to concentrate geographically, the influence of the various political parties cuts across ethnic lines, and there is a large degree of interpenetration. Moreover, the various resistance groups understand that their chances of survival demand cooperation and coordination. None has called for the establishment of an independent state; although political feuding is inevitable, the integrity of the whole Afghan state is recognized as vital.

In short, there are grounds for optimism regarding both the prospects for a Soviet withdrawal and the possibility of avoiding a fratricidal bloodbath after their departure. These assessments are unconventional, but it says something for the increasing consideration being given to the first that the second is even being discussed. As the Soviets have discovered, the Afghans are rarely predictable, and although a post-occupation civil war cannot be ruled out, neither should it be considered inevitable. The most qualified experts among those reviewed here are also the most careful to

[11]For the story of the USSR's new vigilantism, see Bohdan Nahaylo, "Soviet Veterans in Afghanistan: A New Social Force?" in Radio Liberty Research No. 241/86, June 24, 1986. For information on drugs in the USSR, see "Afghanistan's Other Front: A World of Drugs," in *The New York Times*, Nov. 2, 1985, p. 1; and *Pravda* (Moscow), Jan. 6, 1987, p. 3, in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (Columbus, OH), Vol. XXXIX, No. 2, Feb. 11, 1987. For psychological trauma, see fn. 3 above, and Sergey Khovanski, "Afghanistan: The Bleeding Wound," in *Detente* (UK), No. 6, Spring, 1986, pp. 2-4. The last is a translation of a powerful *samizdat* document, which also confirms the polling results of a Radio Liberty *Soviet Area Audience and Opinion Research* paper by Sally Wise entitled, "The Soviet Public and the War in Afghanistan: A Trend toward Polarization," AR/1-87, March 1987.

[12]US Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, *Afghanistan: Seven Years of Occupation*, Special Report No. 155, December 1986, p. 12.

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avoid making any predictions. This is not to minimize the inevitable frictions and stupendous problems of refugee resettlement, rural reconstruction, and political restructuring that would follow a Soviet departure, but the Afghans have the best of all possible motives for seeking unity. The USSR will remain a threat for the foreseeable future, and anarchy would be an invitation to another invasion from the north.

The problem of inducing the Soviets to leave Afghanistan may rightly be considered an international one. All countries have a vested interest in seeing to it that unprovoked aggression by a superpower is not rewarded. The question of how to help the Afghans after that step has been achieved, however, is more delicate. Certainly, many will feel a moral obligation to alleviate human suffering by offering foreign aid and advice, but the problem will be to refrain from meddling as the Afghans go about the process of setting up their new government.

The temptation for such interference will be great, especially if there is abuse of aid distribution. If there is a clear lesson from the past eight years' conflict, however, it is that the Afghans will not take kindly to alien instruction, from whatever quarter.

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Superpowers in the Middle East

Carol R. Saivetz

CHRISTINE MOSS HELMS. *Iraq: Eastern Flank of the Arab World.* Washington, DC, Brookings Institution, 1984.

ROBERT G. DARIUS, JOHN W. AMOS II, and RALPH H. MAGNUS, Eds. *Gulf Security into the 1980s.* Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1984.

THOMAS NAFF, Ed. *Gulf Security and the Iran-Iraq War.* Washington, DC, National Defense University Press, 1985.

MARK KATZ. *Russia and Arabia.* Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.

SINCE 1979, developments in the Middle East have combined to focus attention on the Persian Gulf and on the Arabian Peninsula. The collapse of Iran's Peacock Throne[1] in 1978 and then the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 significantly altered the regional balance of power for the superpowers and for the Gulf states. But the eruption into open warfare of the long-smouldering tensions between Iran and Iraq in 1980 not only changed the regional configuration further, but confronted the Gulf states with difficult choices, severely limited the United States' policy options, and created new dilemmas as well as opportunites for the Soviet Union. This essay will discuss the war's impact on the region, and the region's relationship with the Soviet Union. In doing so, it will analyze relations between Iran and Iraq, assess the impact of the war on relations among the Gulf states as a whole, and evaluate both the policies of the two superpowers that have developed as a result of the war and the attendant regional ramifications.

Taken together, the books under review here offer a good overview of Gulf politics after the fall of the Shah. While all of them focus on Soviet involvement, with the exception of Mark Katz's book, none focuses exclusively on the Soviets' regional role. Nevertheless, by providing a discussion of the key issues, these books shed light on Soviet policy toward the Gulf states. Christine Moss Helm's book *Iraq* presents the Iraqi perspective through a descriptive account of the country and its people. The two edited collections, Robert Darius, John W. Amos II, and Ralph H. Magnus's *Gulf Security into the 1980s*, and Thomas Naff's *Gulf Security and the Iran-Iraq War*, focus on the regional actors and their influence on superpower policies. Mark Katz's *Russia and Arabia* analyzes Soviet bilateral relations with the regional actors and the patterns of Soviet involvement.[2]

THE COLLAPSE of the regime in Teheran was of enormous importance for all participants in the politics of the Gulf region. For the United States, it represented the loss of a strategic ally in a vital region, and forced a major reevaluation of US foreign policy. For the Soviet Union, it put major economic interests in Iran at risk, but also presented new opportunities for gaining political and military advantages.

Until the fall of the monarchy, the USSR had enjoyed an economic relationship with Iran so extensive that by the 1970's Iran was the largest Third World purchaser of Soviet equipment and machinery.[3] Moreover, the Soviets had loaned Iran

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[1]In 1736, the Persian ruler Nadir Shah invaded Afghanistan and India. In Delhi, he captured the Peacock Throne and brought it back to Iran. The throne has come to symbolize the Iranian monarchy.

[2]It seems odd that none of the books deals with these Middle East actors. Syria and Libya have each provided vitally necessary military assistance to Iran and have championed the Iranian cause in a variety of forums. Despite self-proclaimed radicals and rejectionists, the two countries' support for Iran has isolated them in the Arab world. Saudi Arabia's role deserves long, detailed analysis. As *the* power on the peninsula, its role was pivotal in the creation of the Gulf Council for Cooperation (GCC), its financial assistance invaluable to Iraq (and to Syria), and its ties to the US a valuable entrée for Washington into regional affairs.

[3]Alvin Z. Rubenstein, *Soviet Policy Toward Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan*, New York, Praeger, 1982, p. 77.

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money to build the IGAT-1 pipeline under an agreement by which they would be repaid in shipments of natural gas. This gas was earmarked for Soviet domestic consumption so that Soviet gas could be reserved for export to Eastern Europe. With the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeyni in power, the Soviet Union had to face the potential loss of these investments and economic ties.

Still, the Kremlin could not but be pleased with events in Teheran. Due to the Ayatollah Khomeyni's Islamic revolution in Iran the United States lost its regional policeman and listening post on the Soviet border. Furthermore, the anti-Americanism of the Khomeyni movement kindled Soviet hopes for establishing a congruence of Soviet-Iranian interests that could be used to the Soviet Union's political and military advantage. Thus, for example, when the hostage crisis developed, the Soviets were quick to show sympathy for Iran's position in hopes of winning favor with the Khomeyni regime. The following statement on the Soviet position toward the crisis was run in a *Pravda* commentary: "To be sure, the seizure of the American embassy in and of itself does not conform to the international convention concerning respect for diplomatic privileges and immunity. However, one cannot pull this act out of the context of American-Iranian relations."[4]

For the regional actors, the Shiite revival and its embodiment in a ruling government, coupled with Khomeyni's appeal to the Shiite populations in other states and his criticism of the secularism promoted by Middle Eastern regimes, translated into a challenge to the authority of the ruling regimes. From 1979 on, no Muslim government could afford to ignore the potent political force of the Iranian brand of Islam. Yet, as Michael Sterner points out in his essay, "The Gulf Cooperation Council and Persian Gulf Security" (in Naff), the Gulf states might have moved to mollify the Islamic Republic of Iran, were it not for the outbreak of the Gulf war (p. 14). Today, caught between apprehensions about the Khomeyni revolution and the even greater fear of an emboldened Iran should the Saddam Husayn regime fall in Iraq, rulers in the region are taking into account Iranian sensibilities when dealing with issues of foreign policy.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan further altered the balance of power in the Gulf region. At the very least, Soviet troops were now several hundred kilometers closer to the Gulf. Moreover, the USSR had demonstrated its willingness to intervene with its own troops to save a Third World communist regime.

For policy-makers in Washington, the occupation was yet another major blow to US interests in that region. President Jimmy Carter warned the Soviet Union in his 1980 State of the Union address that "an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force."[5]

The response of the Gulf states to the Soviet invasion—especially when compared to their rather low-key reaction to the 1978 coup that brought the Peoples' Democratic Party of Afghanistan to power—was shrill. Acting through the Islamic Conference Organization (ICO), the Gulf states sharply criticized the action and suspended Afghanistan's membership in the ICO. Ralph Magnus in his essay, "Afghanistan and Gulf Security: A Continuing Relationship" (in Darius et. al.), notes that the invasion was instrumental in forging greater regional cooperation by arousing and confirming "deeply held religious, military-strategic, psychological, and ideological fears" of Soviet ambitions in the region. For the Islamic states, the war in Afghanistan became "a war of national liberation against the Soviet occupying force" (pp. 25, 27). However, the onset of the war between Iran and Iraq complicated the Islamic show of unity and changed again the regional configuration.

A BRIEF examination of the history of relations between Iran and Iraq indicates that the Iran-Iraq war is an expansion of old hostility between the two neighbors, and is rooted in a centuries-old border dispute—dating back at least to the times of Persian Iran and Ottoman Iraq—over who would control the Shatt al-Arab waterway, Iraq's only access to the Gulf. Despite efforts throughout the centuries to settle the dispute through treaties and international agreements, ethnic conflicts and border skirmishes continued between the two countries.

More recently, relations between Iran and Iraq deteriorated due to Iran's abrogation of a bilateral frontier treaty it signed in 1937. As hostilities intensified, Teheran occupied three strategic islands in the Straits of Hormuz: Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb. Baghdad retaliated by expelling 60,000 Iranians from Iraq. Iran responded by providing military support to the Kurds in Iraq who were struggling against the central government in Baghdad.[6]

[4]A. Petrov, "Display Prudence and Restraint," *Pravda*, Dec. 5, 1979, p. 5, in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Vol. 31, No. 49, Jan. 2, 1980, p. 26.

[5]Cited in Benjamin F. Schemmer, "Was the US Ready to Resort to Nuclear Weapons for the Persian Gulf in the 1980s," in *Armed Forces Journal International*, September, 1986, p. 92.

[6]The Kurds are a significant ethnic minority centered in North Eastern Iraq. Over the years they have fought for political independence and have received assistance from the Soviet Union and Iran.

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In 1975, an agreement was finally mediated by Algeria at a meeting of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) held in that country. As a result, the frontier between Iran and Iraq in the Shatt al-Arab waterway was established along the *thalweg* (median); Iran ended its support for the Kurds; Iraq accepted Iran's occupation of the three islands and provided compensation to Iranians expelled from Iraq. This agreement remained in force until 1980.

It is of great importance for Iraq who controls the Shatt. As a glance at a map will reveal, the Shatt al-Arab is vital to Iraq because it links the Persian Gulf with Iraq's major oil port of Basra, some 47 miles up the river. The Baghdad regime's strong psychological and religious vulnerability to the Shiite propaganda emanating from Teheran since 1979 has compounded Iraq's economic and geographic insecurity; after all, President Saddam Husayn is a Sunni Muslim leader of a predominantly Shiite population, and his government espouses a secular socialist ideology. Given these factors, it is not surprising that Baghdad found it increasingly difficult to live with the hostile propaganda emanating from Khomeyni's Iran.

For at least a year prior to the outbreak of war with Iran in September 1980, Baghdad pursued a carefully worked out plan of securing support for its actions and establishing a leadership position for itself in the Gulf. The Iraqis advanced into the territory they had ceded to Iran in 1975, abrogated the 1975 Algiers Accord, and then, on September 22, launched an all-out invasion of Iran.

John Devlin states in his article, "Iraqi Military Policy: From Assertiveness to Defense" (in Naff), that Iraq began the war due to preemptive assertiveness. Apparently, Saddam Husayn counted on the disarray within the Iranian military to work in favor of Iraq. The Iraqis, however, encountered stiff resistance in the area surrounding Abadan and failed to capture Khorramshahr. By November, military positions froze. Then, after a year of stalemate, the Iranians launched several successful counterthrusts.

According to Devlin, Iranian successes have forced the Iraqis to readjust to a defensive position. On the other hand, Christine Helms claims that, from the outset of the war, Iraq pursued only limited objectives. What happened, most probably, was that Husayn seriously misjudged not only the Iranian resistance but also the stability and tenacity of the Khomeyni regime, and has had to reassess his strategy.

Hope for a new mediated settlement to end the current bloodshed is dim in view of Khomeyni's intransigence and his unabated hostility to the Saddam Husayn regime. Although Khomeyni's attitude is understandable given that Iraq expelled Khomeyni, allegedly at the behest of the Shah, in 1978 and that Iraq initiated the war by attacking Iran, it is still difficult to view Khomeyni's repeated statements that the war will not end until Husayn is overthrown as anything but senseless. Khomeyni's position also seems counterproductive and detrimental to Iran in the long run, because it is economically disruptive and seems to perpetuate Iran's political isolation.

In its seventh year, the war between Iran and Iraq has had a profound impact on relations among the Gulf states and has modified perceptions of the Arab-Israeli dispute. In the essay, "The Iran-Iraq War: Conflict, Linkage, and Spillover in the Middle East," John Amos attempts to analyze the links between the two conflicts. He argues (p. 69) that the dispute over the Shatt al-Arab is "imbedded in a series of successively wider conflicts," namely, the religious conflict between Sunni and Shii, and the preexisting fissures in the Arab world, which were exacerbated by the outbreak of the war. As examples, he cites the long-standing rivalry between the Syrian and Iraqi wings of the Ba'ath party[7] that resulted in Syrian backing for Iran in the war, as well as the Syrian sponsorship of Shiite opposition groups in Iraq, and Iraqi support of the fundamentalist Muslim Brotherhood in Syria.

Although it is clear that the war has intensified the factious nature of the Middle East, it has not necessarily done so in the way Amos describes. One can make an equally strong case that the Gulf war has set off a significant shift in Arab alliances, that there currently exist new groupings defined by support for one or the other combatant in the war. On the Iranian side are Syria, Libya, and to a lesser degree, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), and Algeria. Iraq's search for support has brought together Jordan, Morocco, the Gulf States, and Egypt. Cairo's decision to back Iraq, as Philip Stoddard points out in "Egypt and the Iran-Iraq War" (in Naff), stemmed from fundamental differences between Egypt and Iran. Not only did Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat negotiate with Israel, but worse, from the Iranian perspective, he also permitted the Shah to remain in Egypt until the latter's death. Khomeyni's condemnation of Sadat strengthened the Egyptian president's anti-Iranian sentiments. (Although President Hosni Mubarak later avoided his predecessor's anti-Iranian rhetoric,

[7]The Ba'ath or the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party was founded in the early 1940's by Michel Aflaq. Its tenets include land reform, social reform, and Arab unity. The ruling Ba'ath parties in Iraq and Syria are technically the same; however, ideological and political differences over the years have made them arch rivals.

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he continued to provide much needed arms to Baghdad.)

In an essay dealing with the impact of the Gulf war on the Arab-Israeli dispute, Robert Darius analyzes Iranian foreign policy. According to him, current Iranian objectives in the region are to promote fundamentalist revolutions; to urge the overthrow of those regimes seen as secular or pro-Western; and to support the Palestinian cause.

The Ayatollah has achieved none of these goals. Although many states have modified their legal systems to incorporate Islamic law, and fundamentalist opposition groups exist in some states, there have been no other Islamic revolutions. On the political level, the shifts in the Arab world have deflected attention from the Arab-Israeli arena and from the Palestinians. For example, in September 1981, Colonel Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi, with hopes of strengthening anti-American sentiment in the Middle East, invited Iran to participate in a meeting of the Rejectionist Front.[8] Not only did the Iranian presence exacerbate tensions among the members, but Algeria objected to the resulting weakening of the Front's ties with the rest of the Arab world.[9] Furthermore, the war has attenuated the divisions among conservatives, moderates, and radicals. Saddam Husayn's coalition-building strategy has facilitated the reintegration of Egypt into the Arab world and left Syria and Libya on the periphery of Arab politics. Additionally, Baghdad, a former radical, has reestablished diplomatic relations with the United States, and accepted Egypt's return to the Arab fold. These changes have led some Arab states to see Iran as a non-Arab intruder into their politics. As Darius argues, this "could leave a deep scar in Iran's relations with the Arabs" (p. 45).

Today, many of the moderate Arab states maintain cordial relations with the US, and Egypt's status among them indicates that there is tacit acceptance of the peace process with Israel. Indeed, there has been a perceptible increase in cooperation among the Gulf states. Through the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), organized in 1981 at Saudi initiative, the Gulf states have worked together to deal with problems of economic development and security—initially national, but eventually regional as well.[10] They have managed to meet regularly, implement several economic agreements, and hold joint military maneuvers. They have also begun the process of establishing a joint Gulf rapid deployment force. As John Duke Anthony underscores in his brief essay on the GCC (in Darius), the Gulf states have a major impact on the regional balance because they perceive themselves as actors with a unique role in the Arab world.

THE OUTBREAK of war between Iran and Iraq has had an impact on the relations of both superpowers with the belligerents as well as with other regional states. Finding itself in the difficult position of having no normal diplomatic relations with Baghdad and fearing that the war would adversely affect the tortuous negotiations for the release of American hostages held in Teheran, the United States responded to the outbreak of war between Iran and Iraq by beefing up its presence in the Gulf. The perception that the geographic proximity of Soviet forces was tilting the scales in the Kremlin's favor, added to US concern over the war. Within a week after the Iraqi attack, Airborne Warning and Control aircraft (AWAC's) were dispatched to Saudi Arabia. Washington also announced that a guided missile cruiser was being sent to the Gulf, and a flotilla of 60 British, US, French, and Australian warships was assembled in the Indian Ocean.

Alarmed by US moves, and hoping to forestall a buildup of the American presence in the region, General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, while on a trip to India in December 1980, proposed the demilitarization of the Gulf. According to the Soviet plan, foreign powers were to have no military bases in the region.

As the war continued, the USSR found itself caught between its long-term relationship with Iraq and its economic commitment to Iran. Established after the overthrow of the Iraqi monarchy in 1958, Soviet relations with Iraq varied over the years depending on the Baghdad regime's regional politics and its attitudes toward the local communists. The weakening of ties between the USSR and Egypt in the early 1970's led to a significant warming in Iraqi-Soviet relations. In February 1972, Saddam Husayn, then vice-president, went to the USSR to propose that Baghdad and Moscow sign a treaty of friendship and cooperation. Two months later, at a ceremony in Baghdad, Iraq became the third member of the Nonaligned Movement (after Egypt and India) to sign such a treaty with the USSR. Despite that treaty, Iraq continued to be highly independent. It diversified its arms supply, executed the leadership of the Iraqi communist party,

[8]The term "rejectionist" was introduced into Arab parlance after the 1973 Middle East war by Iraq and Libya both of whom objected to any settlement with Israel. The front was formed after Anwar Sadat's trip to Jerusalem in 1977 and took its final form in 1979. It is composed of Syria, Libya, the PDRY, the PLO, and Algeria.

[9]See the discussion in *Middle East Contemporary Survey, 1981-1982*, New York, Holmes and Meier, 1984, p. 245.

[10]As Sterner emphasizes, for the Gulf states, security dilemmas have grown to be two-fold. Not only do many states have reason to fear their Shiite inhabitants' sympathy for Iran and the revolution, or, as in the case of Kuwait, the pressures from the Palestinian worker population, but they also fear the continuation and spreading of the Iran-Iraq war.

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and condemned the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Having ties with both countries, Moscow's policy toward the war had to consist of a careful balancing act. With respect to Iraq, this entailed holding up military shipments to Baghdad during the first winter of the war, while at the same time letting its Warsaw Pact allies increase significantly their military sales to Iraq in a bid to keep the Husayn regime friendly.[11] On the Iranian side, it entailed allowing military assistance to flow through Libya and Syria. The deliveries were of Soviet equipment and it is presumed that the Kremlin approved the transfers.

Although the Soviet arms connection to Iran via Syria and Libya continues, Iran was determined to maintain its distance from both superpowers. Blaming the United States for reimposing the Shah in 1953 and for the excesses of his regime, the Islamic leadership in Teheran worked at destabilizing pro-American states in the Middle East. However, Khomeyni also viewed the Soviets as Satan—albeit a lesser one—and did not refrain from vilifying the Kremlin. The Soviet Union's concern over deteriorating relations was expressed by Pavel Demchenko in *Pravda*:

We know that the Shiite clergymen who hold the reins of government in Iran are not uniform in their political beliefs or social positions. There are various conservative factions. . . with extreme rightwing views. It seems that it is these groups who want to put up obstacles to the expansion of Soviet-Iranian relations even though such action could harm the Iranian economy and Iran's ability to fight imperialist pressure.[12]

The Demchenko article coincided with the beginning of a new stage in the war. The Iranians sent 200,000 troops north toward Iraq, and by May 1982 Iraqi troops were expelled from Khorramshahr. In June, Iraq declared a unilateral ceasefire and withdrawal, but in July, Iranian troops crossed into Iraq. The changes in the military situation created new dilemmas and raised the risks for Moscow: Could the Kremlin afford an Iraqi defeat? Could it live with a victorious Iran?

Doubts about Iranian-Soviet relations coupled with fears about the effects of an Iraqi defeat led to a reinstatement of the Moscow-Baghdad arms connection. Arms deliveries resumed by early fall of 1982. This, in turn, led to a further deterioration in Soviet-Iranian relations. By 1983, Iran had cracked down on the pro-Soviet Tudeh party and had expelled 18 Soviet diplomats.

Soviet support for Iraq did not decrease the wariness with which the Iraqis viewed the Kremlin. Baghdad had already indicated a willingness to reevaluate ties with the United States in early 1981. In an interview published in *The Washington Post* on April 19, 1981, Foreign Minister Tariq 'Aziz had stated that Iraq favored a dialogue with Washington, although a resumption of diplomatic relations was not foreseeable in the near future.[13] Between 1981 and 1984, Baghdad and Washington followed a slow convoluted path toward the normalization of relations. By November 1984, the Husayn regime, apparently hoping to nudge the Soviets, reestablished ties with the United States.

The resumption of US-Iraqi diplomatic relations came at a time when the Soviets appeared to be tilting perceptibly toward Iraq. The Soviet press had called Iraqi attacks on Iranian oil installations justified, while condemning Iran for refusing to accept mediation to end the war. Soviet observers spent considerable energy downplaying the significance of the reestablishment of ties between Washington and Baghdad, treating the move as a mere normalization of relations.

Mikhail Gorbachev's accession to power has introduced a new element into Gulf politics. Greater flexibility in Soviet foreign policy, especially toward the Iran-Iraq war, has been increasingly evident. While tilting toward Iraq, the Kremlin has intensified its contacts with Teheran. Starting in the summer of 1985, economic and diplomatic contacts were being resumed. In February 1986, First Deputy Foreign Minister Georgiy Korniyenko travelled to Teheran: the talks were described as extensive, and they apparently laid the groundwork for expanded economic contacts. (Ironically, it was during this same period that the United States initiated its connection with Teheran.) Despite Soviet displeasure with the Fao[14] offensive, which followed the Korniyenko visit, the contacts were not disrupted. By the end of 1986, the Soviet-Iranian joint economic commission, in recess since 1980, reconvened, and an agreement was reached to

[11]During the first winter of the war, Iraq received 100 T-55 tanks from Poland, Bulgaria, and East Germany. According to TASS, Baghdad also accepted delivery of arms from Somalia, North Yemen, and Egypt, all transshipped through Saudi ports. *Middle East Contemporary Survey, 1980–1981*, New York, Holmes and Meier, 1982, p. 26; and TASS (Moscow), Apr. 23, 1981, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS- SOV*) Apr. 24, 1981, p. H/7.

[12]Pavel Demchenko, "USSR-Iran: In the Interests of Good Neighborliness," in *Pravda*, Mar. 9, 1982, p. 4.

[13]*Washington Post*, Apr. 19, 1981, pp. A1, A20.

[14]In February 1986, Iranian revolutionary guards crossed the Shatt and captured the Fao peninsula. They took the Iraqis, who had been expecting a thrust toward Basra, by surprise. Iranian troops have held on to the territory.

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resume natural gas shipments to the Soviet Union. The Soviet balancing act continues. Arms are transferred to Baghdad, while economic contacts are pursued with Teheran.

The pattern of US relations with Iran and Iraq is less clear. Apparently, Washington, too, has tried to balance its contacts with the two combatants. The revelations of November 1986 that the US had shipped arms to Iran illustrate the Reagan administration's clear desire to reestablish some kind of connection with Teheran. This information plus reports that the United States has provided faulty intelligence to Iraq may have damaged the renewed ties to Baghdad.

IN THE wider context, the United States continues to respond to events by enhancing its naval presence in the region and cultivating the Gulf states. Although the United States maintains diplomatic relations with all Gulf states, and, of course, military cooperation with Oman and Saudi Arabia, there are inherent limits on US policy. Charles MacDonald in his essay "US Policy and Gulf Security" (in Darius) argues that Gulf security is comprised of regional and global balances (p. 98) and that equilibrium on one level may prevent or preclude balance on the other. Washington remains concerned about Soviet threats to the region. The Gulf states, however, remain reluctant to provide the stable military access necessary for an effective US rapid deployment force. As Macdonald writes: "The United States and the Gulf states are well aware that the latter could not defend themselves against a Soviet attack, but the Gulf states remain committed to avoiding a US presence in the Gulf" (p. 108). Not only do the regional actors wish to avoid too close an association with either superpower, but they are also afraid that ties with Israel's strategic ally will compromise the regimes' domestic and foreign standing with other Arab states.

Despite these built-in constraints on US Gulf policy, the Soviets continue to be concerned that the war will facilitate a permanent intrusion of US military power into the region. They fear that the Gulf states will accept a permanent US presence in the region, and that this will allow Washington to recoup the influence it lost when the Shah fell. To forestall such developments, the Kremlin has begun a diplomatic initiative of its own toward the peninsula states.

The history of Soviet involvement with the Gulf states—particularly with the Peoples' Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY or South Yemen) and the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR or North Yemen) —has been relatively long. This subject is well covered in Mark Katz's book *Russia and Arabia*, which provides the background necessary to understand Soviet policy there.

The case history of the YAR is the more interesting and represents an example of long-term and significant Soviet involvement in the area. Yet, Soviet ties with the YAR have not been exclusive. Moscow was directly involved in Yemen's civil war —with Soviet pilots flying missions for the almost defeated (North Yemen) republican forces—but when Marxist-Leninists came to power in Aden, the USSR appeared to choose South Yemen as the more attractive client state. The Soviet Union provided arms for both, but the more sophisticated weapons flowed to the South. In 1972, the YAR moved to reestablish diplomatic relations with Washington and, when fighting again erupted in 1979, the Carter Administration did not hesitate to send US military assistance to North Yemen. At the same time, regime changes in Aden brought to power radical Marxist-Leninists who moved the PDRY closer to Moscow. A Friendship and Cooperation Treaty, permitting the USSR a major presence at Socotra Island, was signed by Moscow and South Yemen in 1979. In an interesting move, the YAR also signed a friendship treaty with Moscow in 1984, but in contrast to the PDRY treaty, it was more a Soviet promise of good relations than a substantial commitment.

The other case studies discussed by Katz are less detailed. This is due in part to the very different nature of Soviet relations with the other peninsula states. For example, Kuwait has long been the sole GCC state that maintained relations with the Soviet Union, and, as such, has been held up by the Kremlin as an example to be followed. Although Kuwait has purchased Soviet arms, and has certainly shared policy perceptions with the Soviets with regard to the Arab-Israeli dispute, it clearly cannot be counted as a part of the Soviet camp. It is a member of the GCC and the Islamic Conference, and it certainly has not implemented the kinds of domestic programs that would merit Soviet approval.

Recently, Kuwait has pursued greater superpower engagement in the region. A staunch supporter of Iraq, it has suffered from Iranian attacks on Gulf shipping and has found itself a target of Shiite terrorism. The continuation of the war poses clear and serious threats for Kuwait and it has turned to the superpowers in the hope that they would force an end to the conflict.

The Kuwaitis first approached the Soviet Union and then the United States about protection for Kuwaiti oil tankers. According to published reports, the US government decided in January 1987 to assist Kuwait; as reports appeared in February of a Soviet offer to lease tankers to Kuwait, the United States has accelerated its involvement. In mid-March, after the Iranians emplaced anti-

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ship missiles along the Straits of Hormuz, US Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger confirmed the US commitment "to do what's necessary to keep the shipping going . . . ."[15] The Soviets, in turn, leased three tankers to Kuwait, and the US agreed to reflag 11 tankers.

Although Soviet involvement with Kuwait provides the legitimation of a Soviet presence in the Gulf long sought by Moscow, it also lays the foundations for a long-term US military presence in the region. Alarmed by the quickness and extent of US responses to Kuwait's request, the Soviets have attempted to downplay their own involvement, while criticizing US plans for reflagging Kuwaiti ships. Soviet propaganda beamed at Iran has alleged that the Soviet Union's involvement is purely commercial while asserting that US actions are intended to exacerbate the conflict.

At present, both superpowers are in a policy bind. Their assistance to Kuwait and assurances of freedom of navigation in the Gulf have angered the Khomeyni regime, which has threatened to retaliate against their increased presence. Spokesmen for the regime have warned that superpower involvement would be a "grave error."[16] In one speech, Iranian President 'Ali Khamene'i stated that neither superpower could truly safeguard shipping, and in another statement, he warned Kuwait against "seeking refuge behind the skirts of the US and the USSR."[17]

Not much can be said about Soviet relations with the other Gulf states since such ties are virtually nonexistent. Indeed, until 1985, the Gulf states—with the already mentioned exception of Kuwait—had no formal ties at all with the Kremlin. Then, in fall 1985, Oman and the United Arab Emirates took out what might be called "reinsurance" policies by establishing relations with Moscow. These relations remain relatively low-key; in fact, Oman has not even agreed to have a Soviet ambassador in permanent residence.

AS RECENT incidents in the Gulf indicate, the prolongation of the war is fraught with dangers for all concerned. For Washington, still feeling the effects of the Iran-Contra affair, the war offers no easy options. Relations with Iraq are cool, and ties to Teheran, nonexistent. The US attempt to curry favor in Iran with the transfer of arms has failed, and there is little likelihood of an improvement in relations as long as the current regime is in power in Teheran.

For Moscow, the Iran-Iraq war has also had negative consequences. First, since the beginning of substantial Soviet involvement in the Middle East, the Soviets have pushed for the creation of a united anti-Israeli and anti-American Arab front. The exacerbation of intra-Arab conflicts has clearly hindered this policy. Second, the Kremlin leadership resented its exclusion from the Middle East peace process and, therefore, gave its support to those Arab forces that opposed the US-brokered Camp David Accords and banished Egypt from the Arab League and the ICO. Iraqi moderation and Egypt's reentry into the Arab fold and the consequent emergence of a strengthened moderate camp have limited the Soviet Union's leverage.

Moreover, despite renewed economic and diplomatic contacts with Teheran, Moscow felt impelled in early 1987 to tilt toward Iraq. Calling for a negotiated end to the war, it implicitly denounced in a front page *Izvestiya* editorial Iran's determination to overthrow the Saddam Husayn regime.[18]

More recently, however, Moscow has apparently reversed its pro-Iraq stance by condemning Iraq's renewal of the tanker war and supporting the Iranian position in the UN Security Council. It has also signed a new pipeline agreement with the Khomeyni government. Not only have these actions upset the Iraqis, but they have aroused Arab anger. Clearly, the balancing act is becoming increasingly difficult for the Soviet Union.

Soviet calls to end the war appear genuine. Kremlin spokesmen have called for UN efforts to terminate the conflict. In an interview, Aleksandr Ivanov, chief of the Arab Gulf section in the Middle East and North Africa Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry said:

The UN and the Security Council should play a special and distinguished role . . . by issuing a resolution calling for a ceasefire and withdrawal to international borders . . . . The Security Council has the power to force the two sides to a ceasefire and has the means to protect security and navigation in the Gulf, even if circumstances dictate that UN forces be formed for this purpose.[19]

He also warned Iran that the USSR would retaliate if its ships in the Gulf were attacked.

Indeed, the UN Security Council has passed a new resolution, backed by both superpowers, calling for an end to the war. Official Soviet statements praise the UN action, urge the Secretary General to do everything in his power to implement the resolution, and condemn US naval activity in the Gulf.

[15] AP Wire, Mar. 23, 1987.

[16] A summary of a speech by President 'Ali Khamene'i in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Middle East and Africa* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-MEA*), Apr. 27, 1987, p. ii.

[17] Ibid.

[18] *Izvestiya*, Jan. 8, 1987, p. 1.

[19] *Al Ra'y Al 'Amm* (Kuwait), June 1, 1987, p. 19 trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, June 8, 1987, p. E/2–E/3.

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It is important to remember that, for the Soviets, an Iranian victory would lengthen the shadow cast by Islamic fundamentalism and Iraq's defeat would damage their standing as a supporter of the Arabs. But an Iraqi victory would enhance Iraqi independence and render Baghdad even less pliable than it is today.

The best conclusion to the conflict, from the Soviet point of view, would be a mediated settlement and a return to the status quo ante. Moscow has indicated that it would like to play a mediator's role, as it had in the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war. In June, Deputy Foreign Minister Yuliy Vorontsov travelled to Teheran and to Baghdad. The Gulf press accounts made it clear that he was attempting to broker an agreement. The Soviet proposal reportedly calls for an end to the tanker war, negotiations to be held in Moscow, and UN aid to the belligerents for rebuilding their war-devastated countries. It was also reported that, despite Iranian objections to parts of the plan, the trip was generally viewed positively by the Gulf states.[20]

Barring a mediated settlement, it seems safe to predict that the war will indeed continue with Iranian offensives, Iraqi counterattacks, and threats to close the Straits of Hormuz. This is, however, an increasingly dangerous scenario for the two superpowers. Not least among the concerns of US and Soviet policymakers is the impact of domestic instability within the Gulf states. Moscow has already learned the potential costs of such upheaval as a result of the January 1986 events in the PDRY.[21] Then the USSR was caught between two factions, one more orthodox than the other, fighting for power in Aden. Although in the end the USSR did not lose, the potential damage to Moscow's fortunes was considerable. The US, with its stake in on-going relations with the conservative sheikhdoms and with the monarchy in Saudi Arabia, has reasons to fear insurgencies against, or the overthrow of, these regimes.

Both superpowers need to proceed warily. Indeed as nearly all of the authors discussed here point out, the impact of any action must be weighed carefully and analyzed on several different levels.

[20]Radio Monte Carlo, citing Gulf reports, June 17, 1987, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, June 18, 1987, p. K/1.

[21]See David Pollock, "Moscow and Aden: Coping With a Coup," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), May–June, 1986.

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